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Abstract 
 Travel Warnings and Travel Alerts are documents issued by the United States 
Department of State to inform U.S. citizens traveling to other countries about the safety 
conditions of the desired destination. Travel Warnings are created for protracted conditions while 
Travel Alerts are meant for temporary circumstances. Scant research exists about official State 
Department travel advice, and there is an absence of knowledge about its components. This 
qualitative study seeks to answer the questions, what is the nature of State Department Travel 
Warnings and Alerts and what is their function? This study explores and seeks to describe the 
nature of Travel Warnings and Alerts and analyzes their function. The qualitative research design 
employs content analysis of archived Travel Warnings and Alerts and is anchored in Social 
Construction Theory, which provides a framework for understanding the social construction of 
target populations. This study then asks, is there a relationship between how a foreign country is 
socially constructed from the perspective of the United States and the issuance of State 
Department Travel Warnings and Alerts? Social Construction Theory is extended here to 
countries of the world and shows that there is indeed a relationship between the issuance of 
Travel Warnings and Alerts and the foreign countries for which they are issued based on their 
social construction. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Travel Warnings and Alerts 
On December 20, 1988, the U.S. Department of State made a new telephone hotline 
available. Using a touch-tone menu, U.S. citizen travelers could listen to a recording to learn 
whether or not there was an advisory about travel to a given country. Unbeknownst to most 
citizens, these advisories were routinely available to the public for the previous ten years, but 
only if passport applicants happened to look at a passport center bulletin board or a discerning 
travel agent volunteered to mention it (Wade, 1989). The day after the new voice recording went 
live, the State Department was overwhelmed with calls about travel safety, but not because word 
had traveled fast about the new user-friendly system. Rather, a detonated Semtex bomb had 
caused Pan Am flight 103 to explode over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing 270 people; 179 of them 
were American (Wade, 1989; Stottlemyre, 2011). 
 Foreign ministries or foreign offices, as State Department equivalents are termed 
throughout the world, have been generating and providing travel advisories of some kind to their 
citizens for decades. The United States may be one of the first governments on record to do so at 
the outset of World War I, having released a warning “…to the general public, advising in 1914 
against travel to the European belligerents” (Lowenheim, 2007, p. 210). A first notice was issued 
for Americans already in Europe, ordering them to register with the nearest U.S. consular 
outpost, a practice that is still advised today through a registration system on the State 
Department website. Following that first notice in 1914 was another publication that advised all 
Americans to avoid non-essential travel to such countries “and warned them against unneutral 
conduct if they should go” (Riesman, 1940, p. 822). Advisories such as these continued to be 
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published over the years, but not for regular, public consumption. Instead, they were sporadic 
and meant only for government personnel (Lowenheim, 2007).  
Definitions 
 Today’s advisories are now easily accessible on the State Department’s website. They are 
divided into two categories: Travel Warnings and Travel Alerts. A Travel Warning is the more 
serious and enduring type among the two and is meant for protracted, negative conditions. The 
Office of American Citizen Services and Crisis Management produces the content of these 
communications and writes:  
We issue a Travel Warning when we want you to consider very carefully whether you 
should go to a country at all. Examples of reasons for issuing a Travel Warning might 
include unstable government, civil war, ongoing intense crime or violence, or frequent 
terrorist attacks. We want you to know the risks of traveling to these places and to 
strongly consider not going to them at all. Travel Warnings remain in place until the 
situation changes; some have been in effect for years (travel.state.gov, 2015).  
 
The Travel Alert is designed for recent changes in conditions that State anticipates will be 
temporary. The State Department tells citizens:  
We issue a Travel Alert for short-term events we think you should know about when 
planning travel to a country. Examples of reasons for issuing a Travel Alert might include 
an election season that is bound to have many strikes, demonstrations, or disturbances; a 
health alert like an outbreak of H1N1; or evidence of an elevated risk of terrorist attacks. 
When these short-term events are over, we cancel the Travel Alert (travel.state.gov, 
2015). 
 
Official Travel Advice Today 
At any given time, there may be dozens of Travel Warnings on the State Department 
website and a smaller amount of alerts. Using mid 2015 as a snapshot, there were Travel 
Warnings for 38 countries and Travel Alerts for only six listed on http://travel.state.gov. Visiting 
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the State Department website, a reader would notice common components across Travel 
Warnings that the State Department deems important enough for the citizen traveler to know. 
Every Travel Warning and Alert include contact information and the location of U.S. embassies 
and consulates in the given country. Most advise that travelers continue to monitor current events 
in the country to which they wish to travel.  
Alerts cover a wide range of situational and short-term circumstances and include an 
expiration date. For instance, a 2015 Travel Alert for Burundi concerned its legislative and 
presidential election season during the early summer. It emphasized the likelihood of protests 
and violence during that period and was scheduled to expire in September 2015, asking 
Americans to “avoid political rallies, demonstrations, polling stations, and crowds of any kind in 
the weeks before and after the elections” (travel.state.gov, 2015). Another document was for 
three countries in West Africa and “alert[ed] U.S. citizens to screening procedures, travel 
restrictions, and reduced aviation transportation options in response to the outbreak of Ebola” 
(travel.state.gov, 2015). It was scheduled to expire in early June 2015. An Alert for Burkina Faso 
describes the resignation of its president during fall 2014 and the unknown nature of the 
transitional government. Finally, an Alert about the South Pacific tropical cyclone season asked 
Americans to monitor weather reports and went into detail about travel insurance and evacuation 
(travel.state.gov, 2015). 
Travel Warnings begin with a description of circumstances that justify warning U.S. 
citizens to defer non-essential travel. In fact, the phrase and recommendation to defer non-
essential travel is a regular component across the Warnings and Alerts for 2015, and it seems 
that State does not appear to expressly forbid Americans from traveling to foreign countries. 
Sometimes State will express that embassy and consular services are limited and that U.S. 
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personnel may not be able to assist a U.S. traveler in his or her time of need. A Warning may be 
generated for a clear and present danger, which could include war or terrorism. A 2015 Travel 
Warning for Syria provides details about the all-consuming civil war there. The document for 
Nigeria brings attention to the reign of terror upon the people by the paramilitary group, Boko 
Haram (travel.state.gov, 2015). Other circumstances described in the Warnings may include 
petty crime, violent crime, sexual assault, homicide, gun battles, drug violence, highway robbery, 
carjacking, and kidnapping (travel.state.gov, 2015). Categories of crime can become very 
specific, such as the types of kidnapping. The Travel Warning for Mexico classifies kidnapping 
as traditional, express, or virtual. Traditional kidnapping refers to an abduction that continues 
until ransom is paid. An express kidnapping is a temporary abduction in which, for example, a 
perpetrator may highjack a victim’s car and hold that person captive until he or she drives to an 
ATM to withdraw funds and hand them over to the captor. A virtual kidnapping occurs when 
money is extorted for the release of a victim who was never kidnapped in the first place 
(travel.state.gov, 2015). The casual American traveler may not have known that kidnapping was 
a problem in Mexico prior to reading the Warning, let alone know that three types of kidnapping 
existed in the first place.  
The criteria for Warnings are not limited to crime. The Travel Warning for Nepal is 
expressly in response to the 7.8 earthquake it experienced in April 2015. The fact that it is a 
Warning and not an Alert indicates that State anticipates that conditions, services, infrastructure, 
disease, access to healthcare, access to clean food and water, and safety are severe to the extent 
that a protracted call for deferring non-essential travel to that country is warranted 
(travel.state.gov, 2015). In other cases, it may be that the U.S. does not have “diplomatic or 
consular relations” in a certain country and that elements in said country may be “hostile to the 
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United States”, such as the Warnings for Iran and North Korea (travel.state.gov, 2015). Note that 
it is not against U.S law to travel to those countries as an American; the danger is that the 
American traveler may not be able to return home to the U.S.  
Prolonged Travel Warnings are not just reserved for countries hostile to the U.S.; 
conversely, a Warning could be issued and stay active for years in a country that is a close U.S. 
ally, such as Israel. While Israel is actually a generally safe place (outside the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip), the Travel Warning focuses on Israel’s hostile neighbors and the potential for 
sporadic, sudden, and severe violence, such as missiles being launched into the country from 
Gaza, Lebanon, or Syria, among other countries. It also includes a language about U.S. citizens 
of Arab or Muslim heritage being singled out by security personnel at Israel’s airports, causing 
those travelers “significant difficulties in entering or exiting” the country (travel.state.gov, 2015). 
Travel Warnings often include the geography of concern. The document may be a blanket 
warning for the entire country, such as the one for Afghanistan, where “no province…should be 
considered immune from violence or crime…” (travel.state.gov, 2015). The State Department 
knows where Americans like to travel, and it appears that in a country like Mexico where 
Americans visit regularly, the Travel Warning is designed to describe the security and safety 
situation state by state, even neighborhood by neighborhood. One line of the Warning states, for 
example, “In Acapulco, defer non-essential travel to areas further than two blocks inland of the 
Costera Miguel Aleman Boulevard, which parallels the popular beach areas” (travel.state.gov, 
2015).  
There are miscellaneous circumstances, as well. A Travel Warning may include 
information about a safety or legal curfew in a given destination. The potable condition of the 
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water supply might be described. The mode of transportation one should use to travel to a 
country may be specified. Using the Acapulco example again, the State Department explains that 
even its own personnel are allowed to travel there only by plane or cruise ship because the 
highways into that city are not secure from highway robbery, violence, and high jacking 
(travel.state.gov, 2015). There are country facts—a traveler, for example, may not have known 
that “Honduras has had one of the highest murder rates in the world for the last five years” 
(travel.state.gov, 2015). Americans may not realize that Ebola still rages through Sierra Leone, 
or that Haiti has a “weak emergency response infrastructure” (travel.state.gov, 2015). To be sure, 
there is a lot that U.S. citizen travelers do not know about the countries of the world, and they 
may not even know the State Department has a resource to guide them. 
Travelers 
It is difficult to know how many U.S. citizens are reading Travel Warnings and Alerts 
and even more difficult to know if they are heeding the State Department’s advice. In 2011, a 
State Department spokesman named John Echard “acknowledged that the State Department does 
not have the technology to track or gauge how many people are reading their travel warnings” 
(msnbc.com, 2015). Even if it did, tracking who reads its travel advice is not the same as 
knowing who follows the advice. It begs the question, who is consuming State Department 
Travel Warnings and Alerts, and how are they using them?  Some citizen travelers and 
vacationers may be using them, and aid and development workers may use them, too (Briggs, 
2002). Entities that have a moral, legal, and financial interest in protecting individuals they send 
abroad, such as travel operators and agencies, corporations, and educational institutions make 
use of them (Friend, 2011; Lowenheim, 2007). The descriptions of Travel Warnings and Alerts 
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above are from one snapshot in time in 2015, and it provides a glimpse of the type of content 
during one contemporaneous moment.  
Statement of the Problem 
Much less is known about historical Travel Warning content and if and how it may have 
changed over time. There is no compilation and analysis of historical U.S. Department of State 
Travel Warnings. They are not archived in the State Department library or, for that matter, in the 
National Archives (J. Sherer, personal communication, January 20, 2015; D. Langbart, personal 
communication, January 28, 2015). There is no study that reports on the composition and content 
of historical Travel Warnings. There is not a published index of Travel Warnings revealing to an 
inquirer any details about the collective body of travel advice. 
 The dearth of information about Travel Warnings and Alerts generates questions.  Some 
researchers ask if all travel advice is created equally. Sharpley, Sharpley, and Adams (1996, p. 6) 
suggest that by leveraging the economic power of tourism, governments can use foreign office 
travel advice as a sanctioning effect “for political ends”. Travel Warnings and Alerts could 
therefore be used as an “international disciplinary mechanism” (Lowenheim, 2007, p. 207). Bias 
and prejudice may also play a role, such as the otherness of non-Western countries and cultures, 
with or without intent. Conversely, allied countries may be treated differently in times of crisis, 
whether brief or protracted (Lowenheim, 2007). Close allies may not be issued a Travel Warning 
when another country would be issued one under similar circumstances. That is not the case with 
U.S. ally and partner, Israel, which has been under a U.S. Travel Warning for many years. While 
it is more likely that most travel advice issued by the State Department is meant to protect its 
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citizen travelers, no one has taken the time to show it methodically. The research is limited, 
parceled, and mixed, and there has not been a comprehensive study of these documents. 
Purpose of the Study 
 The purpose of this theoretically guided, qualitative analysis (Yin, 2014) is to explore 
official Travel Warning and Alert documents created and disseminated by the United States 
Department of State. At this stage of the research, a Travel Warning and Travel Alert are defined 
as official travel advice issued by the Department of State for U.S. travelers visiting countries 
that may, respectively, have protracted or temporary conditions, which may be unsafe to the 
extent that a deferral of non-essential travel or travel of any kind is warranted. The context of this 
study on the macro level is international in scope, but on the micro level is the U.S. Department 
of State and the presidential administration under which it served. The data studied is archived 
Travel Warnings and Alerts issued from 1994 through 2014, focusing on six years each of the 
Clinton, Bush, and Obama Administrations, respectively. This 18-year span will cover the 
administrations of three U.S. presidents, and this timeframe is chosen simply to capture the 
census of official travel advice that is available. The study is meant to describe the nature of 
Travel Warning and Alerts—their components, content, frequency, quantity, duration active, and 
subject countries. This study is anchored in Social Construction Theory, a framework that helps 
understand the social construction of target populations in democratic policy design. The target 
population for this study is the country for which a Travel Warning or Alert is issued. This study 
shows that there is a relationship between the social construction of foreign countries and the 
issuance of Travel Warnings and Alerts. 
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 There is little research about official State Department travel advice, calling for the need 
for the exploration this study undertakes. Further, there is no official archive of State Department 
travel advice in the State Department Library or the National Archives (J. Sherer, personal 
communication, January 20, 2015; D. Langbart, personal communication, January 28, 2015). 
Travel Warnings and Alerts are available on the State Department website, but only those that 
are currently active. A non-profit organization called the Internet Archive, however, exists to 
catalog websites over time. The Internet Archive calls its search engine The Way Back Machine, 
seeming to borrow from the Rocky and Bullwinkle cartoons. To use this search engine, the 
inquirer types in the URL of a given website of interest. The results show the frequency the 
Internet Archive crawled that website during a given year and what years the site was archived. 
When entering the URL http://travel.state.gov, it is revealed that that website is archived back to 
1996, but shows Travel Warnings in 1996 from as far back as 1994. In this way, clicking on 
archived web pages of travel.state.gov since 1996 can one find Travel Warnings and Alerts 
issued by the U.S. Department of State. This is the only known public source of archived Travel 
Warnings and Alerts. 
Methods 
 The research methodology for this study consists of a qualitative content analysis of the 
text of Travel Warnings and Alerts. Because this research is informed by Social Construction 
Theory, the research design employs principles from Yin’s Case Study Research: Design and 
Methods (2014) to enhance reliability and validity. The data will be managed using ATLAS.ti 
software, which is a text management program that aids the researcher in coding, organizing, and 
mapping content.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The State Department and Policy 
 Social Construction Theory is a theory of public policy. Applying it here is to assume that 
the State Department is a policy-making entity, which it is. In the early years of the United 
States’ new government and up through the World Wars, though, the role of the Secretary of 
State and the Department of State were in line with the country’s isolationist priorities. Simpson 
(1967, p. 3) writes: 
Our relations with the rest of the world came more and more to be those of an aloof 
spectator. Observation, not action; reportage, not maneuver; the following of day-to-day 
events, not the mapping of large strategy and tactics, came to typify our stance overseas. 
Our diplomatic representatives were generally expected to remain on the sidelines, 
keeping Washington informed but avoiding a tricky business at which others were 
considered more adept and which others seemed to need more than we. It was thus that 
our diplomats came to be officially described as “the eyes and ears of our Government 
abroad.” Their tools were little more than a pair of eyes, a pair of ears and a quill. 
 
 Isolationism became less tenable or sustainable with the advent of World War I. The 
United States was thrust into international affairs and geopolitics in a violent way. Still, it was 
not until after World War II that U.S. diplomacy moved far beyond a spectator sport. When 
Congress passed the Marshall Plan to rebuild devastated Europe, it “implied active involvement 
in the affairs of recipient countries” (Warwick, 1975, p. 17). The subsequent Cold War brought 
domestic and foreign policy together in a new way as the United States assumed its role as one of 
the great powers. Warwick (1975, p. 17) explains: 
These developments and the U.S. position of dominance in the world affairs placed a 
heavy burden on the State Department and the Foreign Service. The new demands also 
clashed with some of the most venerable traditions in diplomacy. One of the strictest 
rules in the diplomatic code, for instance, is that the diplomat is a guest who is not to 
interfere in the political life of his host. 
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 This contrast from observational diplomacy to an integrative one changed the role of the 
State Department. As the United States assumed a larger presence and advanced its interests on 
the global stage, the State Department was well placed to create and exercise policy. Indeed, 
shortly after President Truman installed General Marshall as Secretary of State, Marshall created 
in 1947 the Policy Planning Staff (Acheson, 1969). His Undersecretary at the time and later 
Secretary of State, Dean Acheson (1969, p. 214), wrote in his memoir, Present at the Creation, 
that General Marshall... 
 …conceived this group as being able to look ahead, not into the distant future, 
but beyond the vision of the operating officers caught in the smoke and crises of 
current battle; far enough ahead to see the emerging form of things to come and 
outline what should be done to meet or anticipate them.  
 
This group is still in place today, and its current mission “is to take a longer term, strategic view 
of global trends and frame recommendations for the Secretary of State to advance U.S. interests 
and American values” (state.gov, 2015). Indeed, the Policy Planning Staff may be one of the 
most enduring and important policy offices in the federal government (Pugliaresi & Berliner, 
1989). It has influenced foreign policy over decades. Its founding director and career foreign 
officer, George F. Kennan, had accurately and singly reported his prediction of Stalin’s true 
intentions after World War II when he was Deputy Chief of Mission serving in Moscow 
(Pugliaresi & Berliner, 1989). This propelled him into his founding policy position at State, and 
he and his staff became important contributors to post-war foreign policy. Over time, the Policy 
Planning Staff became even more involved in policy execution. In the early years of the Cold 
War, the staff was involved in “policy development on the implications of the Korean War, 
German rearmament, the Iranian oil dispute, the impact of thermonuclear weapons, and the 
periodic foreign exchange crises” (Pugliaresi & Berliner, 1989, p. 385). Its power waxed and 
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waned over the years, being reconstituted during the Nixon Administration and renamed during 
the Reagan Administration. Some Secretaries of State elevated Policy Planning Staff into 
prominence, such as under Kissinger, while others did not. Overall, it remained influential and 
relevant from its inception (Pugliaresi & Berliner, 1989). Today, its original name is restored, 
and its daily work is divided into seven areas: Analysis, Special Projects, Policy Coordination, 
Policy Articulation, Liaison, Planning Talks, and Dissent (state.gov, 2015).  
 In 2015, the stated mission of the U.S. Department of State was to “Create a more secure, 
democratic, and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people and the international 
community” (state.gov, 2015). Warwick (1975, p. 85), provided a more nuanced assessment: 
Measured by its formal goals, the State Department’s most significant product is an 
elusive compound called “foreign policy.” State is also responsible for a variety of 
additional outputs, including support services for other agencies, passports, visas, 
educational exchange programs, and miscellaneous services to U.S. travelers. But in the 
local ethos, policy towers above all else. The problem is that it is not clear just what 
policy is, or who makes it. It may consist in formal decision and explicit plans of action 
or it may be a vaguely formulated set of attitudes toward another country or even an 
implicit decision to ignore a certain issue. Moreover, in State as elsewhere, policy is 
made at all levels of the organization, not only at the top. A consular official’s decision to 
refuse a visa to a student activist in Latin America is as much an expression of U.S. 
foreign policy as formal proclamations opposing student radicalism. 
 
 Establishing the State Department’s policy influence is important. It is easy to assume 
that the State Department or a foreign ministry of a given country is defined solely by its service 
to citizens and immigrants. After all, they create and issue passports for their citizens and 
provide consular support to them while traveling abroad. They staff consulates and embassies, 
where foreign nationals go to apply for visas to travel to the issuing country. Such descriptions, 
however, are superficial compared to the actual role of agencies such as the State Department. 
The State Department has true policy influence at all levels of its organization. If policy 
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decisions are made at all levels at State, as Warwick (1975) writes, then even the Travel Warning 
is a policy tool. It is in this context that this paper proceeds in its exploration of official State 
Department travel advice. 
Travel Warning Research 
  Scholarly research on State Department or other foreign ministry travel advice is limited 
and considerably so when focusing on the U.S. State Department, specifically. Still, some work 
has been done, and it is reviewed here. While it was mentioned before that the United States may 
have been one of the first countries to issue a Travel Warning in 1914 as a prelude to World War 
I (Lowenheim, 2007: Riesman, 1940), that Warning was not made as part of a formal program of 
routinely disseminated risk communication to the traveling public. Rather, the State Department 
did not implement a structured Travel Warning program for dissemination to the general public 
until 1978 (Friend, 2011). “At that time, bulletins in the form of Notices, Cautions, Public 
Announcements, and warnings were issued to airlines, travel agencies, and passport processing 
centers for dissemination to their clients (Friend, 2011, p. 3).” Guidelines for what content would 
be disseminated to whom, however, was not sophisticated. For example, the Federal Aviation 
Authority disseminated intelligence in December 1988 “regarding an anonymous but credible 
threat to a Pan Am flight out of Frankfurt, Germany” (Friend, 2011, p. 3). State alerted several 
embassies, but not the public; the consequences were severe.  
Years of discussion about what type of security threats would be unclassified and 
released to the public ensued (Friend, 2011). Finally, in 1990, “Congress passed the Aviation 
Security Improvement Act that in Section 109, added a requirement to the Federal Aviation Act 
that the President ‘develop guidelines for ensuring notification to the public of threats to civil 
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aviation in appropriate cases” (Friend, 2011, p. 3). As a result of this Act, State created the “No 
Double Standard Policy” (Friend, 2011, p. 3). This meant that what State would do for the public 
in the context of aviation, they would also do for all other non-aviation contexts. Its mechanism 
for dissemination of that information was a more robust travel advice system, including Travel 
Warnings and Alerts as well as country profiles (Friend, 2011).  
The need for travel advice from government remains relevant. From 2009 through 2011, 
approximately “2,773 U.S. citizens died from non-natural causes, such as injuries and violence, 
while in foreign countries (excluding deaths occurring in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan)” 
(cdc.gov, 2015). Causes of death during that time included motor vehicle accidents (27 percent), 
homicides (22 percent), suicides (14 percent), and drowning (12 percent); disaster, aviation, 
drug-related instances, and other miscellaneous instances are the remaining causes of death 
(cdc.gov, 2015). As for severe injuries, those included “natural disasters, aviation accidents, 
drugs, terrorism, falls, burns, and poisoning” (cdc.gov, 2015).  While men die in higher 
frequency than women abroad, women are more likely to be victims of acquaintance rape and 
sexual assault (cdc.gov, 2015). Keeping American travelers safe is clearly a problem. Despite 
evolving sophistication in providing detailed Travel Warnings to the public, the issue remains 
that potential travelers are either not reading or not heeding Travel Warnings and Alerts prior to 
departure.  
Briggs (2002) studied travel advice issued by the British Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FCO), which is the State Department equivalent for the United Kingdom. She draws 
attention to British travelers falling into a more frequent incidence of trouble abroad, including 
imprisonment, death, hospitalization, or the much less severe loss of passport (Briggs, 2002). She 
finds that the less developed a country is, the more likely a British traveler will experience 
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trouble of some kind. At the time of her study, British travelers were not making use of FCO 
travel advice, and advice was not getting to those who needed it. “Checking Foreign Office 
travel advice should become as natural as checking that you have your passport, tickets and 
foreign currency before travelling abroad (Briggs, 2002, p. 5).” Briggs (2002, p. 5) posed an 
interesting question: “When travelers have ignored official advice and ended up in trouble, 
should diplomatic resources be spent trying to get them out?” After all, if one’s government has 
recommended a traveler not visit a given country, it may be frustrating for consular support to 
exert financial and human resources sorting out a traveler’s avoidable misfortune. She also 
addressed that British travelers have many misconceptions about travel and safety abroad. First, 
one-fifth of surveyed British travelers were uninsured, while half believed that consular 
personnel could secure their release from custody if arrested. As for misconceptions, one-third 
believed consulates and embassies could issue temporary loans, and one-fifth believed they 
would have access to better healthcare treatment than locals (Briggs, 2002).  
Better informed travelers make for safer travels—of course, not all unsafe conditions can 
be avoided, like natural disasters or unexpected political strife or terrorist activity. However, 
safety information about most countries is readily available and accessible and making informed 
choices can easily help travelers avoid harm. Briggs (2002, p. 12) writes:  
Tom Hargrove was an agricultural scientist working in Colombia when he was kidnapped 
by the guerilla group the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Driving to 
work he was met by a crossroads and a choice: he could either drive through the busy, 
congested streets of Cali in the rush-hour or take the scenic route and, as he says, “This 
was the last decision I made for the next 12 months.” His car was stopped shortly down 
the road at a roadblock and he was taken away by the guerrillas at gunpoint. The risk of 
kidnapping in Colombia is clear in travel advice about the country, especially the fact that 
kidnappings usually take place, not in Colombia’s violent cities, but in the countryside 
around them. If Tom had known this, his decision that morning might have been 
different. 
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Travel risk will vary depending on the type of travel, whether travel is for vacation with a tour 
operator, independent, for business, or as an aid or development worker (Briggs, 2002). Formal 
tours tend to be the safest. Independent and business travel increases in risk commensurate with 
the level of development in the country visited. Aid and development workers are usually at the 
most risk (Briggs, 2002). Still, official travel advice exists specifically to protect citizen 
travelers, and they and sponsoring institutions can make use of them. 
Friend (2011) writes that Travel Warnings can be used to develop effective response 
procedures for educational institutions and other organizations that send individuals or groups 
abroad. She lays out a ten step program for institutions to use Travel Warnings for risk 
assessment and response. They include an institution’s appetite for risk, assessment of the 
sophistication of travelers, how to balance Travel Warnings with media reports and reports from 
the ground, and working with partner institutions abroad, among other steps (Friend, 2011).  
Freedman (2005) writes about the politics of warning and the balance between 
combatting terrorism and communicating risk to the public. Indeed, Travel Warnings and Alerts 
serve an important purpose in creating an informed citizen traveler. The U.S. government has 
resources and personnel on the ground in almost all countries around the world, and they assume 
an appropriate role as risk communicator when informing the public about international travel 
conditions. Risk communication is “intended to supply laypeople with information they need to 
make informed, independent judgments about risks to health, safety, and the 
environment”…from … “authoritative and trustworthy sources” (Morgan, 2002, p. 4). 
Freedman (2005) articulates that communicating risk to the public through Travel 
Warning mechanisms can be delicate. In some instances, one government may not desire 
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creating hysteria or offending another government. Also, governments have dual interests in 
protecting their citizens from terrorism and also stopping it. Tipping off would-be terrorists that a 
government knows of their intentions could result in losing the opportunity to bring those 
terrorists to justice while catching them in the act. Conversely, perpetrators may react by 
scuttling their plans for mayhem if they see their intentions are known, resulting in no incident, 
and consequently weakening the power and credibility of future Travel Warnings (Freedman, 
2005).  
In a case study of the bombing of the tourist resort in Bali, Indonesia in 2002, Freedman 
(2005) found that the State Department had travel advisories to the effect that Americans should 
avoid all non-essential travel to Indonesia, citing potential for civil and ethnic violence, 
kidnapping, and terrorist activity in areas outside of Bali. The U.S. was particularly sensitive to 
terrorist activity and how it communicated risk level to Americans in the aftermath of the 
September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York. While the U.S. had shared 
intelligence with the Australian and British foreign ministries about Indonesia, neither of these 
countries issued similar Travel Warnings of their own. Consequently, when the bomb was 
detonated at the Indonesian resort, 88 Australians and 26 Britons of the total 200 victims were 
killed (Freedman, 2005). While a small amount of Americans also lost their lives, surviving 
family members of Australian and British victims expressed anger at being let down by their 
governments’ failure to provide warnings about the danger of traveling to Bali (Freedman, 
2005). Travelers felt that their countries had a responsibility to keep them informed.  
Lowenheim (2007, p. 1) wrote of Travel Warnings from the perspective of a 
government’s duty to “responsibilize” its citizenry. Responsibilization, a concept that emerged in 
social science literature in the mid-1990s, “is the process whereby the state encourages or even 
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impels people and communities to acknowledge—and assume—a responsibility to govern their 
own risks” (Lowenheim, 2007, p. 204). He identifies three modes of responsibilization: 
1. A government divests itself from the role of welfare state through privatization of 
services and public-private partnerships to manage risk. For example, privatizing security 
services or healthcare may cause citizens to take a more active role in their security and 
health; 
2.  A government links citizen conduct to access of government services. For example, a 
citizen may need to be drug free in order to receive welfare benefits; 
3. A government produces and disseminates knowledge about risk to its people, so they may 
be able to make informed choices about the consequences of their conduct (Lowenheim, 
2007). 
It is primarily in this third area that the author focuses his research on foreign office travel 
advice. He interprets “the practice of travel warning as a state effort to regulate transborder travel 
by responsibilizing the traveling citizen” (Lowenheim, 2007, p. 204). The author explains that 
the state has numerous reasons for responsibilizing its citizens in this way. First, there is the 
moral and ethical interest of keeping its citizens alive and well for their own sake and the sake of 
their loved ones. There is, also, a material interest for the state and citizen. It is simpler and 
requires fewer material and human resources to encourage a citizen to make responsible choices 
about travel safety before they embark than it would to assist a citizen while traveling abroad. 
When it comes to citizen travel, in other words, “prevention is better than cure” (Briggs, 2002, p. 
6). If a citizen traveler is arrested, consular personnel are sent from the embassy of that person’s 
home country to meet them at their place of incarceration and to work with local authorities to 
assure that his or her rights according to the host country’s laws are being met. Legal cases can 
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be a drain on embassy personnel and may result in the extra cost of employee overtime 
compensation. In some cases of natural disaster, war, or other violence, an embassy may be 
ordered to evacuate its expatriates out of the country. For instance, the State Department was 
responsible for evacuating approximately 15,000 Americans from Lebanon during the summer of 
2006 when war broke out there between Israel and Hezbollah (gao.gov, 2007). In that case, the 
evacuation was so massive that State had to cede control of operations to the Department of 
Defense and stopped having evacuees sign promissory notes for eventual repayment of 
evacuation costs (gao.gov, 2007). Other reasons for responsibilizing the citizen through 
providing Travel Warnings include the warning about the potential cost to the traveler—through 
injury, illness, ransom, or medical evacuation. Finally, the government issues Travel Warnings 
also out of fear of being sued for negligence for not warning citizens about the risk of travel to 
certain parts of the world (Lowenheim, 2007).  
 Lowenheim (2007, p. 212) establishes that the government assumes “a role of guiding 
people in making the right choices”, but it also faces a challenge of effectiveness. Many people 
do not read Travel Warnings—out of ignorance or indifference. Some travelers will read the 
Warning but disregard it out of a sense of adventure or a need to reconnect with a place of 
heritage and family (Lowenheim, 2007). The author also asserts controversy. He explains that 
Travel Warnings are not believed to be wholly pure in their protection of citizens. Some official 
travel advice is believed to serve as a means for “soft sanctions”, in which one country will 
punish or coerce another by using  Travel Warnings to impede the flow of tourism dollars until 
that country acquiesces (Lowenheim, 2007, p. 206). Other travel advice, he asserts, may have its 
roots in prejudice, while, as a beneficiary of favoritism, another country may experience no 
Travel Warnings when one is warranted (Lowenheim, 2007). 
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Official travel advice issued as punishment has received some attention from scholars. In 
Travel advice or trade embargo?, Sharpley et al (1996) conducted a case study of the British 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s (FCO) treatment of The Gambia, a country in West Africa. 
Its thesis is that tourism is an aspect of international political economy that can be used or 
manipulated to achieve economic and political ends. Sharpley et al (1996, p. 2) explain, “…the 
potential exists for the governments of tourism-generating countries to influence, through travel 
advice, the flow of tourists, thereby exerting economic and political pressure on destination 
countries.”  
The Gambia is among the smallest countries in all of Africa. It is poor, relies heavily on 
international aid, and, since the 1960s, was an ideal tourist destination for Northern Europeans 
desperate for sunshine and warmth during their winter months (Sharpley et al, 1996). Most 
tourism to The Gambia was managed by British and Scandinavian tour operators. The revenue 
from tourism was quite significant for The Gambia. The authors explained that because of the 
extended family structure of Gambian families, up to ten people were supported by one salary. 
Consequently, one job in the tourism industry had a powerful, rippling impact there.  
 A former British colony, The Gambia became independent in 1965. Its first president 
remained in power from 1970 until 1994. Citing widespread corruption, the Armed Forces 
Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC) assumed power in July 1994 in a bloodless coup (Sharpley 
et al, 1996). AFPRC immediately “stated its commitment to human rights, freedom of the press, 
and the safety of foreign visitors and expatriates” (Sharpley et al, 1996, p. 3). Even though no 
tourists were harmed, the FCO issued three subsequent travel advisories warning Brits from 
traveling there on vacation. In case the FCO travel advice was insufficient, FCO sent an 
unprecedented letter to each British agency operating tours in The Gambia alerting each to the 
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advisories and writing that it would be irresponsible not to heed them (Sharpley et al, 1996).  All 
British tour operators save one cancelled its trips to The Gambia; many Scandinavian operators 
followed the British lead. In just a few short months, consequently, Sharpley et al (1996, p. 3) 
describe: 
Over 1000 jobs in hotels disappeared, at least eight hotels closed, and people indirectly 
dependent on tourism, such as taxi drivers and souvenir vendors, immediately lost their 
primary source of income. Another 1000 jobs were lost at the country’s largest 
horticulture business; in the absence of scheduled flights between London and Banjul, 
charter flights had been fulfilling an important function as freight carriers, but following 
withdrawal of the major operators, fresh produce could no longer be shipped out of the 
country. Employment in many other sectors of the economy, including agriculture and 
brewing, was also threatened whilst the government itself faced a serious shortfall in 
revenue from tourism-related sources such as sales tax, airport departure tax and import 
duties. 
 
 The one British tour operator and other Dutch and German operators that continued trips 
to The Gambia did so without incident to the travelers. Nonetheless, the FCO insisted that its 
advisories were for the safety of British travelers. Inconsistently, the British government did not 
evacuate the 700 British expatriates living in The Gambia or encourage that they leave (Sharpley 
et al, 1996), which begs the question, did the FCO believe The Gambia safe or not? The authors 
could only speculate as to the British government’s motivation for an “unofficial trade embargo”, 
but they believe it was political. The British government maintained a friendly, political 
relationship with the president of The Gambia, which was “an important and geographically 
strategic ally in West Africa” (Sharpley et al, 1996, p. 4). The AFPRC had originally released a 
four-year plan to return The Gambia to democratically elected government. Under pressure, it 
shortened the transition to two years, and the FCO revised its travel advisory (Sharpley et al, 
1996). 
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 Withholding tourism and trade is an acceptable method of sanction and coercion, but it is 
usually done through an official trade embargo, such as the United States’ decades-long 
relationship with Cuba. A surreptitious embargo under the guise of a Travel Warning meant to 
keep travelers safe is not an openly common practice, which does not preclude its existence. The 
question of sanctions through Travel Warnings was one of which Combs (2009) set out to 
address in a master’s thesis titled, A multivariate analysis of State Department travel warnings. 
In her study, she used a binary logistic regression to explore the determinants of Travel 
Warnings, with particular emphasis on answering if Warnings were a sanctioning tool or 
mechanism to protect would-be travelers. Her sample included all Travel Warnings active at one 
moment in time, September of 2009, by the U.S. Department of State and the foreign offices of 
Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. She hypothesized that decreased political stability, 
high crime and violence, and non-democratic state status would determine the issuance of Travel 
Warnings (Combs, 2009).  Her dependent variable was Travel Warning/risk, and her 
independent variables were level of democracy, percent of Muslim population, crime, terrorism, 
civil unrest, diplomatic relations, G20 membership, and foreign direct investment. She used 
information from the CIA World Factbook, U.S. Department of State, G20, U.S. Department of 
Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis, United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, and 
Freedom House Organization to determine each variable.  
 Combs (2009, p. 24) found that the State Department issued “travel warnings based 
mainly on the declining political stability of a given country”. She also found a significant 
sanctioning effect present for non-democratic states, but not a significant effect for 
predominantly Muslim countries. She found that crime played no role as a determinant for a 
Travel Warnings. GDP, foreign direct investment, diplomatic relations, and G20 membership 
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also did not play a significant role. The models for the foreign ministries of Australia, Canada, 
and the United Kingdom produced results similar to the U.S., with slight variations (Combs, 
2009). Combs’ work is revealing, and her small sample in time encourages more research. Her 
findings indicate a significant sanctioning effect, but also that the majority of Travel Warnings 
are meant to keep American travelers safe. 
Theoretical Framework 
 Combs (2009) designed her dependent variables using criteria that classified countries by 
their economic, social, political, and religious statuses. Classifying target groups based on their 
circumstances brings this paper to its theoretical anchor. Schneider and Ingram (1993) 
introduced their theory of social construction of target populations and its implications for 
politics and policy. “…Social construction of target populations refers to the cultural 
characterizations or popular images of the person or groups whose behavior and well-being are 
affected by public policy (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 334).” In later publications, Schneider, 
Ingram, and deLeon (2014, p. 105) further defined social construction as “important political 
attributes” or “powerful images or stereotypes”. Schneider and Ingram (1994, p. 334) explain:  
Our theory contends that the social construction of target populations has a powerful 
influence on public officials and shapes both the policy agenda and the actual design of 
policy. There are strong pressures for public officials to provide beneficial policy to 
powerful, positively constructed target populations and to devise punitive, punishment-
oriented policy for negatively constructed groups.   
 
 The authors use the terms target population or target groups to identify who will receive 
benefits or burdens as a result of democratic policy design. This policy design is meant to 
“achieve some public purpose that may include approbation and punishment” (Schneider et al, 
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2014, p. 107). This concept represents the first proposition of their framework, which divides 
target populations into four categories.  
1. Advantaged 
2. Contenders 
3. Dependents 
4. Deviants 
For the purposes of this paper, target groups in Social Construction Theory will be extended to 
foreign countries. 
“The advantaged have high levels of political power resources and enjoy positive social 
construction as deserving people important in the political and social hierarchy in general and, 
more specifically, in social welfare as broadly construed (Schneider et al, 2014, p. 110).” In a 
study of the theoretical application of Schneider and Ingram’s social construction framework in 
scholarly research over twenty years, Pierce et al (2014) found the following groups categorized 
as Advantaged by researchers: veterans, elderly, farm lobby, government workers, home owners, 
middle class, mortgage banks, Native American casino owners, prison administrators, scientists, 
and environmental organizations, among others. Schneider et al (2014) would add small business 
owners, soldiers, job creators, primary care physicians, and more. In the context of foreign 
countries from the U.S. perspective, Advantaged countries are likely Western democracies (with 
special exceptions like Japan) and well developed. 
“Contenders have substantial political resources but are negatively regarded by many in 
the population as relatively selfish, untrustworthy, and morally suspect (Schneider et al, 2014, p. 
111).” Researchers from 1993 to 2013 categorized the following groups as Contenders: 
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pharmaceutical companies, property developers, gaming industry, affluent people, political 
activists, and more (Pierce et al, 2014). Schneider et al (2014) add major labor unions, insurance 
companies, firearm industries, big banks and lenders, and Wall Street brokers. They explain that 
these groups are likely to benefit from their political power, but policy makers do so 
clandestinely, so as not to be openly associated with supporting them. In the context of foreign 
countries, Contenders are likely resource wealthy and maybe non-democratic countries like 
powerful China and Russia. 
 “Dependents are positively constructed as deserving, at least in terms of sympathy and 
pity (Schneider et al, 2014, p. 112).” Researchers have studied Dependents that include different 
classes of the elderly, immigrants, AIDS patients who are women or children, the impoverished, 
students, public housing tenants, and the working class, among others (Pierce et al, 2014). 
Schneider et al (2014) add mothers, children, the hungry, homeless, handicapped, disaster 
victims, and others of misfortune. While Dependents lack political power, they have sympathy. 
The sympathy accounts for some benefits, but they are limited and inadequate. “Because they do 
not have a strong role in the creation of national wealth, dependents are viewed as ‘good’ people 
but considerably less deserving of actual investments than advantaged groups (Schneider et al, 
2014, p. 112).” Programs created for these groups are the first to be cut during periods of 
recession. In the context of foreign countries, Dependents are countries that cause no one trouble, 
are poor, are victimized, and have underdeveloped infrastructure, like various African, Asian, 
Eastern European, Latin American, and Pacific Island countries.  
 “Deviants lack both political power and positive social constructions and tend to receive 
a disproportionate share of burdens and sanctions (Schneider et al, 2014, p. 112).” Historically, 
researchers have found the following groups to be socially constructed as Deviant: gay people or 
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minorities living with AIDS, criminals, illegal immigrants, the obese, impoverished minorities, 
public landlords, smokers, and others (Pierce et al, 2014). Schneider et al (2014, p. 112) add 
“…terrorists, sex offenders, welfare cheats, deadbeat dads, young male minority dropouts, … 
and drug dealers”. These groups are targeted as the ills of society and are meted out punishments, 
whether deserved or not, through policy action or policy indifference. Policymakers benefit from 
being tough on such groups. In the context of foreign countries, Deviants could be non-
democratic states hostile to the U.S., such as North Korea and Iran.  
Across these four categories, there will be overlap, as is typical in Social Construction 
Theory. Russia is pulled toward Contender because of its military resources, but its aggressive 
behavior in neighboring countries like Ukraine likewise pulls it toward Deviant territory. 
Conversely, while Iran’s behavior can be classified as Deviant, its financial and arms support of 
paramilitary groups throughout the Middle East, like Hezbollah (Smith, 2013), pulls it toward 
Contender status. Does North Korea really have a nuclear weapon? If so, maybe it moves itself 
across a Deviant/Contender spectrum. India is the largest democracy in the world, is resource 
rich, is a nuclear power, has poor infrastructure, and many of its people are desperately poor—its 
construction may cross Advantaged, Contender, and Dependent. Most countries, though, will be 
more precisely constructed into one category, which leads to this paper’s first guiding 
hypothesis: Countries that are constructed as Advantaged are less likely to have a Travel 
Warning or Alert while countries that are constructed as Contender, Dependent, and Deviant are 
more likely to have one. This does not suppose causation, but rather a relationship. 
 Most groups do not and cannot change their status, and this concept represents the second 
proposition in social construction theory. Schneider et al (2014) propose that social construction 
is accompanied over time with a feedback and feed forward effect. In other words, socially 
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constructed groups begin to perpetuate their status in a self-fulfilling way. Their typology as 
Advantaged, Contender, Dependent, or Deviant is embraced as an identity, and it affects their 
political participation and attitudes. Future groups of immigrants, the obese, or minorities may 
inherit their typology after years of subtle and overt policy action against them. Further, 
policymakers may continue to treat target groups a particular way simply because that is how 
they have always been treated. Bias and prejudice are reinforced over time. In the context of 
foreign countries, many African countries seem to remain trapped in a vicious cycle of 
entrenched poverty and corruption despite being resource rich. Mistrust and suspicion of 
communist China remain despite China being one of the United States’ most significant trade 
partners.  
 The third proposition is that “social constructions emerge from emotional and intuitive 
reactions and then are justified with selective attention to evidence” (Schneider et al, 2014, p. 
121). Kahneman (2011) referred to this as fast thinking. Individuals rely on impulse, intuition, 
impressions, feelings, and heuristics to make an inordinate amount of judgments and decisions 
throughout every moment of the day. When policymakers have to make decisions about target 
groups, they make use of these heuristics and even exploit them.  
Proposition four allows for the possibility of groups changing their social constructions. 
It is important to observe that some groups may be able to change their status over time. Gay, 
lesbian, bisexual, and transgender individuals, for example, represent a group that has had a 
drastic change in public opinion over the past decade. Schneider et al (2014) suggest that the 
higher education and income held by people in this group and their likelihood of not being 
ghettoized play a role. In the context of foreign countries, some foreign countries have clearly 
experienced a change in social construction. For example, Russia would likely have been 
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classified as deviant in construction during the Cold War. After the Iron Curtain fell, Russia 
became an emerging democracy with a capitalist economy, with residual, mutual distrust that 
continues to exist today. Iran was a U.S. ally until its revolution in 1979 (Halliday, 2012), and 
henceforth has been known for its anti-U.S. orientation. Presently, Cuba may be moving in the 
reverse direction from Deviant to something else as the Obama Administration opens diplomatic 
relations with it for the first time in over fifty years, having removed the country from its list of 
State Sponsors of Terror (state.gov, 2015).  
 The fifth and final proposition of social construction theory addresses policy change. 
“Types and patterns of policy change vary depending on the social construction and power of 
target groups (Schneider et al, 2014, p. 129).” Many public policy theories address the 
phenomenon of policy change over time, but they do not address “who benefits from change and 
whether change impacts the conditions of democracy” (Schneider et al, 2014, p. 129). Within 
this framework, policy change is predictably stable. Advantaged groups will receive benefits, 
and will be largely satisfied. Deviant groups will be the recipients of punitive policy, and the 
public will laud policymakers with approval. Research shows that the public is more approbating 
when policy punishes such groups rather than providing treatment (Schneider et al, 2014). The 
formula is easily maintained and change occurs when policymakers deviate from making 
Advantaged groups happy or Deviant groups are given resources of which the public 
disapproves. When this takes place, change occurs, and policymaking returns to equilibrium 
(Schneider et al, 2014).  
 Since Schneider and Ingram developed this theory, scholarly work that featured the social 
construction framework was published in over 80 different journals. These include the American 
Political Science Review, Policy Studies Journal, Journal of Public Administration Research and 
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Theory, and Social Science Quarterly (Pierce et al, 2014). It has appeared in numerous books, 
and there is also international scholarly interest in this theory. Over time, scholars extended this 
theory into different groups of people, organizations, spaces, and even groups of animals. This 
paper intends to extend this theory to different countries and how they may be socially 
constructed from the U.S. point of view. After all, numerous studies have already applied the 
Social Construction Framework to cultural and immigrant populations. Some studies include pre-
World War II Japanese immigrants and contemporary immigrants from Japan, China, 
Scandinavia, and other parts of Europe. Studies have also included immigrants who are elderly, 
children, farmers, students, women, and poor. They have included immigrants who came to the 
U.S. illegally (Pierce et al, 2014). An immigrant population is a representation of a larger culture, 
a reflection from some other place—in other words, a country. As such, if a population can be 
constructed based on its cultural identity, it is conceivable that countries of the world may also 
be classified into the typologies of Advantaged, Contender, Dependent, and Deviant and that the 
U.S. government would shape policy toward those countries accordingly. It has been established 
that the State Department is a policy influencing and implementing arm, and scholars have 
shown that official travel advice from various governments may be influenced by more than just 
safety of a given travel destination. That said, this paper’s second guiding hypothesis is that 
while social construction plays a role in the creation of Travel Warnings, most official State 
Department travel advice is for the pure purpose of transmitting safety information to U.S. 
citizen travelers.  
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Chapter 3: Research Design 
Archived Documents 
This research employs a theoretically guided, qualitative methodology (Yin, 2014). The 
data is the body of State Department Travel Warnings and Travel Alerts from 1994 through 
2014, taking 6 year intervals out of each of the three presidential administrations of that time 
period. Historic Travel Warnings and Alerts have not been archived at the State Department 
Library or at the National Archives, according to written exchanges with librarians at each 
institution (J. Sherer, personal communication, January 20, 2015; D. Langbart, personal 
communication, January 28, 2015). The author of this paper has submitted a Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) request to the State Department, which has been confirmed as in process 
by the State Department but has not yet been fulfilled. The length of time and uncertainty of 
fulfillment called for an alternate source for Travel Warnings and Alerts.  
 The Internet Archive is a non-profit organization that is essentially a library of the 
Internet’s websites. Its archive features a search tool called the Wayback Machine, which 
archives billions of historic webpages. If a researcher enters the URL, http://travel.state.gov, a 
page will appear with each year the Internet Archive has archived, or ‘crawled’ in Internet 
Archive parlance, that particular website. Within each year, a website will have been crawled 
numerous times. The Wayback Machine began crawling http://travel.state.gov in 1996 and has 
continued to do so through the present. The 1996 State Department website includes Travel 
Warnings and Public Announcements (as Travel Alerts were termed then) as far back as 1994. 
Those documents are included in the analysis because they were still officially active in 1996. 
Each Travel Warning and Alert was copied and electronically saved as well as printed. The 
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Internet Archives is the only place where historic Travel Warnings and Alerts exist that are 
readily available to the public.  
ATLAS.ti Software 
Data was collected by manually mining the Internet Archive, week by week, year by year 
since 1996. The data was analyzed using content analysis, which was aided by ATLAS.ti 
software. Berg and Lune (2012, p. 349) write, “Content analysis is a careful, detailed, systematic 
examination and interpretation of a particular body of material in an effort to identify patterns, 
themes, biases, and meanings.” ATLAS.ti is a text management program that assists in the 
organization, coding, and mapping of themes that emerge from the content analysis. It is not an 
automated, logarithmic coding software; rather, it requires the qualitative analysis by the 
researcher, just not in the traditional style with pencil and paper. The software manages the data, 
while the author analyzes it (Bernard & Ryan, 2010).  
 Through content analysis, the author produced an index of every Travel Warning and 
Alert that was issued over the period studied and includes descriptive data, such as: country 
name, organizational components of each document, duration, time, frequency, type (Warning or 
Alert), and document content. The reasons for Warnings is the bulk of what emerged from the 
content analysis. As themes emerged, the author used ATLAS.ti to produce a list of codes in the 
software. In addition to thematic coding by the author through content analysis, this study relied 
upon a peer, experienced coder to promote intercoder reliability (Creswell, 2013; Yin, 2014; 
Bernard & Ryan, 2010). With intercoder reliability, when coders produce similar themes derived 
from the content, that reliability should indicate that the themes are also valid (Bernard & Ryan, 
2010). Pattern matching, also known as the congruence method in political science research, 
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adds to the internal validity of this study by determining if the findings match predictions made 
(Yin, 2014). 
Intercoder Reliability  
 Reliability in content analysis is a reasonable concern. Content analysis is slow and 
solitary, and qualitative research is not meant to be generalizable in the way that quantitative 
research is. It has a different purpose. Still, there are methods to enhance the trustworthiness of 
qualitative research output, and one of those ways is intercoder reliability. The addition of at 
least one more coder for the sample content allows a researcher to “test whether people think that 
the same constructs apply to the same chunks of text” (Bernard & Ryan, p. 301, 2010). The 
process is to take a selection of documents from the sample and have a second coder code those 
documents. The two coders meet to compare how each coder coded the same documents, and 
they discuss where there is agreement and disagreement (Creswell, 2013).  
 The second coder for this study took a selection of 10 Travel Warning and Alerts from 
across the sample. Across the 10 documents, there was approximately 97 percent agreement and 
3 percent disagreement between the two coders. What is considered enough with regard to 
agreement is subjective, but most qualitative researchers today agree that over 70 percent is 
considered adequate agreement while at least 80 percent is considered strong agreement or high 
reliability (Bernard & Ryan, 2010). One disagreement concerned a coding choice about 
corruption. For the Travel Warning for Chad in August 2011, the State Department noted that 
“law enforcement/military units have been implicated in violent crime” (DOS, Chad a, 2011). 
The primary research coded this Reason code as corruption, but the second coder disagreed, 
saying that coding it as corruption was a leap. Corruption to the second coder implies systemic 
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and intentional subversion of law and order, and those incidents may have been isolated and the 
offenders prosecuted. Other disagreements included the word “narcoterrorist” found in a Travel 
Warning for Colombia being captured as the Reason code, Narcotrafficking, by the primary 
coder (DOS, Colombia a, 2006). The secondary coder believed these two nouns to be distinct—
that a narcotrafficker may not always be involved in terror. Generally, there was overwhelming 
agreement between the two coders, and this agreement lends to the reliability that the codes and 
the process for coding used across the sample were sound, sensible, and consistent.  
Managing the Sample Size 
From 1994 through 2014, 1,662 individual Travel Warnings and Public 
Announcements/Travel Alerts were available for extraction from archived State Department 
webpages using the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine search tool. More travel advice 
documents had been issued over that time period and appeared on the http://travel.state.gov 
website; however, some of the documents were not live links. There were not many of these—
approximately tens, not hundreds. When attempting to open those document links, the pursuer 
was led to a “not found” page. Each document ranged from being no longer than a paragraph to 
up to a dozen pages; most were just a few pages. The Internet Archives began capturing the 
http://travel.state.gov website as far back as 1996, and the 1996 year included active Travel 
Warnings and Public Announcements issued as far back as 1994. As such, the sample of 
available Warnings and Alerts extends from 1994 through present day, which makes for a rather 
large sample, which was limited in the ways described below. First, the documents studied were 
limited to the following six years of each of the three presidential administrations of the time 
period studied, generally for the purpose of convenience relating to sample availability: 
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• Clinton Administration: 1994 – 1999* 
• Bush Administration: 2001 – 2006 
• Obama Administration: 2009 – 2014 
 
(*Note: The Bush and Obama Administration samples start with the first six years 
of both administrations, but the Clinton Administration sample starts 1994, his 
second year, because Travel Warning and Alert data were not available for 1993.) 
The data set was limited further to Travel Warnings, Public Announcements, and Travel 
Alerts that were country-specific rather than region-specific. For example, there were multiple 
Worldwide Cautions that generally spoke of existential threats on a global scale, such as 
terrorism or disease that knew no country boundaries. Other examples included Al-Qaeda 
activity over many years or Ebola more recently. Some regional Warnings or Alerts were titled: 
‘the Caribbean’, ‘East Africa’, ‘the Middle East and North Africa’, ‘West Africa’, ‘the French 
West Indies’, ‘Central Asia’, ‘the Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf’, ‘Europe’, and ‘the 
Pacific Rim’—again referring to widespread terrorism, violence, natural disasters, or disease. 
Other Travel Alerts were specific to destructive but temporary forces of nature typical to a 
certain region and season, including document titles such as the ‘Pacific Typhoon Season’, 
‘South Pacific Cyclone Season’, ‘Hurricane Season’, and ‘Tsunami in Asia and East Africa’. 
One Alert was issued for a regional sporting event, the ‘ICC Cricket World Cup’ for Bangladesh, 
India, and Sri Lanka, which alerted traveling Americans to the potential for violence and petty 
theft despite not having actual credible threats to those ends; the State Department wanted 
Americans to be on guard given the potential for danger. Finally, other non-country specific 
Alerts were in relation to outbreaks of disease, such as a SARS-specific Alert in 2003. Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) was commonly associated with China during that 
outbreak, and it became an acronym with which Americans were generally familiar at the time. 
China, however, was not mentioned once in that particular Public Announcement. Instead, 
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advice was generally provided about SARS prevention with numerous citations of and referrals 
to the Centers for Disease Control and the World Health Organization. Later advisories of which 
disease outbreaks were the subject were issued for Ebola with association to the West African 
region. One Travel Alert marked the first anniversary of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the 
World Trade Center in New York City. These regional documents were all Public 
Announcements (later called Travel Alerts) because of their short-term nature; not one was a 
Travel Warning.  
Filtering out two years from each of the three presidential administrations as well as the 
regional Alerts brought the document count to 1,303 Travel Warnings and Public 
Announcements/Travel Alerts. Those documents in aggregate still presented a large sample and 
required some further filtering. Occasionally, a Travel Warning or Alert would be duplicated 
(sometimes repeatedly) within the same year, perhaps even a week later, and would be identical 
to its predecessor excepting the inclusion of one new piece of information. For example, on 
January 31, 2011, the State Department issued a Travel Warning to describe violence taking 
place in Egypt during what the world would later refer to as the Arab Spring. In that Travel 
Warning, the following contextual information, emphasis added, was provided for the reader, 
which was that the “Department of State [had] authorized the voluntary departure of dependents 
and non-emergency employees.” It was followed by a Travel Warning for Egypt a little over two 
weeks later on February 18, 2011 that was mostly identical to its predecessor, but the language 
for that Warning had changed to: “On February 1, the Department of State ordered the departure 
of all non-emergency U.S. government personnel and family members from Egypt due to the 
ongoing political and social unrest.” Notice that the language changed from “authorized 
voluntary departure” to “ordered the departure”. Then, in the subsequent Travel Warning for 
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Egypt on March 29, 2011, it noted: “The U.S. Embassy in Cairo remains on ordered departure 
status for dependents, but most employees have returned, and the Embassy is resuming normal 
operations.” In other words, ordered departure had been lifted for most embassy and consular 
employees, but not for their children and/or spouses, whose presence in the country remained 
prohibited. In those three instances, the bulk of each successive document remained identical 
except for those three very specific updates. In those cases and cases similar to those, the first 
version of the Warning or Alert was read and coded in its entirety. For the subsequent 
duplications, the entire document was read, but only the updates were coded. In other Warnings 
or Alerts over the eighteen-year sample, the State Department would issue an identical document 
and provide the reader with the caveat that there had been no change. For example, the Travel 
Warning for Iran issued on November 22, 2004 noted: “This Warning is being reissued without 
change after periodic review and supersedes the Travel Warning for Iran issued May 14, 2004.” 
In most of those cases, the document was not coded a second time.  
Application of Social Construction Theory 
Each country of the world was categorized into Schneider and Ingram’s four target group 
categories: Advantaged, Contender, Dependent, and Deviant. The author created his own index 
using existing information about the countries of the world to classify them into the social 
construction categories, paying particular attention to each country’s economic development 
(high or low power) and political values (positive or negative deservingness or regard). This 
index is meant to reflect how countries are socially constructed from the U.S. point of view. 
After the content analysis, this study moves into the analysis of the frequency of Travel Warning 
and Alert issuance compared to each country’s social construction. The data derived from the 
content analysis is applied to see what type of content is associated with each social construction 
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country category. With regard to Social Construction Theory, the research proceeded with two 
guiding hypotheses:  
H1 Countries that are constructed as Advantaged are less likely to have a Travel 
 Warning or Alert while countries that are constructed as Contender, Dependent, 
 and Deviant are more likely to have them. 
H2 While Social Construction plays a role in the creation and issuance of Travel Warnings 
and Alerts, most official State Department travel advice is for the purpose of transmitting 
safety information to U.S. citizen travelers. 
Purpose of Study and Research Questions 
As this study is anchored by a theoretical framework, it is inspired by the following 
research questions: 
1. What is the nature of State Department Travel Warnings and Alerts and what is their 
function? 
2. Is there a relationship between how a foreign country is socially constructed and its 
issuance of State Department Travel Warnings and Alerts? 
The purpose of this study is to explore the world of State Department Travel Warnings 
and Alerts and to collect them, analyze them, and understand them in the context of Social 
Construction Theory. Themes that emerge from the content analysis should contribute to the 
understanding of what exactly official travel advice is composed of and how the social 
construction of countries from the U.S. perspective relates to official State Department travel 
advice issuance. This exploratory study is significant because it makes a contribution to the 
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academic discipline of public affairs, it has professional relevance, and it extends Social 
Construction Theory. The U.S. Department of State is a policy generating and policy executing 
agency. Travel Warnings and Alerts are documents that the State Department produces and 
disseminates about countries across the globe, and those countries can see when the U.S. 
government warns its citizens not to travel there. They are significant policy documents because 
each document represents a decision State made about how it will represent a given country to a 
U.S. citizen traveler.  
The contribution to the academic discipline starts at the most basic level of first collecting 
a body of Travel Warnings and Alerts, as they have not only not been archived in the State 
Department Library or the National Archives, but they also have not been studied. The content 
analysis is the deeper level of contribution, as it is not systematically known what constitutes the 
composition of these documents as a body of policy output. In the realm of professional interest, 
many organizations and institutions send people abroad for various purposes. Colleges and 
universities send students and faculty abroad. Government sends its personnel to travel or live 
abroad to carry out their work. Corporations have their employees conduct international 
business, and tour companies deliver their product by facilitating enjoyable experiences for 
vacationers. This study helps the practitioner with regard to using and interpreting State 
Department Travel Warnings and Alerts. Moreover, these organizations and institutions rely on 
State Department travel advice to make decisions about sending people abroad in order to 
promote traveler safety and in the interest of organizational liability (Friend, 2011; Lowenheim, 
2007). As such, these entities need to know that the documents that they rely on so strictly reflect 
the safety situation on the ground for Americans traveling to various countries. Travel Warnings 
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created for any other reason besides U.S. citizen safety could have a compromising effect on the 
integrity of those documents.  
Finally, extending Social Construction Theory to foreign countries could produce 
worrisome implications. If this exploration finds that positively socially constructed countries 
(i.e., the Advantaged) rarely have Travel Warnings, it may lead to the question, is the State 
Department favoring Advantaged countries by not always producing Travel Warnings and Alerts 
when they would be produced under the same circumstances in negatively socially constructed 
countries? As an exploratory, qualitative analysis, this study should produce potential for ample 
further research to answer such questions.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 40 
 
Chapter 4: Data Analyses and Findings 
 The purpose of this study is to first explore and describe the content of archived State 
Department Travel Warnings and Alerts. The qualitative research method used to achieve that 
goal is content analysis, aided by ATLAS.ti software. ATLAS.ti is a content analysis tool for the 
researcher to utilize; it is not a software that analyzes content in an automated way. Instead, it 
allows the researcher to highlight words and lines of text and assign a code to them. When the 
words ‘code’, ‘coded’, or ‘coding’ are used in the remainder of this paper, they refer to a word or 
length of text from the primary document that was highlighted, extracted, and assigned a 
descriptor (that is, a code) by the researcher as a result of the content analysis. A code list is 
stored in the software, and selecting any code in that list transports the researcher back to the 
primary document in which it was first coded. It is a vast organizational improvement on what 
would otherwise have to be done by hand since over 1,300 primary documents were used for this 
study. ATLAS.ti also provides tools for basic analyses and descriptive statistics. The second 
purpose of this study is to see if there is a relationship between which countries of the world are 
subjects of State Department issued Travel Warnings and Alerts and how they may be socially 
constructed, relying upon Social Construction Theory. Further, using the content described in the 
first stage of this research, this paper analyzes what type of content and language is used for 
which socially constructed country categories. For example, are the content and the language 
used to deliver it different for Advantaged constructed countries compared to Contender 
constructed countries (or Dependent and Deviant constructed countries)? This chapter ends with 
pattern matching (Yin, 2014) of comparing findings to the guiding hypotheses presented in 
chapter three.  
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Descriptive Statistics 
Coding for only new information in documents that were otherwise identical made for a 
more manageable coding process. Despite these filtering efforts, the sample was still vast. 
Ultimately, 31,099 pieces of text (single words, phrases, sentences, or blocks of sentences) were 
coded across the 1,303 documents using the ATLAS.ti software, which was instrumental in 
coding and organizing that quantity of documents. This large sample, though, helped to fulfill the 
qualitative purpose of this research: to describe the components and content of State Department 
Travel Warnings and Alerts over time. Each document included the country that was the subject 
of the Warning or Alert, whether it was an actual Travel Warning, Public Announcement, or, 
later, a Travel Alert, which was the term that replaced Public Announcement. Each document 
also included the date it was issued and usually contact information for the nearest servicing U.S. 
Embassy or Consulate. If it was a Public Announcement/Travel Alert, it also included the 
previous document it superseded and when it would expire. 
Lebanon was the most frequent subject country of Travel Warnings, with a total of 32 for 
the years studied. It was followed by Pakistan with 31, Algeria and Central African Republic 
with 30 each, Afghanistan with 29, Iraq and Israel with 28 each, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo and Yemen with 26 each, and Haiti with 25. Those are the top 10; the complete list can be 
seen in Appendix A. The top 10 countries with the most Travel Alerts were the Philippines with 
22, Mexico with 21, Nepal with 20, India with 14, Malaysia and Russia with 12 each, Egypt, 
Kyrgyz Republic and Thailand with 11 each, and Uganda with 10. These countries are socially 
constructed in similar ways, which will be discussed at length. 
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Components 
In most Travel Alerts, the State Department would regularly provide whether or not the 
document replaced or superseded a previous Alert as well as when it would expire. For Travel 
Warnings, expiration dates were not provided because the nature of a Warning is that it is a 
protracted state of danger with no immediate end in sight, but there usually was a note as to 
which previous Warning it was replacing or superseding. While that data are useful for 
descriptive statistics and are certainly noteworthy components, the content of each Warning and 
Alert was the focus of the research. To that end, very early in the coding process, it became clear 
that each document had three primary content components: 1) Background (contextual) 
information, 2) Reasons for the Warning or Alert, and 3) Advice in the form of verbs. As such, 
the three primary code structures were, “Background:__________”, “Reason:__________”, and 
“Verb:__________”. Take this text from the Travel Warning for Rwanda on September 12, 
1995: 
The Department of State warns U.S. citizens to defer travel to Rwanda. Sporadic 
fighting continues inside Rwanda; border areas in particular have been the sight of 
low-key insurgent outbreaks. Further, poor communication, transportation, and 
health services continue to make travel in Rwanda difficult and potentially 
hazardous. The U.S. Embassy in Kigali resumed consular services July 26, 1995 
(DOS, Rwanda a, 1995).   
 
Employing those three primary code components, first the State Department provides 
immediate advice, which is to defer travel to Rwanda. This advice was coded as “Verb: 
Travel:Defer…”. Then it provides a handful of reasons for issuing this Warning, including that 
there is insurgent activity, telecommunications are limited, and that travel in that country can be 
hazardous, to name a few. Those reasons were coded thusly: “Reason:Insurgence”, 
“Reason:PoorTelecommunications”, and “Reason:Hazardous”. There was also some contextual 
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information about consular services, which was coded as 
“Background:ConsularServicesResumed”. Accounting for just Background, Reason, and Verb 
codes, 25,424 pieces of text were coded over the 1,303 documents. Much of the following will 
focus on that particular content. Other pieces of text coded were dates, country names, document 
type, and salient words and phrases that did not neatly fit into the three primary code categories 
of Background, Reason, and Verb; altogether, 31,099 pieces of text were coded. There will be 
some discussion of those codes, as well. Using the discourse analysis qualitative method (see 
Appendix B), further insight was derived from the coding and is included throughout the 
following summary of the three code types (Putney, 1994). While the following sections are 
meant to fill the descriptive goals of this qualitative research, they include some analyses through 
deepening the content analysis and are then followed by analyses using the Social Construction 
theoretical framework. 
Background Codes 
 Each travel advice document provided more than just the description of danger and 
actionable advice. They all consistently included some type of background information that 
helped the consumer of the information to understand the context in which the danger was set. 
There were 138 total codes for contextual information, coded as “Background:_________”; see 
Appendix C for the complete list of Background codes. Some of the least common codes are 
noteworthy, even if found across the 1,303 documents only once. For example, one piece of 
contextual information that appeared just once was particularly revealing in the June 10, 1997 
Travel Warning for Afghanistan, in which it was indicated that “alcohol, video tapes, music, 
television and social activities between the sexes” were prohibited (DOS, Afghanistan a, 1997). 
Information tucked into a Travel Warning provides a glimpse of living under a severe regime. 
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Although less common codes will be mentioned when they aid discussion, the following three 
sections on Background, Reason, and Verb codes focus on the most salient of those codes. Table 
1 shows the top 25 Background codes; that is, it shows the pieces of contextual information that 
were the most common across the Travel Warning and Alert documents sampled over the 
eighteen years.   
Table 1 
 
Top 25 Background Codes 
  
Background Code Frequency 
Background:U.S.Govt:Personnel:TravelRestricted 390 
Background:ConsularServicesLimited 335 
Background:BorderAreas:Dangerous 273 
Background:U.S.Govt:Personnel:Behavior:Modified/Restricted 165 
Background:HostGovt:Cannot/WillNot/Incapable:AssureSafety 128 
Background:U.S.Govt:Personnel:Dependents:Evacuated 106 
Background:U.S.Govt:Personnel:Full/PartialEvacuation 105 
Background:HostGovt:ImposedTravelRestrictions 95 
Background:U.S.Govt:Personnel/Dependents:Evacuation:Lifted 83 
Background:HostGovt/Police:TakingSecurityPrecautions 74 
Background:NoU.S.Embassy/Services 58 
Background:U.S.Govt:Personnel:Dependents:Prohibited 58 
Background:DualCitizenshipHolders:Impeded 47 
Background:PeaceAccords 47 
Background:U.N. 47 
Background:VisaRequired 47 
Background:U.S.Govt:Personnel:Reduced 46 
Background:U.S.Embassy:OperationsSuspended/Closed 41 
Background:Cease-fire 38 
Background:NoDistinctionInTargetingOfficialsOrCivilians 38 
Background:U.S.Govt:RepresentedByThirdNation 36 
Background:Sanctions 34 
Background:NoDiplomaticRelations 32 
Background:WarCriminal/Terrorists:Arrested/Sentenced/Killed 32 
Background:U.S.Govt:Military:Action 29 
 
 The code Background:U.S.Govt:Personnel:TravelRestricted appeared the most 
frequently, coded 390 times.  It is important to remember that travel advice issued by the State 
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Department is not just for American tourists.  Rather, it is created and disseminated for all 
purposes of travel—business, visiting family, study, and work, including living or working 
abroad as an employee of the U.S. government.  Perhaps a very impactful piece of information is 
consumed when the American traveler reads that not even U.S. Department of State personnel 
are allowed to move freely in a given country.  On August 23, 1996, the Travel Warning for 
Burundi in East Africa reads:  
The U.S. Embassy has reduced its staff over the last year and continues to restrict 
U.S. Government personnel from traveling outside the capital due to the 
unpredictable incidents of violence throughout Burundi. Furthermore, U.S. 
Government personnel may travel only to areas in Bujumbura deemed safe by the 
U.S. Regional Security Officer (DOS, Burundi a, 1996).  
 
Not all travel restrictions imposed by the State Department on U.S. Government personnel 
pertain to geographical boundaries.  That same year in Peru, the August 23 Public 
Announcement stated, “…all U.S. Mission personnel are hereby prohibited from flying Aero 
Continente until further notice” (DOS, Peru a, 1996).  Aero Continente was an airline that had 
“been operating aircraft with unsafe engine conditions” (DOS, Peru a, 1996). Airline and airport 
restrictions were not uncommon. Not only did the State Department restrict personnel from 
traveling in ways or to places that were unsafe, but it also restricted travel in places that were 
unsafe and out of the jurisdiction of host government control.  The August 10, 1999 Travel 
Warning for Pakistan stated: 
…due to recent threats against U.S. citizens in Pakistan, on August 6, the U.S. 
Embassy in Islamabad decided to defer all official travel to the tribal areas of 
Pakistan’s northwest frontier province, areas which lie outside the normal 
jurisdiction of the Government of Pakistan (DOS, Pakistan a, 1999).   
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Some personnel restrictions were temporal, as seen in the Paraguay Public Announcement on 
August 6, 1999: “U.S. Embassy personnel have been advised to travel this route only if 
necessary, never alone, and strictly during daylight hours” (DOS, Paraguay a, 1999). 
 Restricting State Department personnel not only serves as behavior modeling for would-
be American travelers, but it also implies something concrete to that potential traveler. Consular 
services regularly include physically sending embassy or consulate personnel to an American in 
distress, such as an American who has been arrested or jailed, whether under legitimate or 
illegitimate circumstances. That essential service can be impeded, as warned in the February 28, 
2002 Travel Warning for Afghanistan: “Embassy officials in Kabul cannot travel outside the 
capital to provide assistance to Americans” (DOS, Afghanistan a, 2002). When possible, 
personnel are allowed to travel with security, as noted in the February 3, 2003 Travel Warning 
for Algeria: “They [personnel] travel off compound by armored car only with appropriate 
security, whether for official business or personal reasons” (DOS, Algeria a, 2003). Serving 
one’s country in the foreign service brings with it many potential consequences, and State 
Department personnel and other U.S. Government personnel working abroad may live under 
intense security regimes to account for their safety, including curfews (DOS, Togo a, 2005).   
 Related to personnel travel restrictions is the limitation of consular services and not just 
the service of leaving the embassy or consulate to physically go to an American traveler in 
distress. The second most common Background code was Background:ConsularServicesLimited. 
In some cases, a consular officer may not be able to make his or her way to a citizen in need.  In 
the October 24, 2013 Travel Warning for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, it stated that 
“Very poor infrastructure (road and air) makes the provision of consular services difficult outside 
of Kinshasa” (DOS, Democratic Republic of the Congo a, 2013). In other cases, the nature of the 
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danger a U.S. citizen is experiencing may be the cause of limited consular services: “…the U.S. 
government’s ability to assist kidnapping victims is limited” (DOS, Colombia, 2013). Sometimes 
the host government would inhibit the movement of consulate and embassy staff, which would 
have an effect on its ability to fulfill their consular role. Take the Travel Warning for Eritrea 
issued on April 18, 2012:  
The Eritrean government continues to restrict the travel of all foreign nationals. 
The restrictions require all visitors and residents, including U.S. diplomats, to 
apply 10 days in advance for permission to travel outside of Asmara’s city limits. 
Permission is rarely granted. As a result, the U.S. Embassy is extremely limited in 
its ability to provide emergency consular assistance outside of [the capital] 
Asmara (DOS, Eritrea a, 2012). 
 
This calls to mind a Background code not in the top 25, 
Background:HostGovt:Prohibits/Delays/ImpedesConsularAccess. This related code appeared 19 
times and was the occasional reason behind consular services being limited.  In the February 12, 
2009 Travel Warning for Syria, the State Department included this language: “Syrian officials do 
not notify the American Embassy when American citizens are arrested. Syrian officials do not 
inform detained American citizens that they have the right to request consular access” (DOS, 
Syria a, 2009). In the March 24, 2011 Travel Warning for the same country, it was added that 
“…in the past, security officials also have not responded to Embassy requests for consular 
access…” (DOS, Syria a, 2011).  
Of course, safety of consular personnel is paramount and if going to an American traveler 
in need meant putting an embassy or consulate employee in danger, consular services would be 
limited.  Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza were often the subjects of Travel Warnings during the 
sample studied, and in the one issued for March 19, 2012, it mentioned: “Security conditions in 
the West Bank can hinder the ability of consular staff to offer timely assistance to U.S. citizens” 
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(DOS, Israel a, 2012). Generally speaking, when travel advice is issued to discourage Americans 
from being present in a given country for a given danger, that danger often served as the same 
reason that inhibited consular staff from moving freely throughout that nation.  
The code Background:BorderAreas:Dangerous appeared 273 times.  This information 
could have been captured as a Reason code, as in a reason the State Department deems a location 
dangerous.  However, given that it involved a border area, at least two or more countries could 
have been involved, so it was therefore coded as contextual information. In some cases, the 
border areas were dangerous because of rebel activity (DOS, Liberia a, 1998). Armed conflict 
over border disputes were not uncommon, as was the case between Eritrea and Ethiopia (DOS, 
Eritrea a, 1999). Violence of some kind, including criminal, was usually to blame. The Public 
Announcement issued for Mexico on January 26, 2005 alerted “U.S. citizens to the current 
security situations along the Mexican side of the U.S.-Mexico border in the wake of increased 
violence among drug traffickers” (DOS, Mexico a, 2005). Terrorist violence was also common: 
“Al-Qaida and Taliban elements continue to operate inside Pakistan, particularly along the 
porous Afghan border region” (DOS, Pakistan, 2005). 
The next most frequent Background code at 165 times coded was 
Background:U.S.Govt:Personnel:Behavior:Modified/Restricted. It is similar to the earlier code 
of travel being restricted for U.S. Government personnel, but focused more on limitations placed 
on their behavior. It was not simply that personnel could not go somewhere; rather, it was a 
restriction on how they lived. Those restrictions were included in these documents, with the 
specific instruction that other American travelers in the region should follow suit. In many cases, 
personnel operated under an Embassy imposed curfew or restriction on mode or route of travel. 
Often there would be a reference across these documents across multiple countries to a daily 
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security regime, as in the Travel Warning for Algeria on April 2, 2010: “The U.S. Government 
considers the potential threat to U.S. Embassy personnel assigned to Algiers sufficiently serious 
to require them to live and work under significant security restrictions” (DOS, Algeria a, 2010). 
For example, personnel in Burundi were required to adjust their behavior for the security 
conditions in the following way: 
Within 30 km of the city, employees may travel in single vehicles, but must check 
in and out with the Embassy.  The Embassy’s Regional Security Officers (RSO) 
must pre-approve all Embassy personnel travel outside this approximately 30-km 
radius of Bujumbura, and employees must travel by an approved itinerary in two-
vehicle convoys equipped with satellite phones and emergency equipment. All 
employee movement outside the city after dark is forbidden… (DOS, Burundi a, 
2011). 
 
 The code Background:HostGovt:Cannot/WillNot/Incapable:AssureSafety can be 
summarized as informing American travelers that a country’s conditions are not only dangerous, 
but even the local authorities cannot or will not assure visitors’ safety. Appearing 128 times, it is 
an impactful piece of contextual information—the traveler has primarily him- or herself upon 
which to rely. The next two codes, Background:U.S.Govt:Personnel:Dependents:Evacuated and 
Background:U.S.Govt:Personnel:Full/PartialEvacuation were coded 106 and 105 times, 
respectively. These two codes are related to two others further down the top 25 list: 
Background:U.S.Govt:Personnel/Dependents:Evacuation:Lifted and 
Background:U.S.Govt:Personnel:Dependents:Prohibited, coded 83 and 58 times, respectively.  
These four codes often appeared in the first paragraph of a Travel Warning or Alert. They 
reflected the severity of a security situation and served as an indication as to truly how dangerous 
circumstances in a particular country were. Indeed, it sends a strong message to the American 
traveler that a place is so unfit for safety that even embassy/consular staff and their dependents 
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are not staying. It should be noted that U.S. Embassies and related living compounds tend to be 
very fortified.  
 Among those previous four codes was Background:HostGovt:ImposedTravelRestrictions, 
which was coded 95 times. Travel advice and restrictions of course do not fall under the sole 
purview of the Department of State. The host government also restricts travel of foreigners 
within its boundaries. In some instances, as in the case of the Travel Warning for Indonesia on 
November 23, 2001, the justification for the restriction is for traveler safety:  
Americans should avoid all travel to the regions of Aceh, Irian Jaya, Maluku, and 
North Maluku – places where the Indonesian government has restricted travel by 
U.S. and other foreign government officials – and West Timor, Central and West 
Kalimantan and Central and South Sulawesi, because of the risk of violence 
(DOS, Indonesia a, 2001).  
 
In other instances, like the case of Pakistan mentioned earlier, the restriction is for locations 
where the government has less control: “The Government of Pakistan requires all citizens of 
countries other than Pakistan and Afghanistan to obtain permission from the Home and Tribal 
Affairs Department prior to visiting these tribal areas which lie outside the normal jurisdiction of 
the Government of Pakistan” (DOS, Pakistan a, 2001). In other instances, travel restrictions are 
put in place by the host government to keep foreigners from seeing something country officials 
do not want seen. In the Sri Lanka Travel Warning of June 26, 2009, it stated: “Travel in some 
parts of the country remains highly restricted by the Sri Lankan government, with particular 
sensitivity concerning the large number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in camps” (DOS, 
Sri Lanka a, 2009). This calls to mind reports of the North Korean government allowing visitors 
to only see fully stocked grocery stores and developed neighborhoods and plazas, while 
concealing the country’s endemic poverty and famine.   
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 In numerous Travel Warnings and Alerts, the State Department would describe the 
predicament and add that host country authorities were taking precautions.  Coded 74 times as 
Background:HostGovt/Police:TakingSecurityPrecautions, it is an encouraging piece of 
information. It is important to remember that the government hosting the U.S. diplomatic 
delegation is not always and perhaps often not an antagonist and is taking an active role in 
mitigating circumstances it would prefer not to be experiencing.  The host government may even 
be partnering with the U.S. Government in such campaigns. In response to threats of terrorism 
against U.S. interests and citizens in Peru, a Public Announcement included that “Peruvian 
authorities continue increased security at the U.S. Embassy and U.S.-affiliated facilities” (DOS, 
Peru a, 2002). During an outbreak of Ebola in 2003, a Public Announcement for the Republic of 
Congo stated, “The Congolese Ministry of Health, with the support of the World Health 
Organization (WHO) and other non-governmental organizations, has sent medical teams to the 
region to help contain the disease and begin a public awareness campaign on how to limit the 
spread of the virus” (DOS, Congo a, 2003). During the 2010 Commonwealth Games in India, a 
time when petty theft against tourists and games observers spikes, a Travel Alert noted that 
“Indian police and security forces will increase their presence in Delhi during the Games, 
particularly around game venues”, providing a balance of assurance while alerting tourists to 
potential crime (DOS, India a, 2010). 
 The code Background:NoU.S.Embassy/Services, coded 58 times and related codes 
further down the top 25 list, Background:U.S.Govt:Personnel:Reduced, coded 46 times, and 
Background:U.S.Embassy:OperationsSuspended/Closed, coded 41 times, were usually reserved 
for severe conditions. Either the embassy was closed or staff was reduced because personnel 
were in mortal danger, or the embassy was not there in the first place, which implies no 
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diplomatic relations, which is severe in its own right. In countries during times in which their 
governments were hostile to the U.S. Government, Travel Warnings would indicate the absence 
of an operating U.S. Embassy, for countries including Libya in 1994, Somalia in 1996, and Iran 
throughout the entire sample, not to mention various others (DOS, Iran a, 1995; DOS, Libya a, 
1994; DOS, Somalia a, 1996). In the Travel Warning for Afghanistan on July 8, 1999, years 
before the U.S. invasion of that country in 2001, it stated: “All U.S. personnel at the U.S. 
Embassy in Kabul were evacuated in 1989, and no other diplomatic mission represents U.S. 
interests or provides consular services in Afghanistan” (DOS, Afghanistan a, 1999). The end of 
that sentence hints at a caveat that sometimes appeared in documents, which were coded with 
Background:NoDiplomaticRelations, also in the top 25, coded 32 times. The accompanying 
code, coded 36 times, is Background:U.S.Govt:RepresentedByThirdNation. In that same year, 
for example, the Travel Warning for Iran, mentioned that the “Swiss government, acting through 
its embassy in Tehran, serves as [a] protecting power for U.S. interests in Iran” (DOS, Iran a, 
1999). That piece of information was present in all the Iran Warning documents. Curiously, the 
Swiss government does not always represent the U.S. government in countries where there is no 
U.S. Embassy. Travel Warnings showed that Poland’s diplomatic mission represented the U.S. in 
Iraq for some time, Belgium’s in Libya, Sweden’s in North Korea, the Czech Republic’s in 
Syria, and France’s in Central African Republic (DOS, Iraq a, 1997: DOS, Libya a, TW 6/6/10; 
DOS, North Korea a, 2010; DOS, Syria a, 2012; DOS, Central African Republic a, 2013).  
 Another piece of contextual information was targeted at a very specific group of 
travelers. The code Background:DualCitizenshipHolders:Impeded (47 times) was meant for U.S. 
citizens visiting what was likely their or their parents’ birth country, in which the host 
government was not amenable to its citizens having dual citizenship with the U.S. In Israel, this 
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code was prevalent: “Dual Palestinian American citizens may encounter difficulties departing the 
West Bank and Gaza during times of Israeli closures in those areas” (DOS, Israel a, 2001). Iran 
was also particularly averse to this idea: “The Iranian government does not recognize dual 
citizenship and generally does not permit the Swiss to provide protective services for U.S. 
citizens who are also Iranian nationals. In addition, U.S. citizens of Iranian origin who are 
considered by Iran to be Iranian citizens have been detained and harassed by Iranian authorities” 
(DOS, Iran a, 2003). 
 A handful of remaining codes are self-explanatory. Background:PeaceAccords (47 times) 
and Background:CeaseFire (38 times) call attention to a conflict resolved or temporarily 
resolved. The code Background:UN (47 times) indicated United Nations involvement of some 
kind, whether as a peacekeeping force or relief presence, which were sub-coded as such.  
Sometimes the U.N., U.S., E.U., or another coalition body would level sanctions on a given 
country, and that context would be provided and consequently coded as Background:Sanctions 
(34 times). That code would warn American travelers of the limits to which they could spend 
money or conduct business in that country. The code Background:VisaRequired  (38 times) 
stressed the importance of not traveling to a given country without the proper immigration 
document. When the U.S. government conducted military operations in a given country, whether 
a war or a more temporary intervention, it was coded as Background:U.S.Govt:MilitaryAction 
(29 times). Sometimes related, the code 
Background:WarCriminal/Terrorists:Arrested/Sentenced/Killed (32 times) was accompanied by 
information about reprisals, which sometimes could be the reason for the warning. Finally, 
Background:NoDistinctionInTargetingOfficialsOrCivilians (38 times) was a code that indicated 
indiscriminate cruelty. “Terrorist actions may include, but are not limited to, suicide operations, 
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assassinations, hijackings, bombings or kidnappings. Terrorists do not distinguish between 
official and civilian targets (DOS, Afghanistan a, 2005).” The second sentence of that quotation 
is reproduced verbatim across multiple Travel Warnings and Alerts for multiple countries, 
indicating some type of overarching editorial review of State Department issued travel advice; 
other verbatim sentences across the sample imply the same.  
Background Codes Content Analysis 
 Taking the content analysis deeper for the top 25 Background codes, some patterns 
emerge. Table 2 shows the Background codes at three levels of analysis.  The first level is often  
Table 2 
 
Background Codes Analyzed 
  
 
Open Coding   
Level 1 
Axial Coding 
Level 2 
Thematic Coding    
Level 3 
U.S.Govt:Personnel:TravelRestricted (390)   
BorderAreas:Dangerous (273)   
U.S.Govt:Personnel:Behavior:Modified/Restricted (165)   
HostGovt:Cannot/WillNot/Incapable:AssureSafety (128)   
U.S.Govt:Personnel:Dependents:Evacuated (106) Safety (1,430)  
U.S.Govt:Personnel:Full/PartialEvacuation (105)   
HostGovt/Police:TakingSecurityPrecautions (74)   
U.S.Govt:Personnel:Dependents:Prohibited (58)   
DualCitizenshipHolders:Impeded (47)  Actionable (2,101) 
U.S.Govt:Personnel:Reduced (46)   
NoDistinctionInTargetingOfficialsOrCivilians (38)   
ConsularServicesLimited (335)   
HostGovt:ImposedTravelRestrictions (95)   
NoU.S.Embassy/Services (58) Instructive (576)  
VisaRequired (47)   
U.S.Embassy:OperationsSuspended/Closed (41)   
Sanctions (34)   
WarCriminal/Terrorists:Arrested/Sentenced/Killed (32) Punitive (95)  
U.S.Govt:Military:Action (29)   
U.S.Govt:Personnel/Dependents:Evacuation:Lifted (83)   
PeaceAccords (47)   
U.N. (47) Circumstantial (283) Informational (283) 
Cease-fire (38)   
U.S.Govt:RepresentedByThirdNation (36)   
NoDiplomaticRelations (32)   
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taken verbatim from the data, while the next two levels are created by the researcher through 
insight and analysis. Level 1 is the most basic and descriptive, which is that these excerpts of 
Travel Warning and Alert text are pieces of contextual, background information. This is called 
open coding in content analysis (Marshall & Rossman, 2011). Level 2 moves toward grouping 
the Background codes into categories, analyzing for similarities; this is called axial coding 
(Marshall & Rossman, 2011). Those top 25 Background codes were categorized into four axial 
coding groups: Safety, Instructive, Punitive, and Circumstantial. The first axial category was 
composed of Background codes that transmitted safety information. It let the reader know that 
border areas are dangerous or what parts of the country were so dangerous that State Department 
personnel were restricted from traveling there. The second axial category was instructive, 
meaning that it provided instructions and parameters for travel in the host country, like informing 
a traveler that he or she needs to secure the appropriate visa before entering the country. The 
third category was punitive, which is rather different from the other categories. It provides 
information about punitive measures being taken by the U.S. government (in most cases) against 
the host country or host country inhabitants, like sanctions. Sanctions are a powerful tool to 
punish and coerce a country into compliance. Finally, the last category (Circumstantial) includes 
Background codes that describe the circumstances on the ground, such as the United Nations 
(U.N.) having a presence there or a cease-fire having taken place.  
 Looking deeper at patterns in this data, the most frequent Safety category codes were 
present in countries considered developing economies. Those countries were Mexico with the 
most, followed by Israel and Sudan.  The countries with the most Instructive category codes 
were Serbia-Montenegro, Lebanon, Eritrea, Israel, and Iraq, most of which have experienced 
great conflict. It makes sense that those governments would impose travel restrictions on visitors, 
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which travelers need to know. The countries with the most Punitive category codes experience 
punishing actions in generally low frequency, with codes being assigned mostly once. The 
countries with the most punitive codes in this category were Iraq, Pakistan, Libya, Yemen, 
Afghanistan, and Syria. What is noteworthy about this group is that not only are they developing 
countries, but they are all autocratic. The countries specifically coded as having had sanctions are 
Libya, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Nepal, Eritrea, Cote d’Ivoire, and Mali. All of those 
countries were at some time during the sample studied or are still autocratic with the exception 
Mali (Geddes et al, 2014). The Circumstantial category Backgrounds codes were associated 
logically with country types. The code for no diplomatic relations appeared more frequently for 
countries like Iran and North Korea, while the peace accords code appeared in places where there 
had been conflict, like Congo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central African Republic, and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo.    
 The content analysis of the Background codes were distilled into a third level of coding, 
called thematic coding in content analysis (Marshall & Rossman, 2011). The Background codes 
placed in the Safety, Instructive, and Punitive codes were themed as Actionable. The theme 
Actionable was used because although these Background codes are not explicit Verb codes, 
which will be discussed later, one can act on the information provided in them. If travelers are 
provided the context that a border area is dangerous, then they can travel elsewhere. If travelers 
see that a visa is required prior to entry, they can submit the appropriate application to that 
country’s embassy or consulate in the U.S. prior to departure. If they see a country has been 
assigned sanctions, they may learn that they cannot legally conduct business there and may go 
elsewhere. The last group of codes in level two (axial) was categorized as Circumstantial, and 
those codes were then themed as Informational. Reading that the U.S. does not have diplomatic 
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relations with a certain country and is instead represented diplomatically by a third country 
provides the traveler with information about the United States’ diplomatic limits in that country.  
Reason Codes 
 In addition to contextual information, Travel Warnings and Alerts always included a 
reason in justification of their issuance. There were a myriad of reasons why the State 
Department considered a certain country unsafe or less safe for American travelers. Across the 
18 years of travel advice documents analyzed, there were 381 different reasons found and coded 
for why a particular country’s environment may put the American traveler at risk. Each of these 
were coded as “Reason:____________”. The following is a discussion of the top 25 Reason 
codes (see Table 3 on the next page and see Appendix D for a complete list). 
The number one reason coded across the 1,303 documents was Reason:Murder, coded 
564 times. “On August 5, 2010, a group of doctors, nurses, and medical practitioners, including 
six U.S. citizens, were shot and killed near their vehicles in Badakhshan province as they 
completed a medical aid visit to remote areas in nearby Nuristan province” (DOS, Afghanistan a, 
2010). Perhaps the most difficult part of this exploratory exercise was coding these documents, 
line by line, and periodically succumbing to the despair of the human condition—in war, 
conflict, famine, and pestilence. These Travel Warnings and Alerts represent the worst that can 
happen to the people of a nation. The code, Reason:Murder, represented only one type of 
mortality. Not in the top 25, both Reason:Assassination and Reason:Death were also coded. The 
differences are nuanced, but important. Reason:Murder was used if one person’s death was 
caused by another. Reason:Assassination was used if that person was of political importance. 
Reason:Death was used when an individual died not by the hand of another human, but instead 
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by natural disaster (flood, earthquake, storm, landslide, mudslide, tsunami, drought, etc.), 
famine, or major disease outbreak. 
Table 3 
 
Top 25 Reason Codes 
  
Reason Code Frequency 
Reason:Murder 564 
Reason:Violence:U.S.Targeted* 511 
Reason:Terrorism 485 
Reason:Threat 406 
Reason:Demonstrations 381 
Reason:Kidnapping 380 
Reason:Potential:Violence** 328 
Reason:Crime/Criminal 258 
Reason:ParamilitaryActivity 243 
Reason:Risk*** 243 
Reason:Security:Concerns/Incidents 209 
Reason:Anti-American/Western 204 
Reason:Military 199 
Reason:Elections 185 
Reason:Violence:Foreign/Non-U.S.Victims:Targeted 184 
Reason:Roads:Impeded 177 
Reason:Al-Qaeda 161 
Reason:Unpredictable 154 
Reason:Danger*** 153 
Reason:Robbery 150 
Reason:Tensions 127 
Reason:Violence:Criminal 124 
Reason:Unrest:Civil/Social/Political 117 
Reason:Extremists 107 
Reason:Landmines 103 
Reason:Carjacking 101 
Reason:Rebels/Rebellion 101 
Reason:DiplomaticPersonnel:Attacked/Injured/Killed/Targeted 99 
Reason:Detention 98 
*Expanded to include different types of Violence codes 
**Expanded to include different types of Potential codes 
***Not included in top 25 discussion because all Reason codes reflect 
risk/danger, despite this specific word being used in documents coded  
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The next most salient code was Reason:Violence:U.S.Targeted, coded 511 times. This 
category broadly catches many types of violence exacted upon U.S. targets, be they American 
citizens and government personnel, diplomatic and military facilities, or business interests. The 
August 7, 2001 Travel Warning for Yemen read: “The Department of State continues to warn 
United States citizens to defer travel to Yemen in light of recent events, including the terrorist 
attack on a U.S. Navy vessel in port at Aden, Yemen, in October 2000” (DOS, Yemen a, 2001). 
Violence of some type, like Reason:Violence:Criminal, found further down on the top 25 Reason 
code list, was so ubiquitous throughout the sample that types of violence needed to be further 
categorized, and the top 25 violence codes are presented at the end of this section in Table 4.  
Returning to the top 25 Reason code list, Reason:Terrorism was coded 485 times. 
Terrorism was exacted using many of the same codes that appear on the top 25 Reason code list. 
Reason:Threat was used 406 times and was referred to more existentially; for example, “The 
[Abu Sayyaf Group] ASG remains a security threat to areas of Malaysia near the Southern 
Philippines” (DOS, Malaysia a, 2001). Demonstrations proved to be a very common reason at 
381 times coded, and they were often mentioned in tandem with an outburst of violence or 
potential violence. Demonstrations were often connected to elections or referenda, but also 
included protests and strikes. In Ecuador, the Public Announcement on February 7, 1997 noted, 
“There continue to be localized demonstrations sponsored by the political parties, and there have 
been sporadic incidents of violence” (DOS, Ecuador a, 1997). Advice to avoid crowds and 
demonstrations, even seemingly peaceful ones, almost always followed. Reason:Kidnapping was 
coded 380 times, and was an endemic form of terror, intimidation, and revenue (from ransom). 
Kidnapping appeared in numerous countries, but none so seriously as Colombia: 
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About 2,200 kidnapping incidents were reported throughout Colombia in 2003. 
Since the year 2000, 28 Americans were reported kidnapped in various parts of 
the country. American kidnap or murder victims have included journalists, 
missionaries, scientists, human rights workers, U.S. government employees and 
businesspeople, as well as persons on tourism or family visits, and even small 
children. No one can be considered immune on the basis of occupation, 
nationality or any other factor. Most kidnappings of U.S. citizens in Colombia 
have been committed by terrorist groups, including the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), which 
have been designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations by the Secretary of State. 
Since it is U.S. policy not to make concessions to, or strike deals with, terrorists, 
the U.S government’s ability to assist kidnapped U.S. citizens is limited (DOS,  
Colombia a, 2004). 
 
In some instances in certain countries, the State Department advised holding a kidnap insurance 
policy. The next code was Reason:Potential:Violence coded at 328 times, and it calls attention to 
a special category that emerged across the Travel Warning and Alert sample—potential danger. 
There were so many of these Reason:Potential codes that they are broken down with 
explanations into a longer list of their own at the end of this section in Table 5. 
 Next in the top 25 Reason codes, Reason:Criminal was coded 258 times. Crime was 
described in all the regular ways, ranging from criminal violence to non-violent theft. Some 
criminal activity warnings were extremely nuanced. In the Travel Warning for Burundi on 
January 8, 2009, the State Department explained: “Common crimes include muggings, 
burglaries, robberies, and carjackings” (DOS, Burundi a, 2009). Those crimes are decidedly all 
bad, but it is a wonder as to how one differs from the other. Perhaps a house gets burgled, a 
business gets robbed, and a person gets mugged; nonetheless, all possibilities are addressed. 
 Paramilitary activity was coded 243 times, and it was used when the word paramilitary 
was written explicitly, but also for operations by armed groups, insurgents, rebels, terrorist 
groups, and guerillas. Jumping further down the top 25 list, a related code, 
 61 
 
Reason:Rebels/Rebellion was also used 101 times when such activity was limited to a group 
rebelling against the ruling party. The code Reason:Security:Concerns/Incidents was found in 
sentences that were often used vaguely in the opening paragraphs of Travel Warnings and Alerts 
and then followed by more specific information and advice. For example, the Travel Warning for 
Jordan that was issued on February 7, 2003 begins with this sentence: “This Travel Warning is 
being issued to alert Americans to increased security concerns in Jordan” (DOS, Jordan a, 2003). 
It was such a common phrase across the travel advice documents that it merited coding, despite 
not being overly specific. 
 Reason:Anti-American/Western was also a common code, and it was used 204 times. 
This type of information transmits to the would-be traveler that not only is a given location 
dangerous, but that it is specifically dangerous for the American traveler. “Rallies, 
demonstrations and processions occur from time to time throughout Pakistan on very short notice 
and have occasionally taken on an anti-American or anti-Western character (DOS, Pakistan b, 
1999).” In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Travel Warning for April 13, 2001 stated: “There have been 
recent outbreaks of mob violence against American citizens and other members of the 
international community, particularly in the Herzegovina region” (DOS, Bosnia-Herzegovina a, 
2001).  
Coded 199 times, Reason:Military referred to military activity or operations that made a 
particular country or region within a country unsafe for visitors. Usually, military activity was 
representative of some type of conflict, and, generally speaking, a country in a state of military 
conflict exposes travelers to serious danger. This code was typically accompanied by sub-codes 
specific to the military, such as the military being attacked or military personnel being killed, 
soldiers being undisciplined and poorly trained, military corruption, and decommissioned 
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soldiers engaging in criminal activity. The July 27, 1999 Travel Warning for Angola warned 
Americans that “Travel within Angola remains unsafe due to high-intensity military actions, 
bandit attacks, undisciplined police and military personnel, and land mines in rural areas” (DOS, 
Angola a, 1999).  
 An election was another reason that the State Department used regularly to caution 
American travelers.  Coded 185 times, Reason:Elections tended to appear more in Travel Alerts, 
since elections are usually fleeting. The necessity for alerting Americans to upcoming elections 
in given countries is because in many countries, elections are a time of conflict and strife. 
Transitions of power may not be peaceful, as Americans are accustomed to in the United States. 
Losing parties and their supporters may demonstrate, and demonstrations may suddenly turn 
from peaceful to violent. A typical example of language used regarding elections throughout the 
sample is found in this early Public Announcement:  
Nicaragua will hold national elections on October 20, 1996, as well as a potential 
runoff round for the President in late November or early December. Substantial 
numbers of international observers and other travelers are expected in Nicaragua 
during that period of October 1 through December 15. To date, the political 
campaign has been peaceful, and no disturbances are expected on election day. 
However, visitors to Nicaragua should exercise particular caution during this 
period. It may be prudent to avoid large crowds (DOS, Nicaragua a, 1996). 
 
In many instances, international observers for the assurance of fair elections were not present, 
and campaigns were not peaceful. In nearly all election warnings and alerts, the State 
Department advised Americans to avoid demonstrations and crowds of any form. 
 The State Department did not only report anti-American violence, but any kind of 
violence exacted upon the local population or other visitors.  Reason:Violence:Foreign/Non-
U.S.Victims:/Targeted was coded 184 times and was coded to capture any information provided 
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about local civilians and other non-U.S. citizen victims of violence or targeting in the host 
country. In Pakistan: “Kidnappings of foreigners are particularly common in the Northwest 
Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan. In 2008, one Iranian and two Afghan diplomats, two 
Chinese engineers, and a Polish engineer were kidnapped in NWFP” (DOS, Pakistan a, 2009). 
 The code Roads:Impeded was recorded 177 times. Official and unofficial road block 
checkpoints, road washouts, road damage, shakedowns by armed gunmen for extortion or worse, 
and even blockades were ubiquitous throughout the sample. This would leave American travelers 
confined to cities and off the open road for overland travel. Impeded roads of any kind is 
extremely limiting, and American travelers would need to think very carefully about how they 
would safely convey themselves from one city to another, especially if air travel was also 
unreliable or less available.  
 The only terrorist or paramilitary group to appear enough times to be included in the top 
25 codes was Al-Qaeda. Reason:Al-Qaeda was coded 161 times. Other similar groups appeared, 
too, but less frequently, like the Taliban in Afghanistan, Hamas in Gaza, Boko Haram in Nigeria, 
Al-Shabaab in Somalia, Maoists in Nepal, and more recently ISIS across the Middle East, among 
others. An interesting code that appeared 154 times was Reason:Unpredictable. During the 
Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the State Department reported that, “The situation along 
the border is unpredictable and could change quickly. Armed, pro-Russian groups are reportedly 
traveling illegally across the border into Ukraine and could increase the potential for clashes in 
Russia near the border” (DOS, Russia a, 2014). The unpredictable code reflects the difficult 
situation in which the State Department regularly finds itself—it has to warn Americans of 
danger that may or may not happen, but very well could and has come to be in the past. Crowds 
and demonstrations are unpredictable, autocrats are unpredictable, severe weather is 
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unpredictable, disease outbreaks are unpredictable, and paramilitary groups are unpredictable. 
While some American travelers may find solace in knowing that something that might happen 
has not yet happened and decide to go through with their travel plans, the State Department 
cannot be so carefree. Unpredictable is a dangerous state.  
 Reason:Robbery was coded 150 times and included types of theft that were mentioned 
before, such as muggings, petty theft, pick pocketing, and burglaries. Reason:Tensions and 
Reason:Unrest:Civil/Social/Political were coded 127 and 117 times, respectively, and were used 
vaguely in a way similar to that of Reason:SecurityConcerns/Incidents, which was explained 
earlier—typically in the first few sentences of a travel advice document. Helpfully, these more 
vague codes were consistently supported by more succinct pieces of information in the larger 
body of each document. Reason:Extremists appeared 107 times, and this code was only used 
when the word extremist was used explicitly, usually in the form of ‘extremist group’ or 
‘extremist element’, which was then accompanied with their corresponding violent activity. 
Reason:Landmines, coded 103 times, was an unfortunately common code. This legacy of 
conflict was often accompanied with ‘unexploded ordnance’ or ‘unexploded ammunition’ and 
then followed by advice on how to attempt to avoid them. In a 1997 Travel Warning for 
Afghanistan, it noted that “Landmines are still prevalent throughout the countryside. Close to 
10,000,000 landmines and tons of unexploded ammunition pose a danger to all visitors” (DOS, 
Afghanistan a, 1997). In the Lebanon Travel Warning of January 31, 2014, the State Department 
warned:  
Landmines and unexploded ordnance pose significant dangers throughout 
southern Lebanon, particularly south of the Litani River, as well as in areas of the 
country where fighting was intense during the civil war. More than 40 civilians 
have been killed and more than 300 injured by unexploded ordnance remaining 
from the 2006 Israel-Hizballah war. Travelers should watch for posted landmine 
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warnings and strictly avoid all areas where landmines and unexploded ordnance 
may be present (DOS, Lebanon a, 2014).  
 
 Coded 101 times, Reason:Carjacking merited its own code outside of simply 
Reason:Robbery because it seemed pervasive and complicated beyond simple pickpocketing or 
purse-snatching. Carjacking is a commandeering action that can simultaneously include 
kidnapping and/or murder. Reason:DiplomaticPersonnel:Attacked/Injured/Killed/Targeted was 
coded 99 times, which was a revealing code and not always pertaining to just U.S. diplomatic 
personnel and facilities. In Turkey, a 2003 Travel Warning issued on the same day of the 
incident in question noted: “On November 20, the British Consulate General and the London-
based HSBC bank in Istanbul were damaged by powerful explosions, killing dozens and 
wounding hundreds” (DOS, Turkey a, 2003). In Zimbabwe: “In November 2002, U.S. Embassy 
staff members were detained and one was beaten by war veterans on a farm near Harare” (DOS, 
Zimbabwe a, 2003). In Sudan: “On January 1, 2008, two American Embassy employees were 
assassinated while traveling in their vehicle in Khartoum” (DOS, Sudan a, 2009). In Ciudad 
Juarez, Mexico: “Three persons associated with the Consulate General were murdered in March, 
2010” (DOS, Mexico a, 2011). Diplomats, by their very purpose, are not warriors, and violence 
against them is an especially meaningful piece of information for American travelers to 
contemplate prior to making their travel arrangements.  
 Reason:Detention, coded 98 times, is the final code on the top 25 Reason list. It comes 
with some associated sub-codes, including detention for unsubstantiated allegations and 
detention for dual citizenship (i.e., being a host country citizen as well as a citizen of the United 
States). In a Public Announcement for China in 2001, the State Department warned: 
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The Ministry of State Security (MSS) of the People’s Republic of China has 
recently taken into custody several American citizens and U.S. permanent 
residents of Chinese origin. Of these, at least two Americans are now being 
detained by the Chinese authorities under suspicion of espionage or damaging 
China’s national security, even though the Chinese Government has not offered 
any evidence to substantiate the allegations. Others have been questioned for up 
to four days and then released. …It should be noted as well that the Americans 
recently detained by MSS had previously visited China without incident, but were 
nonetheless detained during their most recent visits (DOS, China a, 2001). 
 
These codes were occasionally accompanied by Reason:HarshPrisonConditions. For example:  
A number of Eritrean-U.S. dual citizens have been arrested without apparent 
cause. Once arrested, detainees may be held for extended periods without being 
told the purpose of their incarceration. Conditions are harsh—those incarcerated 
may be held in very small quarters without access to restrooms, bedding, food, or 
clean water. The Eritrean government does not inform the U.S. Embassy when 
U.S. citizens, including those who are not dual nationals, have been arrested or 
detained (DOS, Eritrea a, 2001).  
 
 The Reason codes were the most numerous, far more than the Background and Verb 
codes. A complete list of Reason codes can be viewed in Appendix D, and they are interesting.  
The rest of the codes include occurrences one can easily imagine to those that are less 
predictable. They include natural disasters such as volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, mudslides, 
floods, hurricanes, and tsunamis. Disease outbreaks like Ebola, SARS, cholera, dysentery, 
malaria, typhoid, gastroenteritis, and foot/hoof and mouth ravaged too many people in too many 
countries. There was ‘hooliganism’ in Japan and predatory scams from Nigeria, the emails with 
which many Americans are long familiar. Apostasy in Iran, that is, the abandonment of Islam 
and conversion to an alternate religion, was subject to arrest and possible execution. Cash 
shortages in Argentina and Madagascar and angry youth in France and Monaco were others, 
while corruption, martial law, poachers, curfews, and mutiny made appearances in various 
countries. Chadian authorities demanded the registration of satellite phones. It seems as if the list 
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is exhaustive, and it is difficult to imagine there could be any other reasons for danger that have 
not already happened and were not recorded in a State Department Travel Warning or Alert.  
 As mentioned earlier, there were multiple codes that emerged about violence—so many 
that it was important to explore them separately. On the next page in Table 4, there are the top 25 
of 67 types of violence coded, the complete list of which can be viewed in the list of all Reason 
codes in Appendix D. Evidently, bombs and other explosives, coded 358 times, were presented 
as a preferred and common means to exercise violence, contributing to murder and injury (coded 
286 times, with various causes) throughout the sample. Suicide bombings began appearing in the 
sample in 2003, also on the list and coded 93 times. Other forms of violence that appear on the 
top 25 Reason:Violence list are some the reader might expect—violence caused by drug 
trafficking, criminal, political, and sectarian violence, shootings, fighting, and, of course, war. 
Perhaps the most desperate form a violence coded was Reason:Violence:RockThrowing, which 
seems to be reserved for the most powerless and desperate. “There have been demonstrations in 
Khartoum against United States foreign policy. In some instances, demonstrators have thrown 
rocks at the U.S. Embassy and Westerners. Americans should avoid large crowds and 
demonstrations” (DOS, Sudan a, 2003). Another code is noteworthy specifically because it did 
not make the top 25. The code Reason:Violence:Rape did not appear as a reason in a Travel 
Warning or Alert until 2004, which likely is not because rape was absent as a form of violence in 
country subjects of Travel Warnings from 1994 to 2003, but rather was not included for reasons 
unknown. 
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Table 4 
 
Top 25 Reason:Violence Codes 
  
Reason:Violence Code Frequency 
Reason:Violence:U.S.Targeted 511 
Reason:Violence 485 
Reason:Violence:Bomb/Bombing/Explosives 358 
Reason:Violence:Attacks 335 
Reason:Violence:Injuries 286 
Reason:Violence:Shooting 180 
Reason:Violence:AgainstCivilians 167 
Reason:Violence:ArmedConflict/Clashes 162 
Reason:Violence:Criminal 124 
Reason:Violence:SuicideBombing 93 
Reason:Violence:Fighting 89 
Reason:Violence:Rocket/MissileLaunches 69 
Reason:Violence:Hostility 58 
Reason:Violence:Political 54 
Reason:Violence:Vehicles:Attacked 54 
Reason:Violence:Assault 38 
Reason:Violence:Riots 38 
Reason:Violence:NarcoTrafficker 36 
Reason:Violence:SoftTargets 32 
Reason:Violence:Buses:Attacked 31 
Reason:Violence:RockThrowing 27 
Reason:Violence:Sectarian 27 
Reason:Violence:Ambush 26 
Reason:Violence:CivilWar 26 
Reason:Violence:Arson 24 
 
 As seen on the next page in Table 5, there are numerous potential Reason codes that were 
also broken down into their own list. The State Department presented certain reasons that 
justified their Warning and Alert documents, and those reasons tended to have happened or were 
happening at the time. However, there was another category of reasons the State Department 
wanted travelers to consider, and they concerned not just what had happened, but what could 
happen. These were coded as Reason:Potential:_______. For example, there was kidnapping, 
 69 
 
and then there was potential kidnapping. In other words, Americans were warned about both 
actualities and potentialities. 
Table 5 
 
Top 25 Reason:Potential Codes 
  
Reason:Potential Code Frequency 
Reason:Potential:Violence 329 
Reason:Potential:Terrorism 171 
Reason:Potential:U.S.Govt:Personnel/Facilities/Citizens/BusinessesTargeted… 141 
Reason:Potential:Kidnapping 90 
Reason:Potential:Attacks 86 
Reason:Potential:Demonstrations 79 
Reason:Potential:Danger 59 
Reason:Potential:Unrest:Civil/Political/Social 46 
Reason:Potential:Bomb/Bombing/Explosives 43 
Reason:Potential:Arrest/Detention 42 
Reason:Potential:InterruptionInServices 37 
Reason:Potential:U.S.Embassy:Closure/SuspensionofServices/Evacuation 33 
Reason:Potential:Crime 21 
Reason:Potential:SuicideOperations 20 
Reason:Potential:Instability 17 
Reason:Potential:TransportationINterrupted 16 
Reason:Potential:Harassment 15 
Reason:Potential:Assassination 12 
Reason:Potential:Robbery 11 
Reason:Potential:Deportation 9 
Reason:Potential:Hostility 9 
Reason:Potential:Injury 9 
Reason:Potential:Murder 8 
Reason:Potential:Retaliation 8 
Reason:Potential:Roadblocks 8 
 
Reason Code Content Analysis 
 Taking the content analysis deeper to better understand patterns in the Reason codes, the 
top 25 Reason codes were categorized into four categories. Level one of open coding in the  
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Table 6 
 
Reason Codes Analyzed 
  
 
Open Coding 
Level 1 
Axial Coding 
Level 2 
Thematic Coding  
Level 3 
Murder (564)   
Violence:U.S.Targeted (511)   
Terrorism (485)   
Potential:Violence (328) Violence (2,299)   
Violence:Foreign/Non-U.S.Victims:Targeted (184)  Harm (3,087) 
Violence:Criminal (124)   
Landmines (103)   
Kidnapping (380)   
Crime/Criminal (258) Criminal (788)  
Robbery (150)   
ParamilitaryActivity (243)   
Military (199) Actors (710) Actors (710) 
Al-Qaeda (161)   
Extremists (107)   
Demonstrations (381)   
Anti-American/Western (204) Circumstantial (947)  
Elections (185)   
Roads:Impeded (177)   
Threat (406)   
Risk (243)  Concern (2,356) 
Security:Concerns/Incidents (209)   
Unpredictable (154) Existential (1,409)  
Danger (153)   
Tensions (127)   
Unrest:Civil/Social/Political (117)   
 
content analysis is considered descriptive; in other words, each reason provided by the State 
Department for issuance of the Travel Warning or Alert was coded as Reason, as was just 
described at length. The researcher extrapolated the next two levels of coding based on 
observation of patterns. The second level of axial coding categorized these Reason codes into 
five groups: Violence, Criminal, Actors, Circumstantial, and Existential. This content analysis is 
seen in Table 6. In the top 25 Reason codes alone, the codes categorized as Violence appeared 
2,299 times. They include murder, violence targeted at U.S. interests, terrorism, potential 
violence, violence that targeted foreign/non-U.S. interests, criminal violence, and landmines. The 
countries with the most Warnings and Alerts with these Violence category codes are Mexico, 
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Philippines, Israel, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Mauritania, Kenya, Lebanon, 
Somalia, and El Salvador. It is perhaps not surprising to find that these countries tend to have the 
most violence category codes. Mexico’s narcotrafficking violence has become an endemic 
problem there. Israel’s neighbors are hostile on almost all sides. Somalia is a failed state.  
 The next group of top 25 Reason codes were distilled into a second level as Criminal. 
The included codes were kidnapping, crime/criminal, and robbery. Again, Mexico appeared at 
the top of the list with the most criminal category codes. It was followed by Guatemala, 
Honduras, El Salvador, Nigeria, Philippines, Colombia, and Afghanistan. The emergence of 
more Central American countries may be related to narcotrafficking that flows from Colombia 
through Mexico, where cartels compete violently over territory. Colombia is also notorious for 
its history of kidnapping. The next axial category among the top 25 Reason codes is Actors, 
which include paramilitary, military, extremists, and Al-Qaeda. Mauritania and Mali were at the 
top of the Actors list, particularly for Al-Qaeda activity. Lebanon was also the most coded for 
these Actors, and not for just one in particular, but all. Nigeria followed for extremist elements. 
This Actors category captures the perpetrators of major violence and conflict in countries that are 
the subjects of Warnings and Alerts. While these countries are all developing economies 
according to the U.N., they have different forms of government, both autocratic and not (un.org, 
2016; Geddes et al, 2014).  
The next two categories of Reason codes are Circumstantial and Existential. The content 
analysis proceeded into the third level of thematic coding, placing these two groups of axial 
Reason codes into a theme called Concern. They reflect non-specific concerns like: risk, 
tensions, demonstrations, etc. The categories of Violence and Criminal described for groups of 
Reason codes above were themed as Harm. Actors maintained that title for the third level theme. 
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The pattern here is that these documents are largely divided between reasons that are imminently 
dangerous, including life threatening, to not so dangerous. Most of the Reason codes reflect an 
imminent level of harm. The other portion of Reason codes are still nasty in and of themselves, 
but are more of concern rather than imminently life threatening. Next, along with each reason the 
State Department provided for Americans to give traveling to a particular destination a second 
thought, there was advice. If one intended to travel to a country ‘despite a warning’ or ‘despite 
an alert’—common phrases found and coded in hundreds of those documents—the State 
Department had advice for doing so to enhance one’s chances for a safer stay. 
Verb Codes 
 The third main code group was Verb:___________, and this coding choice was made to 
not only explore what type of advice the State Department imparted to potential travelers, but 
how that advice was given. The top 25 Verb codes can be seen in Table 7 on the following page. 
In other words, these codes explored for the type of language used with regard to firmness. Did 
the State Department lightly suggest one avoid a certain country, or did it explicitly state not to 
take one action or another? The list of Verb codes is longer than the Background code list, but 
has fewer codes than the Reason code list. At 199 codes total (see Appendix E), the Verb codes 
reflect directives and suggestions provided by the State Department in relation to the nature of 
the danger described in a given Travel Document or Alert.  For example, the Congo Travel 
Warning of June 17, 1997 states: “The Department of State warns U.S. citizens to cancel travel 
to the Congo-Brazzaville due to the deteriorated security situation and the suspension of the 
operations of the U.S. Embassy in Brazzaville” (DOS, Congo a, 1997). Two advice verbs were 
used in this sentence: ‘warns’ and ‘cancel’.  They were coded Verb:Warns and 
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Verb:Cancel:Travel. While Verb:Warns was an extremely common verb, coded 274 times, 
Verb:Cancel:Travel was coded only once out of over 1,300 documents.  
Table 7 
 
Top 25 Verb Codes 
  
Verb Code Frequency 
Verb:Urge* 633 
Verb:Exercise:Caution/Prudence/Vigilance/GoodJudgement 590 
Verb:Register/Enroll:WithU.S.Embassy/Consulate/STEP 556 
Verb:Avoid/BeAlertTo:Crowds/Demonstrations 392 
Verb:Avoid:TravelToSpecificAreas 318 
Verb:Encourages* 305 
Verb:Travel:Defer/CurtailPostpone/ReduceForgo/CarefullyConsider/Avoid 298 
Verb:PersonalSecurity:Evaluation/BeAlertTo/BeAware 293 
Verb:Warns* 274 
Verb:Travel:Warns/Cautions/RecommendsAgainst 202 
Verb:Advise* 197 
Verb:BeAlertTo/AwareOf:Surroundings/Situation 176 
Verb:Monitor:News 169 
Verb:TakePrecautions:Security 156 
Verb:Alerts* 145 
Verb:Reminds* 143 
Verb:Depart* 132 
Verb:Consider* 131 
Verb:Maintain/Keep:LowProfile 130 
Verb:Monitor:Situation 87 
Verb:Vary/Take:AlternateRoute 87 
Verb:Travel:DuringDay/AvoidNightTravel 82 
Verb:Avoid/BeAlertIn:AreasPopularWithWesterners/Foreigners 71 
Verb:Maintain:Passport/VisaValidity 66 
Verb:Report:ConcernsToU.S.Embassy 58 
Verb:Avoid* 48 
Verb:BeAware* 46 
Verb:Follow:OfficialInstructions 46 
Verb:Have:EmergencyEvacuationPlan 45 
Verb:Avoid:PublicAreas 42 
Verb:Avoid:PublicTransportation 34 
Verb:Stay:Indoors 32 
Verb:BeAlertTo:Unexpected:Visitors/Packages/Incidents 29 
Verb:Carry:TravelDocuments/PhotoID 29 
Verb:Avoid:OverlandTravel 28 
*Not counted in Top 25 because verb without advice  
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Only once was the State Department so explicit as to write “cancel travel”. It is an interesting 
stance for the State Department to take—a suggestive stance (warns) more often than a directive 
stance (cancel). It seems that the State Department was and is much more comfortable with 
suggesting Americans ‘defer’ travel or ‘carefully consider’, ‘curtail’, ‘postpone’, ‘reduce’, 
‘forgo’, or ‘avoid’ it. Over the course of the sample, the State Department ‘warned’ and 
‘recommended against’ travel, but rarely used language as bold as ‘cancel’. “Verb:Depart” coded 
at 132 times was an example of a more explicitly directive code, but it was aimed at Americans 
already in a country when danger arose.  The top 25 Verb codes are explored here (see Table 7 
above), with some supporting tables for certain verb categories.  
If the State Department does one thing the most in its travel advice documents, it ‘urges’. 
More than any other Verb code, Verb:Urge was coded 633 times. While it is the top code, the top 
25 Verb code discussion will focus on verbs that come with specific advice. These stand-alone 
codes, like ‘urge’, will be mentioned, though. Verb:Urge rarely stood alone; it was regularly 
accompanied by some other type of supporting and suggestive verb. The State Department 
“urged [Americans] to exercise extreme caution” in Algeria (DOS, Algeria a, 1995), “urged 
[Americans] to avoid all travel in Iraq” (DOS, Iraq a, 1998), it frequently “urged [Americans] to 
register with the U.S. Embassy” (DOS, Fiji a, 2001), and it “urged [Americans] to be alert for 
unusual behavior” in Macedonia (DOS, Macedonia a, 2002).  
The code Verb:Exercise:Caution/Prudence/Vigilance/GoodJudgement was used 590 
times. The advice verb was ‘exercise’, and it appeared quite regularly and was accompanied by 
either ‘caution’, ‘prudence’, ‘vigilance’, or ‘good judgement’. This type of advice moves into a 
subjective space. While good judgement is exercised much less frequently than some people of 
the world may desire, the more pressing questions are, what exactly is ‘vigilance’ and does the 
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layman reader understand how to exercise it? After all, parents do not shout out to their children 
as they leave for school to remember their lunches and be vigilant; it is simply not used 
colloquially in the United States (and Americans are the target audience for these Warnings and 
Alerts) but appears in these documents quite regularly. 
In the Travel Warning for Bosnia-Herzegovina on March 30, 2006, “Travelers are 
warned to exercise additional vigilance in urban areas to avoid being victimized during 
confrontational crime” (DOS, Bosnia-Herzegovina a, 2006). The words ‘avoid being victimized’ 
taken in isolation is advice frustrating enough, but the sentence as a whole leaves the layman 
traveler without actual concrete advice on what it means to exercise vigilance (or prudence or 
good judgment). This point would not be belabored to this extent if this particular code was not 
the second most frequent Verb code, meaning that many Travel Warnings and Alerts present this 
advice without the context needed. One standout example of a Travel Warning that did provide 
the context of what it means to be vigilant was issued for Syria on September 14, 2006:  
Americans in Syria should exercise caution and take prudent measures to 
maintain their security. These measures include being aware of their 
surroundings, avoiding crowds and demonstrations, keeping a low profile, varying 
times and routes for all required travel, and ensuring travel documents are current 
(DOS, Syria a, 2006).  
 
To be sure, all Travel Warnings and Alerts are full of advice, even when they use vague 
terminology as previously described. It is clear, though, that there is a diplomatic security 
vernacular that the State Department uses, and, as described above, it may not be language that is 
meaningful to the untrained traveler. Following the Syria Travel Warning’s explicit connection 
of what it means to be vigilant could be put to good use by the State Department if applied to 
more travel advice documents.  
 76 
 
Coded 556 times, Verb:Register/Enroll:WithU.S.Embassy/Consulate/STEP mostly 
appeared at the conclusion of many documents. STEP refers to the Smart Traveler Enrollment 
Program (step.state.gov, 2016). In the early years studied, travelers were ‘urged’ to register their 
presence with the nearest U.S. Embassy or Consulate in the subject country of the Warning or 
Alert. This allowed the consular personnel to know how many Americans were in the host 
country in the event they needed to communicate emergency or evacuation information to the 
U.S. citizens present; occasionally, this was explained. Over time, the documents implied that the 
State Department automated this process with the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program.  
Verb:Avoid/BeAlertTo:Crowds/Demonstrations was a very common code, coded 392 
times. In Haiti: “Crowd behavior is unpredictable, and violence can flare up at any time, so 
American citizens are warned to avoid political gatherings and demonstrations” (DOS, Haiti a, 
2001). ‘Avoid’ was a particularly popular verb that was coupled with various types advice. Table 
8 shows all the “Verb:Avoid:________” codes at the end of this section.  
Returning to the top 25 Verb codes, the next one is Verb:Avoid:TravelToSpecificAreas, 
coded 318 times. Also on the Avoid code list, this particular code was useful. Essentially, all 
Travel Warnings and Alerts are suggesting one avoid travel to a particular country, but in many 
cases that advice is rather specific. This code accounts for that specificity. A Travel Warning and 
Alert for a given country does not imply that the entire country is unsafe. During 2014’s invasion 
of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia, the Ukraine Travel Warning stated: “The Department of 
State warns U.S. citizens to defer all non-essential travel to Ukraine and to defer all travel to the 
Crimean Peninsula and eastern regions of Kharkiv, Donetsk and Lugansk due to the presence of 
Russian military forces in the Crimean Peninsula, and in Russia near the Ukrainian border” 
(DOS, Ukraine a, 2014). The italicized portion of that sentence is what merited the 
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Verb:TravelToSpecificAreas code. Notice the difference between ‘defer all non-essential travel 
to Ukraine’ and ‘defer all travel to the Crimean Peninsula…’. The term ‘non-essential travel’ 
was a stand-alone code not categorized under Background, Reason, or Verb that was coded 176 
times because it was prevalent across the Warning and Alert documents. 
Verb:TravelToSpecificAreas is a useful code because it allows the American traveler to discern 
as to which parts of a given country he or she could travel with less risk. This is important 
information for official travel, allowing corporations or universities, for example, to have a better 
understanding of where their constituents may travel with less risk. 
Next in the Verb list is Verb:Encourages at 305 times coded. Like Verb:Urge, this verb 
was always associated with follow-on verbal advice, such as American citizens are encouraged 
to register with the U.S. Embassy in such and such place. There are a number of verbs like these, 
which appear in Table 7’s Verb Code list because of their high frequency, but are not counted 
toward the 25 concrete verbal advice codes. The others are Verb:Warns, Verb:Advise, 
Verb:Alerts, Verb:Reminds, Verb:Depart, Verb:Consider, Verb:Avoid, and Verb:BeAware. 
Similar supporting verbs were regularly associated with the noun ‘travel’ and almost always 
appeared in the first sentence, coded as 
Verb:Travel:Defer/Curtail/Postpone/Reduce/Forgo/CarefullyConsider/Avoid, which was coded 
298 times. Often the term ‘non-essential’, as mentioned earlier, would precede the word ‘travel’. 
Coded further down the top 25 Verb list 202 times is stronger language: 
Verb:Travel:Warns/Cautions/RecommendsAgainst.  
 A very common piece of advice was for the traveler to evaluate, be alert to, or be aware 
of his or her personal security. Coded 293 times, 
Verb:PersonalSecurity:Evaluate/BeAlertTo/BeAware would often be presented thusly: 
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“American citizens who remain in Algeria despite this warning are urged to exercise maximum 
caution and to evaluate regularly their personal security practices” (DOS,  Algeria a, 1997). This 
quote presents an opportunity to bring attention to another stand-alone code that did not fall 
under the Background, Reason, or Verb categories, which is the italicized ‘despite this warning’. 
This appeared quite regularly throughout the sample and appears to be the State Department’s 
way of telling Americans that they have been duly warned and that they proceed with travel at 
their own risk.  
 Verb:BeAlertTo/AwareOf:Surroundings/Situation was coded 176 times and perhaps is a 
better way to advise Americans to be vigilant. Verb:Monitor:News and Verb:Monitor:Situation 
were coded 169 and 87 times, respectively. For Senegal, the State Department wrote: “U.S. 
citizens planning to travel to Senegal during and immediately following the elections should 
monitor local news, assess local conditions and travel routes, and consult Embassy Dakar’s 
website for emergency messages to U.S. Citizens” (DOS, Senegal a, 2011). 
Verb:TakePrecautions:Security was coded 156 times. Sometimes it appeared as advice imparted 
without context, and other times documents could be very specific. Those precautions tended to 
be many of the codes that appeared on the top 25 Verb list. One of them, 
Verb:Maintain/Keep:LowProfile, coded 130 times, was quite common; not attracting attention to 
oneself, when possible, seemed to be staple advice. Verb:Vary/Take:AlternateRoute and 
Verb:Travel:DuringDay/AvoidNightTravel were coded 87 and 82 times, respectively, and are 
succinct. Verb:Avoid/BeAlertIn:AreasPopularWithWesterners/Foreigners, coded 71 times, 
appeared in places where Westerners and non-Western foreigners were targeted: 
Historically, Americans have been the targets of numerous terrorist attacks in 
Lebanon. The perpetrators of many of these attacks are still present and retain the 
ability to act. American citizens should thus keep a low profile, varying times and 
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routes for all required travel. Americans should also pay close attention to their 
personal security at locations where Westerners are generally known to 
congregate, and should avoid demonstrations and large gatherings (DOS, 
Lebanon a, 2006).  
 
 The codes remaining in top 25 Verb codes are also very succinct. They called for 
Americans to maintain their passport and visa validity (coded 66 times) to avoid trouble with 
host country authorities and immigration officers and to report concerns to the U.S. Embassy 
(coded 58 times). Cooperation with local authorities meant for less trouble, so the code 
Verb:FollowOfficialInstructions was used 46 times and seemed to be associated with official 
roadblocks or check-in points. The State Department asked that travelers have emergency 
evacuation plans (coded 45 times) and that they avoid public areas and public transportation, 
coded 42 and 34 times, respectively. Verb:Stay:Indoors was coded 32 times and was often 
associated with nightfall. There was an instance of very specific advice about staying indoors, 
which contrasts very broad advice used in other instances. In a Travel Warning for Burundi: 
“U.S. citizens should stay indoors, in a ground floor interior room, if gunfire occurs nearby” 
(DOS, Burundi a, 2010). If an interior room means a room with no windows, then it makes sense 
that it would be a space that is safer from bullet fire, but why the ground floor? Perhaps it is 
easier to escape from the ground floor if absconding is merited, but without that context, it is 
perplexing advice. Verb:BeAlertTo:Unexpected:Visitors/Packages/Incidents, coded 29 times, 
was a specifically useful piece of advice and is a good example of what one could do to 
operationalize exercising vigilance. A 1996 Public Announcement for Paraguay asked private 
U.S. citizens to exercise caution: “General personal security guidelines include varying 
schedules and routes; being alert to surveillance, unusual events, unexpected visitors, and strange 
vehicles or packages” (DOS, Paraguay a, 1996). Also coded 29 times, American travelers were 
advised to carry their travel documents and photo identification and, 28 times coded, to avoid 
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overland travel. The term ‘overland travel’ was another example of State Department security 
vernacular. It is certainly easy to understand its meaning, so it is not vague vernacular. It does 
show, though, that there are specific terms used consistently across the sample of 18 years for a 
variety of countries, indicating that while these documents may be created at a U.S. Embassy in a 
certain country, there must be an overarching editorial review process at State Department 
headquarters. That very well may be the case, and it may be easily learned through interviews of 
State Department officials. However, this research was meant to derive understanding from 
archival documents, and these documents reflect much to the discerning reader.  
As mentioned earlier, there were many Verb:Avoid codes, so they were broken out into a 
separate list, which can be seen on the next page in Table 8. The various advice given via the 
Verb:Avoid codes are specific and useful. It directs Americans away from present or potential 
danger. In some cases, this advice was overwhelming: “…American citizens should stay away 
from demonstrations and generally avoid crowded public places, such as restaurants and cafes, 
shopping and market areas and malls, pedestrian zones, public transportation of all kinds, 
including buses and trains and their respective stations/terminals, and the areas around them” 
(DOS, Israel a, 2004). That particular Israel Travel Warning left little else to avoid, which is 
essentially equivalent to the Verb:ShelterInPlace code, coded 12 times. If the State Department is 
reluctant to direct Americans to cancel travel outright, language such as this indicates that 
tourists should be circumspect about their plans for tourism in a place where quotidian activities 
are advised to be avoided.  
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Table 8 
 
All Verb:Avoid Codes 
  
Verb:Avoid Code Frequency 
Verb:Avoid/BeAlertTo:Crowds/Demostrations 393 
Verb:Avoid:TravelToSpecificAreas 318 
Verb:Avoid/BeAlertIn:AreasPopularwithWesterners/Foreigners 71 
Verb:Avoid:PublicAreas 42 
Verb:Avoid:PublicTransportation 34 
Verb:Avoid:OverlandTravel 28 
Verb:Avoid:Restaurants/Bars 26 
Verb:Avoid:Predictability 21 
Verb:Avoid:Malls/ShoppingAreas 20 
Verb:Avoid:Walking/TrekkingAlone 19 
Verb:Avoid:ReligiousPlacseOfWorship 17 
Verb:Avoid:CriminalActivity 12 
Verb:Avoid:Military/MilitaryFacilities  12 
Verb:Avoid:BusStops/Buses 11 
Verb:Avoid:Public/GovernmentBuildings 10 
Verb:Avoid:IsolatedAreas 9 
Verb:Avoid:RoadBlocks 8 
Verb:Avoid:Abandoned/DestroyedBuildings 7 
Verb:Avoid:Attention 6 
Verb:Avoid:Docking/SailingThroughHostCountryWaters 6 
Verb:Avoid:Landmines/UnexplodedOrdnanceAreas 6 
Verb:Avoid:PedestrianZones 6 
Verb:Avoid:FuneralRites 3 
Verb:Avoid:Red-light/ProstitutionDistricts 3 
Verb:Avoid:BeingVictimized 2 
Verb:Avoid:Boats 2 
Verb:Avoid:Confrontation 2 
Verb:Avoid:CongestedVehicleTraffic 2 
Verb:Avoid:Contact 2 
Verb:Avoid:Downtown 2 
Verb:Avoid:DrugDealers 2 
Verb:Avoid:CommericalFarms 1 
Verb:Avoid:Hospitals/Clinics(Outbreak) 1 
Verb:Avoid:Ice 1 
Verb:Avoid:PoliticalPartyHQs 1 
Verb:Avoid:PreviousSitesOfTerrorism 1 
Verb:Avoid:Riots 1 
Verb:Avoid:UnpopulatedAreas 1 
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 One category of Verb codes that did not make the top 25 list was the ‘Do Not’ codes, and 
they are noteworthy for that same reason. Table 9 below shows the short list of ‘Do Not” 
directives. It became clear during the content analysis that the State Department was reluctant to 
be overly direct about their advice, reluctant to outright forbid a given behavior, which makes 
these “do not” Verb choices interesting. To be clear, the “do not” codes were used for that 
express language or something similar, like “should not” or “under no circumstances should…”. 
For ease of coding organization, “Verb:DoNot” was used to capture these more strongly worded 
directives. The State Department finds itself in a precarious position. Americans are a free people 
and with the exception of Cuba, Americans are allowed to travel freely to any country in the  
Table 9 
 
All Verb:DoNot Codes 
  
Verb:DoNot Code Frequency 
Verb:DoNot:DisplayWealth 25 
Verb:DoNot:TakePhotos/Video 16 
Verb:DoNot:AttemptToPassThroughRoadBlocks 15 
Verb:DoNot:CarryLargeSumsOfCash 13 
Verb:DoNot:ComeToVolunteerUnofficially 10 
Verb:DoNot:SharePrivateFinancialInformation 6 
Verb:DoNot:TravelAlone 6 
Verb:DoNot:ParticipateInDemonstrations/Protests(Illegal) 3 
Verb:DoNot:Sail/DockNearHostCountry 3 
Verb:DoNot:ChallengeAuthorities 2 
Verb:DoNot:Resist/AntagonizeCriminals 2 
Verb:DoNot:StopCarAtAccidents/Gatherings 2 
Verb:DoNot:ViolateCurfew 2 
Verb:DoNot:AttemptToVisitU.S.Embassy 1 
 
world, even North Korea, albeit at their own risk. The State Department’s role is clearly to warn 
and alert, not forbid, and they seem to take that role earnestly. Finding balance in warning a free 
people about travel to certain countries does not appear to be an easy task, especially given the 
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wide variety of human experience and intellect. There are those who may understand easily what 
it means to exercise vigilance, and then there are those who need to be told, as seen above in 
Table 9, not to “antagonize criminals”.  
Verb Codes Content Analysis 
 To take the content analysis deeper into patterns across the Verb codes, the top 25 of 
these codes were categorized from mere descriptors in level one open coding to groups (see 
Table 10). The three group categories in level two axial coding are Avoid verbs, Alert verbs, 
Table 10 
 
Verb Codes Analyzed 
  
 
Open Coding 
Level 1 
Axial Coding 
Level 2 
Thematic Coding 
Level 3 
Avoid/BeAlertTo:Crowds/Demonstrations (392)   
Avoid:TravelToSpecificAreas (318)   
Travel:Defer/CurtailPostpone/ReduceForgo/ 
            CarefullyConsider/Avoid (298)  
 
Travel:Warns/Cautions/RecommendsAgainst (202) Avoid (1,385)  
Avoid/BeAlertIn:AreasPopularWithWesterners/Foreigners (71)   
Avoid:PublicAreas (42)  General (2,473) 
Avoid:PublicTransportation (34)   
Avoid:OverlandTravel (28)   
Exercise:Caution/Prudence/Vigilance/GoodJudgement (590)   
PersonalSecurity:Evaluation/BeAlertTo/BeAware (293)  Alert (1,088)  
BeAlertTo/AwareOf:Surroundings/Situation (176)   
BeAlertTo:Unexpected:Visitors/Packages/Incidents (29)   
Register/Enroll:WithU.S.Embassy/Consulate/STEP (556)   
Monitor:News (169)   
TakePrecautions:Security (156)   
Maintain/Keep:LowProfile (130)   
Monitor:Situation (87)   
Vary/Take:Alternate:Route (87)   
Travel:DuringDay/AvoidNightTravel (82) Task (1,543) Explicit (1,543) 
Maintain:Passport/VisaValidity (66)   
Report:ConcernsToU.S.Embassy (58)   
Follow:OfficialInstructions (46)   
Have:EmergencyEvacuationPlan (45)    
Stay:Indoors (32)   
Carry:TravelDocuments/PhotoID (29)   
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and Task verbs. The Avoid verbs in the top 25 list appear most frequently in Mexico, Israel, 
Indonesia, Philippines, Nepal, and Thailand. The Alert codes appear most frequently in most of 
the same countries, with the addition of Pakistan. Finally, the category Task was used because 
these Verb codes provided the reader with an actionable task, such as being sure to carry one’s 
passport or monitor the news. The country with the most actionable Task codes was Yemen, 
which was followed by Mexico, Lebanon, Pakistan, Syria, Liberia, Sudan, and Chad. The 
countries in these three top 25 Verb categories do not really reveal a meaningful pattern, except 
that countries with more Travel Warnings and Alerts will have a higher frequency of advice, or 
Verb codes. These three categories of Verbs were distilled into the level three thematic coding of 
content analysis, and those themes were titled General and Explicit. In other words, Avoid and 
Alert codes were less specific and provided something of a general guideline, like avoiding 
public areas. The Task codes were more explicit and more easily actionable. 
Observations in Travel Warnings and Alerts 
 Distilling the content analysis from open coding to axial coding and finally thematic 
coding allowed for a deeper analysis that created an opportunity to draw conclusions about the 
general components of Travel Warnings and Alerts. With regard to Background code 
information provided in these documents, readers will find that, generally speaking, there is a 
theme of providing actionable contextual content and simply informational content. As regards 
Reasons coded across travel advice documents, the traveler will find that the State Department 
accounts for reasons that cause harm, create concern, and lists the actors who may be implicit in 
causing that harm or concern. Finally, with regard to Verb codes, the State Department 
overwhelmingly provides advice in a general way and less often provides advice in an explicit, 
direct way.  
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There were some curiosities across the 18 year sample of these documents. As mentioned 
earlier, rape as a reason for danger in a Travel Warning country did not appear until 2004. 
Likewise, noting that women in particular were a target for violence did not appear until a Travel 
Warning for Nepal in 2009: “Crime in the Kathmandu Valley, including violent crime and 
harassment of women, continues to rise” (DOS, Nepal a, 2009). It appeared nine times total after 
that date in various countries, but 2009 seems rather late for that. Does it mean anything that 
violence against women was accounted for with the start of the Obama Administration, or is it 
simply a coincidence? It is difficult to know without further research. Another curious phrase 
that appeared throughout the sample was, “Violent crime, practiced by persons in police and 
military uniform, as well as by ordinary criminals, is an acute problem” (DOS, Nigeria a, 1996). 
The phrasing in italics is perplexing. Has a criminal stolen a police or military uniform, or is a 
member of the police or military engaging in criminal activity? If the latter, does the State 
Department know this to be corruption and cannot put it in writing, diplomatically speaking, for 
fear of angering the host government? Deriving information strictly from archived material 
leaves the coding up to interpretation, and for the purposes of this study, those phrases were 
extrapolated to indicate corruption and were coded accordingly. It is not unlikely that the State 
Department has to be sensitive to its host government. In numerous Warnings, this type of 
phrasing was present for different countries: “Millions of U.S. citizens safely visit Mexico each 
year, including more than 150,000 who cross the border every day for study, tourism or business 
and at least one million U.S. citizens who live in Mexico” (DOS, Mexico a, 2011). Again, it 
appears as if the State Department is trying to strike a balance, letting Americans know that there 
is a way to travel safely to Mexico, as evidenced by the millions who do it annually, but it then 
follows this statement with pages of descriptive violence, murder, and kidnapping plaguing the 
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country. Not only is it a difficult balance to strike for the State Department, but it is also difficult 
information to process for the potential traveler.  
Exploring these 1,303 documents and coding their main components—
background/context, reasons/danger, and verbs/advice—revealed much about what the State 
Department deems dangerous and how they want to present it. Embassies issue Travel Warnings 
and Alerts with contextual information, with reasons for concern and advice to mitigate exposure 
to danger. There is clearly a style, which is careful, more suggestive than directive, and with a 
consistent diplomatic security vernacular used across time and a variety of countries. The second 
part of the analysis was to explore phenomenon beyond exploring the content, and it now turns 
to exploring which types of countries were subjects of Warnings and Alerts and how they may fit 
into a Social Construction theoretical framework. 
Social Construction and Travel Warning and Alerts  
 Social Construction Theory in Democratic Policy Design constructs groups of people into 
four categories: Advantaged, Contender, Dependent, and Deviant (Schneider et al, 2014). This 
paper seeks to extend that theoretical application from groups in the United States, like 
immigrants, single mothers, banks, small business owners, and convicts, etc., to countries of the 
world. There are 193 member states of the United Nations (un.org, 2016). Schneider et al (2014) 
posited that groups were socially constructed based on their level of power and positive or 
negative regard (deservingness). Recall, for example, that small business owners are both well 
regarded and have economic agency; they are considered Advantaged. Children are well 
regarded, but have little power of their own. They are constructed as Dependent. Bankers and 
Wall Street have considerable power, but negative regard. They fall into the Contender category. 
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Criminals are constructed as Deviant because they are low on both power and regard. Each group 
is the beneficiary or target of policy decisions commensurate with their social construction. 
Viewing countries of the world through the Social Construction lens of power and 
regard/deservingness, it was necessary to seek variables to help define that power and regard. 
Those variables were the state of a country’s economy and a country’s government type.  
 Power as described in the framework relates mostly to economic power. As such, for the 
purpose of this study, economic power is determined by the United Nation’s Development Policy 
and Analysis Division’s 2014 World Economic Situation and Prospects (W.E.S.P.) report 
(un.org, 2016). The U.N. classified the countries of the world into Developed Economies, 
Economies in Transition, and Developing Economies.   
Table 11   
   
Developed Economies   
   
Countries   
Australia Germany New Zealand 
Austria Greece Norway 
Belgium Hungary Poland 
Bulgaria Iceland Portugal 
Canada Ireland Romania 
Croatia Italy Slovakia 
Cyrus Japan Slovenia 
Czech Republic Latvia Spain 
Denmark Lithuania Sweden 
Estonia Luxembourg Switzerland 
Finland Malta United Kingdom 
France Netherlands  
 
These three broad categories capture information about influence and power.  The Developed 
Economies category also includes “major developed economies”, which indicates membership in 
 88 
 
the Group of Seven (un.org, 2016, p. 1). Of course, the United States is included in that category, 
but is removed for the purpose of this paper. It is removed because a United States government 
agency is writing Travel Warnings and Alerts about countries around the world and does not 
write Warnings and Alerts for its own country. Countries with developed economies can be seen 
above in Table 11. W.E.S.P.’s second category, Economies in Transition, captures nations at 
time when they are emerging from developing and moving toward developed economy status; 
they essentially cover both spaces. They are listed in Table 12. Among the Developing 
Economies (see Table 13), W.E.S.P. further classifies some countries as Least Developed, 
Heavily Indebted, Small Island Developing States, and Landlocked Developing Countries 
(un.org, 2016). Some of the countries classified as Developing may surprise the reader, like 
China, but China wields influence in other ways, which affects its place in the social construction 
power typology.  
Table 12  
  
Economies in Transition  
  
Countries  
Albania Moldova 
Armenia Montenegro 
Azerbaijan Russia 
Belarus Serbia 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Tajikistan 
Georgia Turkmenistan 
Kazakhstan Ukraine 
Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan 
Macedonia  
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Table 13    
    
Developing Economies    
    
Countries    
Afghanistan Dominican Republic Malawi Saudi Arabia 
Algeria Ecuador Malaysia Senegal 
Angola Egypt Maldives Seychelles 
Antigua and Barbuda El Salvador Mali Sierra Leone 
Argentina Equatorial Guinea Marshall Islands Singapore 
Armenia Eritrea Mauritania Solomon Islands 
Azerbaijan Ethiopia Mauritius Somalia 
Bahamas Fiji Mexico South Africa 
Bahrain Gabon Micronesia South Sudan 
Bangladesh Gambia Moldova Sri Lanka 
Barbados Ghana Mongolia Sudan 
Belize Grenada Morocco Suriname 
Benin Guatemala Mozambique Swaziland 
Bhutan Guinea Myanmar Syria 
Bolivia Guinea-Bissau Namibia Tajikistan 
Botswana Guyana Nauru Tanzania 
Brazil Haiti Nepal Thailand 
Brunei Honduras Nicaragua Timor Leste 
Burkina Faso Hong Kong Niger Togo 
Burundi India Nigeria Tonga 
Cabo Verde Indonesia Oman Trinidad and Tobago 
Cambodia Iran Pakistan Tunisia 
Cameroon Iraq Palau Turkey 
Central African Republic Israel Panama Turkmenistan 
Chad Jamaica Papua New Guinea Tuvalu 
Chile Jordan Paraguay Uganda 
China Kazakhstan Peru United Arab Emirates 
Colombia Kenya Philippines Uruguay 
Comoros Kiribati Qatar Uzbekistan 
Congo Kuwait Republic of Korea Vanuatu 
Costa Rica Laos Rwanda Venezuela 
Cote D’Ivoire Lebanon Saint Kitts and Nevis Vietnam 
Cuba Lesotho Saint Lucia Yemen 
D.R. of the Congo Liberia 
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines Zambia 
Djibouti Libya Samoa Zimbabwe 
Dominica Madagascar Sao Tome and Principe  
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To determine positive or negative regard, attention was directed toward type of 
government. The United States government and its people have an historical preference for 
countries that share its democratic principles and values; after all, one only need to look toward 
its wars in the 20th Century alone, both of the regular and Cold variety, to reinforce this 
impression. To broadly categorize countries as democratic or not, scholarship on the autocratic 
countries of the world was sought. In their Autocratic Regimes Code Book in “Autocratic 
Breakdown and Regime Transitions”, Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz (2014) 
complete an historical analysis of nation states of the world and their autocracy status over time. 
Using their research, the following countries listed in Table 14 were shown to have an autocratic 
regime, even if for one year, during the sample studied from 1994 through 2014. Note that the 
countries on the list may not be autocratic now or may not have been autocratic during the 1990s 
but are now; they are listed because at some point they had an autocratic government during the 
sample years studied. It is taken into consideration if the tenure of an autocrat was fleeting, 
which affects construction of regard.  
Accounting for a country’s economic classification as well as each country’s status as 
autocratic, countries in the following categories were assigned the following numbers: 
• Developed and Not Autocratic = 1 
• Economies in Transition and Not Autocratic = 2 
• Economies in Transition and Autocratic = 3 
• Developing and Not Autocratic = 4 
• Developing and Autocratic = 5 
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There were no developed countries that were autocratic, so there is not a separate category as 
such. These five numbers classify countries across the spectrum of the social construction and 
power/regard typology (see Figure 1) of Advantaged, Contender, Dependent, and Deviant.  To 
see each country’s numerical classification as described above, see Tables 15 through 19.  
Table 14   
   
Autocratic or Temporarily Autocratic Countries, 1994 – 2014  
   
Autocratic Countries   
Afghanistan Guinea Pakistan 
Algeria Guinea-Bissau Peru 
Angola Haiti Russia 
Armenia Indonesia Rwanda 
Azerbaijan Iran Saudi Arabia 
Bangladesh Iraq Senegal 
Belarus Jordan Serbia 
Botswana Kazakhstan Sierra Leone 
Burkina Faso Kenya Singapore 
Burundi Kuwait Sudan 
Cambodia Kyrgyzstan Swaziland 
Cameroon Laos Syria 
Central African Republic Liberia Tajikistan 
Chad Libya Tanzania 
China Madagascar Thailand 
Congo Malaysia Togo 
Cote d’Ivoire Mauritania Tunisia 
Cuba Mexico Turkmenistan 
D.R. of the Congo Morocco Uganda 
Egypt Mozambique United Arab Emirates 
Eritrea Myanmar Uzbekistan 
Ethiopia Namibia Venezuela 
Gabon Nepal Vietnam 
Gambia Niger Yemen 
Georgia Nigeria Zambia 
Ghana North Korea Zimbabwe 
Guatemala Oman  
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Countries classified as Category 1 (Developed and Not Autocratic) fall into the 
Advantaged quadrant of Figure 1. Those countries have both high power and positive regard. 
Countries classified as Category 2 (Economies in Transition and Not Autocratic) stay to the left 
of the Y axis as still having positive regard, but lower toward the X axis for having less power. 
Countries classified as Category 3 (Economies in Transition and Autocratic) move toward the 
 
right of the Y axis with lower regard and stay at a similar level of power as the Category 2 
countries, but in the Contender quadrant of Figure 1. Countries classified as Category 4 
(Developing and Not Autocratic) remain well regarded and to the left of the Y axis, but move 
down in power below the X axis and into the Dependent quadrant of Figure 1.  Countries 
classified as Category 5 (Developing and Autocratic) find themselves in the low power and low 
regard, or Deviant, quadrant, seen in the lower right corner of Figure 1.  
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Economic power and autocratic/not autocratic are two broad-brushed strokes used to 
paint a picture of how countries of the world may be socially constructed. These broad categories 
are not nuanced, and it is clear that other variables may move a country’s position along the axes. 
The degree to which a form of government is free is on a spectrum, from truly communist to 
truly fascist. The degree to which a country’s economy and its people can provide for themselves 
is also on a spectrum. For example, China is clearly autocratic and classified as a developing 
economy by the U.N.; however, it cannot be cast as not powerful. In the same U.N. W.E.S.P. 
report, it classifies China as having an upper middle per capita income, despite its developing 
economy status. In other words, its people are making decent earnings and although they live 
under an autocratic regime, it is not autocratic to the same extent as neighboring North Korea. 
The people of China can travel abroad, access much of the Internet, even with censorship, and 
are communist more in political ideology than economic ideology. That is a stark difference 
from North Korea. Another variable that could be considered is that China has nuclear weapons 
and the ability to use them, not to mention a robust military. North Korea is alleged to have 
nuclear weaponry with a questionable ability to deploy them. These variables would move China 
up the Y axis from the Deviant quadrant to the Contender quadrant while likely keeping North 
Korea firmly in Deviant quadrant territory. These examples show that there is room for some 
movement. This brings the research to where social construction meets Travel Warnings and 
Alerts. What follows is a discussion and analysis of content found in Warnings and Alerts 
corresponding to countries within the Category 1 through 5 classifications.  
Category 1 Countries 
 Countries classified as Category 1 are Developed and Not Autocratic. Of the 193 
countries of the world recognized by the U.N., 35 were categorized as Category 1 (excluding the 
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United States), and most of them are in Europe. They can be seen in Table 15. During the 18 
years selected for this study between 1994 through 2014, only one country was issued a Travel 
Warning. It was Japan—one Travel Warning for one country. The Travel Warning for Japan of 
March 21, 2011 was not issued because of political turmoil, election violence, mass shootings, 
terrorism, or a coup d’état. Instead, it was issued because 10 days prior on March 11, a powerful 
earthquake put in motion a catastrophic tsunami, which overwhelmed a nuclear power plant and 
its reactors, thus creating widespread concern of radiological release. 
…in response to the situation at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, the 
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Department of Energy, 
and other technical experts in the U.S. Government have reviewed the scientific 
and technical information they have collected from assets in country, as well as 
what the Government of Japan has disseminated. Consistent with the NRC 
guidelines that would apply to such a situation in the United States, we are 
recommending, as a precaution, that U.S. citizens within 50 miles (80 kilometers) 
of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant evacuate the area or to take shelter 
indoors if safe evacuation is not practical (DOS, Japan a, 2011). 
 
The State Department proceeded to mention that its personnel were provided potassium iodide to 
be consumed only at State Department instruction, which is used to block radioactive iodine 
from coursing through the thyroid and throughout the body (cdc.gov, 2016). With regard to 
being present in Japan, the Travel Warning continued: “The State Department strongly urges 
U.S. citizens to defer travel to Japan at this time and those in Japan should consider departing” 
(DOS, Japan a, 2011). 
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Table 15   
   
Category 1 Countries: Developed Economies and Not Autocratic 
   
Category 1 Countries   
Australia Germany New Zealand 
Austria Greece Norway 
Belgium Hungary Poland 
Bulgaria Iceland Portugal 
Canada Ireland Romania 
Croatia Italy Slovakia 
Cyprus Japan Slovenia 
Czech Republic Latvia Spain 
Denmark Lithuania Sweden 
Estonia Luxembourg Switzerland 
Finland Malta United Kingdom 
France Netherlands  
 
 For Category 1 classified countries, however, there were more Travel Alerts. There were 
14 Category 1 countries which were the subject of 30 Travel Alerts, with Japan and the United 
Kingdom having the most with a tie at five each. One of the five Travel Alerts for Japan was for 
the 2002 World Cup, and it called attention to potential security risks, like “terrorism and 
hooliganism” (DOS, Japan-Korea a, 2002). The remaining four were released in succession in 
response to the same nuclear power plant breach caused by the earthquake and tsunami 
mentioned earlier. For the United Kingdom, the first three were released in close succession in 
early 2001 and with regard to “an outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD – known in the 
United States as Hoof and Mouth Disease)” (DOS, United Kingdom a, 2001). Another in 2001 
was in reference to “controversial marches across the province” of Northern Ireland sparked by 
“sectarian clashes in Belfast that have featured sporadic street violence, attacks on police, 
property damage and road closures, especially at night” (DOS, United Kingdom b, 2001). The 
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fifth was released in January 2011 to call attention to the potential for terrorism in the U.K., but 
there was no mention of a realized attack (DOS, United Kingdom a, 2011).  
 As for the others, the reasons varied. Canada had one Travel Alert due to a SARS 
outbreak with the indication of three deaths and 50 cases of infection (DOS, Canada a, 2003). 
Three Travel Alerts were issued about Germany with one cautioning travelers about potential 
demonstration violence during a security conference (DOS, Germany a, 2003). The remaining 
two were about potential election period terrorist activity by Al-Qaeda after it released a video to 
that end, but with no mention of an actual attack (DOS, Germany a, 2009; DOS, Germany b, 
2009). In March and April 2004, two Travel Alerts were issued for Spain in response to bombs 
“detonated on commuter trains in the Madrid area and at the Atocha station…resulting in 
numerous deaths and thousands of injuries” (DOS, Spain a, 2004; DOS, Spain b, 2004). Two of 
the three Travel Alerts for France (and related Monaco and Switzerland) were for potential 
demonstration violence, while one was in response to disenfranchised and “angry youths 
[having] set fire to many buildings and thousands of vehicles” (DOS, France-Switzerland a, 
2003; DOS, France-Monaco a, 2005; DOS, France-Monaco a, 2006). 
 Analyzing the data collected from the content analysis about these 30 Travel Alerts 
issued for Category 1 countries, there are clear patterns. Coded 18 times, demonstrations were 
the primary reason presented as the cause for concern. This Reason code logically extends to the 
next top three Reason codes across that body of Alerts. They are 
Reason:Conferences/Forum/Summit, Reason:Potential:Violence, and Reason:Violence, coded 
eight, seven, and seven times, respectively. It is easy to tell the story here. Most Travel Alerts for 
Category 1 countries are issued in advance of a summit or conference, and the State Department 
wants American travelers to know that protests and demonstrations for that event carry a 
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potential for moving from peaceful to violent or have been known to turn violent in the past. 
Accordingly, the most common verb codes are to avoid or be alert to crowds and demonstrations 
and to exercise vigilance. There is not a single “do not” verb code; instead, the most common are 
codes that begin with “advise” and “alerts”. With regard to Background codes, the most common 
by far is that the host government or police are taking security precautions, which is sensible in 
preparation for a peaceful demonstration that may potentially turn violent. Like the single Travel 
Warning for Japan for the Category 1 countries, which was issued for a naturally caused disaster, 
the Travel Alerts are interesting for what they do not include. They are not about war, rebels, 
insurgency, or drug cartels, and they are not controversial. Instead, most of the Alerts are about 
what may happen, with the exceptions for angry youth or disease outbreaks, which were few. 
These Alerts, in sum, convey that there may be a demonstration at a conference that may turn 
violent, it is in a particular part of town, and it is easy to avoid.  
Category 1 countries represent only 0.1 percent of the total Travel Warnings across the 
sample and six percent of the total Travel Alerts. Does this mean that Level 1 countries are 
intrinsically safer? Does this mean that over the 18 year sample, the most a traveler had to worry 
about was potential demonstration violence? It may indeed be that Category 1 countries that are 
both developed and not autocratic, mostly in Europe, are existentially safe most of the time.  
That question cannot readily be answered by this data set because the content presented in the 
sampled Travel Warnings and Alerts only includes what had been decided to be recorded. One 
would have to separately study the danger that occurred in a given Category 1 country over time 
and then review countries that were subjects of Travel Warnings and Alerts to see if they were 
issued those documents for the same type of danger. Currently, this data set does not provide 
evidence that Travel Warning and Alert issuance is directly proportional to country safety 
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because we do not know what is not being recorded for other countries. After all, one who 
follows the news over time might wonder why there was not even a single Travel Alert for 
Ireland, Northern Ireland, and the rest of the U.K. during the years sampled in the 1990s to 
inform travelers about consistent violence rendered by the Ireland Revolutionary Army (IRA) 
and similar actors in those regions before the peace process was engaged at the end of that 
decade. The same goes for Spain and the bombings by Basque Separatists throughout that 
country over decades. It could be that such violence did not meet some threshold that the State 
Department employs before it issues Travel Warnings and Alerts. It could, instead, be 
preferential treatment, whether intentional or not. It could be that as per the Social Construction 
power-deservingness typology, policy designers at the State Department issue Travel Warnings 
and Alerts accordingly. Countries like Ireland, the U.K, and Spain have people that are of 
predominantly Western origin, like the United States has, with similar cultural values, similar 
religions, their governments and people are generally wealthy, and they have similar political 
values of individual freedoms and institutional democracy.  
Category 2 Countries 
 Category 2 countries are Economies in Transition and Not Autocratic, and they had five 
Travel Warnings and four travel Alerts among them. There are only six countries classified as 
Category 2, which can be seen in Table 16, and they are all in Europe, particularly Eastern 
Europe. Except Moldova, the remaining five each had Travel Warnings with a total of 26 among 
them. Bosnia and Herzegovina had the most at 10, and they concerned the legacies of war, which 
had ended with the Dayton Peace Accords of 1995. One early Warning in 1996 warned 
Americans not to travel there and called attention to landmines, unexploded ordnance, sniping, 
carjacking, and poor infrastructure (DOS, Bosnia-Herzegovina a, 1996). The remaining nine 
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Travel Warnings were related and lasted until 2006. Ukraine had the second most with five 
Warnings. They were all issued in 2014 in quick succession in response to the Russian invasion 
of the Crimean Peninsula (DOS, Ukraine a, 2014). Three Travel Warnings for Albania were 
released in 1997, 1998, and 1999, and they included a political assassination, a government 
issuance and subsequent lifting of a state of emergency and curfew, bombings, gunfire, nighttime 
criminal activity, and general instability (DOS, Albania a, 1997; DOS, Albania a, 1998: DOS, 
Albania a, 1999).   
Only four of the Category 2 countries were issued Travel Alerts, with eight among them. 
Macedonia had the most, with reference to “armed clashes between Macedonian security forces 
and ethnic Albanian radicals” (DOS, Macedonia a, 2001). The 1997 Alert for Albania was 
released after “incidents of violence in some urban areas due to citizens’ frustration with the 
collapse of pyramid investment schemes” (DOS, Albania a, 1997). For Bosnia-Herzegovina, one 
Travel Alert concerned the arrest of a Bosnian-Serb war criminal and warned about the potential 
for retaliation by his supporters against Americans (DOS, Bosnia-Herzegovina-Croatia a, 1998). 
Table 16   
   
Category 2 Countries: Economies in Transition and  
Not Autocratic 
   
Category 2 Countries   
Albania Moldova  
Bosnia and Herzegovina Montenegro  
Macedonia Ukraine  
 
 Analyzing the Travel Warning data for patterns, the Background codes are what one 
might expect from countries in economic and political transition. The five most frequently coded 
pieces of contextual content, from highest to lowest, was that consular services were limited and 
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that the State Department restricted personnel travel and movements. This indicates general 
instability and violence. The next three of the five Background codes were that border areas were 
dangerous, N.A.T.O. was engaged, and that peace accords had been or were being negotiated.  
 The top Reason codes for concern in these countries were landmines, violence, and 
unexploded ordnance and ammunition—all legacies of war. The remaining top Reason codes for 
Category 2 country Travel Warnings were demonstrations, potential danger, political violence, 
and violence targeted at U.S. interests. The top advice corresponding with the reasons for 
concern were to avoid crowds and demonstrations, register with the U.S. Embassy, keep a low 
profile, and exercise vigilance. 
 The Travel Alert Background codes were the same regarding border violence, limited 
State Department personnel movement, and N.A.T.O. involvement. The top Reason codes for 
Category 2 countries were also similar in the Alerts, including demonstrations, but with extra 
focus on violence. Violence codes included general violence, armed conflict and clashes, radical 
elements, and fighting. The Reason:Ethnic code appeared with higher frequency than others, and 
that was a relic of the ethnic conflict in those regions over which a war was fought and tensions 
remained. The advice codes were to avoid travel to specific areas, which revealed over time 
across the sample that while some parts of a country were safe to visit, others needed to be 
avoided. That Verb code was followed with exercising vigilance, being alert to crowds and 
demonstrations, registering with the U.S. Embassy, and generally deferring travel to those 
countries until another time. Again, there were no “do not” directives.  
These Eastern European and Balkan countries have experienced years of conflict, yet 
they represent only three percent of the total Travel Warnings and two percent of the total Travel 
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Alerts across this sample. Considerable violence was described in those Travel Warnings, and 
perhaps there should have been more of them. Their placement in the Advantaged social 
construction quadrant in Figure 1 may indicate why there are fewer Warnings and Alerts despite 
the instability in those countries.  
Category 3 Countries 
 Category 3 countries are Economies in Transition and Autocratic. There are 11 of these 
countries, six of which had Travel Warnings and nine had Travel Alerts. They can be seen in 
Table 17. Of the six countries with Travel Warnings, there were 26 documents among them. 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan had the most with eight each. Tajikistan’s Warnings focused on anti-
American and anti-Western incidents, including murder and kidnapping (DOS, Tajikistan a, 
1998). The Tajikistan Travel Warnings in the late 1990s (1997 and 1998) were 
uncharacteristically vague, including mention of the suspension of embassy operations and a full 
evacuation of embassy personnel amid in-country instability (DOS, Tajikistan b, 1998). Such 
actions seem like last-resort actions, indicating severe violence, but the Travel Warning leaves 
the reader wondering exactly what was taking place on the ground in Tajikistan.  In the 2001 
Warnings, there is more context. It mentions a civil war that ended in 1997, terrorist incursions 
back in 1999 and 2000, and “fighting between government forces and former armed opposition 
leaders” (DOS, Tajikistan a, 2001). The Warnings for Uzbekistan focused on the country’s 
history of terrorism, active terrorism, and potential terrorism. There was also mention of the 
fighting between government forces and militants, evacuation of the Peace Corps, and 
government imposed travel restrictions within the country (DOS, Uzbekistan a, 2006). The 
Kyrgyz Republic Warnings also referred to clashes between the government and opposition 
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forces, in addition to general instability, kidnapping, terrorism, and violence (DOS, Kyrgyz 
Republic a, 2005). 
Table 17   
   
Category 3 Countries: Economies in Transition and Autocratic 
   
Category 3 Countries   
Armenia Kazakhstan Tajikistan 
Azerbaijan Kyrgyzstan Turkmenistan 
Belarus Russia Uzbekistan 
Georgia Serbia  
 
 There were nine Category 3 countries with Travel Alerts, with 44 Alerts total among 
them. Russia had the most with 12. Four of those 12 were from the 2014 invasion of Ukraine, but 
the rest were spread from 1996 through 2006. They ranged from concern about demonstrations 
and strikes to skinhead violence to Chechen separatist violence and terrorism (DOS, Russia a, 
1996; DOS, Russia a, 1998; DOS, Russia a, 2006). Uzbekistan had the second most with nine 
and were similar in content to its aforementioned Travel Warnings. The four for Turkmenistan 
concerned an attack on its president’s motorcade, police checkpoints, home and vehicle searches, 
and its proximity to the dangers of Afghanistan (DOS, Turkmenistan a, 2002). Azerbaijan had 
only one Alert, and it was issued with regard to potential for election violence (DOS, Azerbaijan 
a, 2000). 
 Analyzing the coded Travel Warning data specifically for Category 3 countries, the most 
common Background codes were that border areas were dangerous and that State Department 
personnel had their travel restricted, their dependents were evacuated, or were evacuated 
themselves. Consequently, it was also coded that consular services were limited. The State 
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Department likely has a higher threshold for risk than the average traveler because diplomatic 
personnel and facilities have security and intelligence. As such, if the State Department is taking 
action to protect its personnel and their families from conditions it considers dangerous to the 
extent that it merits removal of personnel, it is a strong indication that host country conditions 
are unstable.  
The top Reason codes for Category 3 countries were terrorism, potential terrorism, 
kidnapping and hostage-taking, and murder. There were also violence codes that appeared in 
high frequency, including potential violence, armed clashes/conflict, suicide bombing, and 
violence targeted at U.S. interests. Occasionally, one particular terrorist group would be 
prominent in certain regions, and Al-Qaeda was a Reason code that appeared in high frequency 
for Category 3 countries. Corresponding Verb codes for advice was to register one’s presence 
with the U.S. Embassy, exercise vigilance, avoid travel to certain areas, and to defer travel. 
Travel Warnings for these countries also regularly advised American travelers to be alert to and 
evaluate their personal security.  
The most common codes across the Travel Alerts were virtually the same for the three 
principal code types, with the following exceptions. In these Alerts, it was more common to add 
the Background code that there was no distinction in targeting officials or civilians for violence. 
In the Reason codes, demonstrations and bombings were included among the more frequent. 
Logically, the added Verb code was to avoid demonstrations and crowds. It is in the Category 3 
country Travel Alerts that the first “do not” advice code is included. It was only coded once, for 
Georgia, and it was Verb:DoNot:TravelAlone. Direct or more forceful language has not been 
common in the previous categories, and it may be that as countries that are socially constructed 
as Contender or Deviant, they are associated with more explicit directives. The forthcoming 
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discussions of Category 4 and 5 countries will review that. Category 3 countries, like Category 2 
countries, represent only three percent of all Travel Warnings; however, their Alerts spike to the 
highest thus far at ten percent out of all Alerts across the 18 year sample. These countries are 
autocratic and as they move to the right along the X axis, the positive-negative regard axis, the 
official travel advice issued about them increases. 
Category 4 Countries 
 Countries classified as Category 4 are Developing Countries and Not Autocratic. There 
are 68 of these countries (see Table 18), and 23 have Travel Warnings issued about them. 
Among those 23 countries, there were 180 different Travel Warnings. Lebanon had the most 
with 32 and, in fact, had the most across the entire 18 year sample. Given the robust number of 
Warning documents for Lebanon from 1996 through 2014, the content covered a myriad of 
Background, Reason, and Verb codes. The State Department restricted travel for its personnel 
almost throughout the entire collection of Lebanon Warnings. Terrorism, Hezbollah, murder, 
bombing, anti-American activity, kidnapping, refugee camp danger, a high profile assassination, 
the canceling of the Fulbright program, sexual assault, landmines and unexploded ordnance from 
the long civil war, and most types of violence were present and coded (DOS, Lebanon a, 1996; 
DOS, Lebanon a, 2004; DOS, Lebanon a, 2005; DOS, Lebanon a, 2012; DOS, Lebanon a, 2014). 
After the month-long war with Israel in 2006, which included a major evacuation of Americans 
from Lebanon, the Travel Warnings for Lebanon began including information about how the 
U.S. Embassy will not evacuate travelers in an emergency, likely because it was very expensive 
and logistically overwhelming to the point that the State Department had to rely on the U.S. 
military to accommodate the vast amount of Americans needing evacuation (DOS, Lebanon a, 
2009). Curiously, it only mentioned “hostilities” in the Travel Warning released in reference to 
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and in the middle of that war with no mention of Israel (DOS, Lebanon b, 2006). Israel is also a 
Category 4 country, and it had 28 Travel Warnings. The title of those Warnings always included 
the West Bank and Gaza. Each year, the Warnings became longer. They included an array of 
Background, Reason, and Verb codes. With hostile neighbors, Americans were warned about 
terrorism, potential terrorism, bombings, suicide bombings, kidnapping, rocket fire into Israeli 
cities, the death of Yasser Arafat and the potential for ensuing instability, Hamas, murder, State 
Department personnel travel restrictions and curfews, dangerous border areas, rock throwing, 
and entry and exit restrictions for Palestinian Americans (DOS, Israel b, 2001; DOS, Israel a, 
2004; DOS, Israel b, 2004; DOS Israel a, 2005; DOS, Israel a, 2013). One piece of advice that 
appeared in some Israel Travel Warnings not seen in documents for other countries was:  
…American citizens involved in pro-Palestinian partisan volunteer efforts were 
severely assaulted in the West Bank by Israeli settlers and harassed by the Israel 
Defense Forces. Those taking part in such efforts, including through 
demonstration, non-violent resistance, and ‘direct action’, are urged to cease such 
activity for their own personal safety (DOS, Israel a, 2004).  
 
This advice disappeared in later Warnings and was instead placed into a linked page elsewhere 
on the State Department website. The United States and Israel have a deep and enduring 
relationship and alliance. One could point out that Israel having been among the countries with 
the most Travel Warnings issued by the State Department is proof that State issues Warnings and 
Alerts objectively and based solely on the security situation on the ground in each country. And 
that may be true, but that is not what is being argued with this study’s extension of Social 
Construction theory to countries of the world and their incidence of State Department travel 
advice issuance. What is being argued is that there is a relationship between a country’s social  
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Table 18   
   
Category 4 Countries: Developing Economies and Not Autocratic 
   
Category 4 Countries  
Andorra Fiji Philippines 
Antigua & Barbuda Grenada Qatar 
Argentina Guyana Saint Kitts & Nevis 
Bahamas Honduras Saint Lucia 
Bahrain India Saint Vincent & the Grenadines 
Barbados Israel Samoa 
Belize Jamaica Sao Tome & Principe 
Benin Kiribati Seychelles 
Bhutan Lebanon Solomon Islands 
Bolivia Lesotho Somalia 
Brazil Malawi South Africa 
Brunei Maldives South Korea 
Cabo Verde Mali South Sudan 
Chile Marshall Islands Sri Lanka 
Colombia Mauritius Suriname 
Comoros Micronesia Timor Leste 
Costa Rica Mongolia Tonga 
Djibouti Nauru Trinidad & Tobago 
Dominica Nicaragua Turkey 
Dominican Republic Palau Tuvalu 
Ecuador Panama Uruguay 
El Salvador Papua New Guinea Vanuatu 
Equatorial Guinea Paraguay  
 
construction and its incidence of being the subject of State Department Travel Warnings and 
Alerts. It is not enough that a country be an ally to the United States. Israel is indeed an 
important and special ally and friend to the United States, but it is not socially constructed as 
Advantaged. Rather, it is socially constructed as Dependent because of its developing economy 
status. This paper submits that countries socially constructed as less powerful while being 
positively (Dependent) or negatively (Deviant) regarded will have more Travel Warnings than 
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more powerful and positively (Advantaged) or negatively (Contender) regarded countries, and 
Israel does. 
 Colombia had many Travel Warnings at 24, and those documents focused heavily on the 
presence of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), drug trafficking and related 
violence, and its long history of extraordinary incidence of kidnapping (DOS, Colombia b, 
2014). The case of Somalia was particularly full of despair. As early as 1996, the Travel 
Warnings warned that there was no national government in Somalia and no U.S. diplomatic 
mission there (DOS, Somalia a, 1996). The Warning documents reveal a country that is rife with 
violence, piracy, conflict, and desperation, and, of course, warns Americans to avoid all travel to 
Somalia (DOS, Somalia a, 2010). There were other countries in this group that had Warnings 
unrelated to violence. For example, Guyana experienced severe flooding in 2005, and three 
successive Travel Warnings that focused on considerable health and sanitation issues that had 
even caused death (DOS, Guyana a, 2005). 
 As for Travel Alerts, this group of countries had 134 of them. The Philippines had the 
most at 22. Most of the Alerts for the Philippines concerned the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group, 
which was active in the Island of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago and which terrorized the 
region through kidnapping, bombings, and murder (DOS, Philippines a, 2001). Almost all of 
them concerned the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group, and they were so consistent and long term that 
one wonders why they were not issued as Travel Warnings (of which there were 14). It could be 
because much of the terrorist activity was concentrated in the far southwest of the country, 
although there was some activity noted in Manila. One other Alert for the Philippines included 
volcanic activity and earthquakes (DOS, Philippines b, 2001). India had the second most Travel 
Alerts within this group at 14 and, of note, had zero Travel Warnings throughout the sample. 
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They included the arrest of a Sikh separatist leader to warn for the potential for retaliatory 
violence against Americans after he and his wife were extradited to India for terrorism violence 
(DOS, India a, 1997). Another advised about potential terrorist activity for the Pushkar Camel 
Fair / Mela, while another alerted Americans about the risk for renewed tensions along the 
border areas of India and Pakistan as “India announced plans to withdraw troops from its border 
with Pakistan” (DOS, India a, 2002; DOS, India b, 2002). Other India Alerts indicated 
intercommunal violence, new visa regulations, potential terrorism, including during holidays, 
potential for petty crime during the Commonwealth Games, and an earthquake along the 
northeastern areas of India (DOS, India a, 2009; DOS, India b, 2009; DOS, India c, 2009; DOS, 
India a, 2010). 
 Analyzing the frequency of Background, Reason, and Verb codes for Category 4 
countries, there are some similarities to the previous categories along with some additions. 
Similarly, the most coded Background codes were that travel and habits for U.S. diplomatic 
personnel were restricted, consular services limited, and that border areas were dangerous. An 
addition to contextual information was that the U.S. government would make no concessions to 
criminals and terrorists by paying ransom for kidnapped Americans. Also seen with more 
frequency were Background codes about the host government—primarily that it was incapable of 
assuring safety, it imposed travel restrictions on foreign visitors, and it may be taking security 
precautions. The Reason codes reflect more violence, with the top codes being murder, terrorism, 
general violence, violence toward American interests, kidnapping, bombings, injuries, attacks, 
rocket and missile firing, shootings, fighting, and violence against civilians. Ransom appeared as 
a top Reason code for Category 4 countries, which makes the inclusion of the Background code 
about the U.S. government making no ransom concessions logical. The corresponding Verb 
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codes were similar to the previous levels, with the addition of avoiding areas popular with other 
Westerners or Americans. There were more “do not” Verb codes for this this group of countries. 
They included not to display wealth, not to carry large sums of cash, not to attempt to pass 
through roadblocks, not to resist or antagonize criminals, and not to travel alone. As the country 
classifications change from Advantaged to Contender to Dependent, the advice is changing. The 
Verb codes are becoming more direct and “do not” codes are being added into the more common 
and gentle “advise” and “alert” codes.   
 The Travel Alert codes for Category 4 countries were virtually the same as the Warnings, 
with some exceptions added for the Verb codes. One frequently coded piece of advice was to 
avoid public areas, and attention is brought to this code because of what it implies. It was coded 
25 times, which is not as much compared to other Verb codes, but it reveals a country where 
safety is so questionable that one can be outside only under the most controlled circumstances. 
The same “do not” codes as seen in the Warnings were also included.  Reviewing the data, these 
68 Category 4 countries represented 36 percent of all the countries in the world. The Travel 
Warnings issued about them represent 23 percent of the total Warnings across the 18 year sample 
and 29 percent of the Alerts. By far, Category 4 countries are issued Travel Warnings and Alerts 
with overwhelmingly higher incidence than Category 1 through 3 countries. As countries are 
socially constructed away from Advantaged and Contender, their Travel Warning and Alert 
issuance skyrockets.   
Category 5 Countries 
 Countries classified as Category 5 were Developing Countries and Autocratic. There 
were also 68 of these countries, like the previous category, and the complete list is presented in 
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Table 19. This category of countries had by far the most Travel Warnings and Alerts, with 559 
and 246, respectively. Their Travel Warnings represent 71 percent of the total Travel Warnings 
across the entire 18 year sample. There would be even more if previously autocratic Afghanistan 
was included, but it was not because of insufficient data on Afghanistan’s economy from the 
U.N. W.E.S.P. report. To provide some examples, the country with the most Travel Warnings in 
this group was Pakistan with 31. In Travel Warnings published about Pakistan from 1997 
through 2014, the State Department relays the state of a country mired in what seems like 
perpetual violence. Violence and extremism is a theme throughout the 31 documents about 
Pakistan, not to mention the handful of Travel Alerts. They draw attention to general anti-
American, anti-Western, and anti-foreign violence, referencing the “1997 ambush murders of 
four American businessmen and their Pakistani driver”, then the kidnapping and brutal murder of 
American journalist Daniel Pearl in 2002, an attack on a Protestant church where two Americans 
were killed, and attacks on other Christian facilities (DOS, Pakistan a, 1997; DOS, Pakistan a, 
2002; DOS, Pakistan b, 2002). There is repeated mention of public sympathy in Pakistan for 
Osama bin Laden and caution for retaliation toward Americans after his death by American 
Navy Seal Forces (DOS, Pakistan b, 1999; DOS, Pakistan a, 2012). There is the assassination of 
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, a government campaign against extremists in the tribal areas and 
North-West Frontier areas of Pakistan, attacks on the U.S. Consulate in Peshawar, and regular 
mention of State Department personnel and dependents being evacuated and U.S. diplomatic 
facilities being run on reduced staff (DOS, Pakistan a, 2004; DOS, Pakistan a, 2006; DOS, 
Pakistan a, 2009; DOS, Pakistan a, 2010).  
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Table 19   
   
Category 5 Countries: Developing Economies and Autocratic 
   
Category 5 Countries   
Algeria Guinea Bissau Oman 
Angola Haiti Pakistan 
Bangladesh Indonesia Peru 
Botswana Iran Rwanda 
Burkina Faso Iraq Saudi Arabia 
Burundi Jordan Senegal 
Cambodia Kenya Sierra Leone 
Cameroon Kuwait Singapore 
Central African Republic Laos Sudan 
Chad Liberia Swaziland 
China Libya Syria 
Congo Madagascar Tanzania 
Cote D’Ivoire Malaysia Thailand 
Cuba Mauritania Togo 
D.R. of the Congo Mexico Tunisia 
Egypt Morocco Uganda 
Eritrea Mozambique United Arab Emirates 
Ethiopia Myanmar Venezuela 
Gabon Namibia Vietnam 
Gambia Nepal Yemen 
Ghana Niger Zambia 
Guatemala Nigeria Zimbabwe 
Guinea North Korea  
 
 Algeria and Central African Republic were tied with 30 Travel Warnings each. Algeria’s 
Warning documents portray a country with general insecurity. The State Department points to 
consistent terrorism violence against Westerners (including kidnapping and murder) and 
terrorism activity exacted upon airports, airlines, and oil company sites in northern Algeria 
(DOS, Algeria a, 1995; DOS, Algeria a, 1999; DOS, Algeria a, 2001). These themes repeat in 
Algeria in each Warning through 2014. Central African Republic reveals a country that seems to 
be systematically self-destructing over the 18 year period studied. Military and civil unrest is an 
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early theme and is enduring (DOS, Central African Republic a, 1996). At one point, violence is 
so endemic that the United States suspends its diplomatic presence for a time (DOS, Central 
African Republic a, 1997). Crime and highway banditry make the country very unsafe and 
require extremely limited movement by visitors (DOS, Central African Republic a, 1999). There 
is rebellion, a host government in transition, and a coup d’état that is successful in deposing the 
country’s leader (DOS, Central African Republic a, 2003; DOS, Central African Republic b, 
2003). Violence against civilians is commonplace, as is corruption and the necessity of paying 
bribes to move through one’s day (DOS, Central African Republic a, 2012). Among many 
things, the body of Travel Warnings show the anatomy of dysfunction for many a country. 
 Transitioning to countries that American readers may expect to be included in this 
Category 5 list are Iran and North Korea with 11 and 7 Warnings respectively. One may wonder 
why there are not more Warnings for these two countries that are notorious in the collective 
American psyche and media. It is important to note that more Travel Warnings usually indicate 
constant and enduring danger but also unpredictable and diversified danger. As dangerous 
circumstances change, another Warning is issued with an update added to the pre-existing 
dangerous conditions. Countries like Iran and North Korea are rather stable in the sense that total 
control over the population is enforced. One does not hear about regular insurgent violence and 
activity in these countries; the people are ruled with an iron fist and circumstances are firmly 
fixed in place. As such, there is not much to update in these Warnings. In fact, many of them are 
almost exactly the same as they are periodically reissued, one document simply extending a 
Warning that had been quietly active and in place since issued a couple of years prior. Take these 
two sentences from Travel Warnings for Iran in 1995 and 2014, respectively: “Former Muslims 
who have converted to other religions, as well as persons who encourage Muslims to convert, are 
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subject to arrest and possible execution,” and “Former Muslims who have converted to other 
religions, religious activists, and persons who encourage Muslims to convert are subject to arrest 
and prosecution” (DOS, Iran a, 1995; DOS, Iran a, 2014). They are virtually the same. For 
reference, these sentences were coded as Reason:ApostasyPunished. While the Travel Warning 
for Iran in 2014 is longer than the one from 1995, many of the components are the same 
throughout the sample: hostility toward the United States, no U.S. diplomatic presence, U.S. 
diplomatic representation by Switzerland, arrest and detention on false charges, and general 
repression and oppression (DOS, Iran a, 2013). North Korea is similar, but for some reason, 
Travel Warnings are not issued for North Korea until 2010. Again, could this have had anything 
to do with the transition to a new U.S. presidential administration? There have been seven 
Warnings issued from 2010 through 2014 for North Korea, and they are all very similar. They 
reference the absence of U.S. diplomatic relations with North Korea, the U.S. being represented 
by Sweden, North Korea’s detention of American visitors for unsubstantiated reasons, harsh 
penalties and harsh prison conditions, and the likelihood of any electronic media being hacked if 
carried into the country (DOS, North Korea a, 2014).  
 The Travel Alerts for this group were numerous, too, at 246. Mexico had the most at 21, 
and it was included as autocratic because it was under the control of one powerful party regime 
from 1915 through 2000 (Geddes et al, 2014). Mexico is one of those countries whose ally 
status, proximity and tourism destination status, and a long mutual history would pull it along the 
negative regard axis toward the positive regard axis so that it may be closer to the axes’ center. 
In the 1990s, the Alerts focused on robberies involving taxis, serious cautions against taking 
firearms or ammunition into Mexico with the punishment of five years’ incarceration, and a 
volcano eruption advisory (DOS, Mexico a, 1997; DOS, Mexico a, 1998; DOS, Mexico a, 1999). 
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Starting in 2005, though, the Alerts shift consistently to Mexico’s problem with narcotrafficking 
and related violence, including kidnapping, disappearances, murder, intimidation, and inter-cartel 
conflict. This lasted through 2010 when the Alerts about that violence shifted to Travel Warnings 
and remained as Warnings throughout the rest of the sample (DOS, Mexico a, 2005; DOS, 
Mexico b, 2005). 
 Nepal had quite a lot of Alerts at 20, and they often focused on Maoist rebel activity and 
intimidation; Maoists were also known as the United People’s Front (DOS, Nepal a, 1996). They 
engaged in insurgency, murder, attacks, beatings, extortion, arson, and enforced general strikes 
known as bandhs, and the Maoists remained subjects of alerts through 2003 until the documents 
(still including Maoist activity) were switched to Travel Warnings (DOS, Nepal a, 1996; DOS, 
Nepal a, 1999; DOS, Nepal a, 2003). The more recent Travel Alerts about Nepal concerned the 
devastating 2011 earthquake and more recent concerns over elections (DOS, Nepal a, 2011; 
DOS, Nepal a, 2013). Another example in a different part of the world, Venezuela, with nine 
Alerts, tells a story of an increasingly anti-American regime under Hugo Chavez with repeated 
Alerts about strikes, various referenda to vote Chavez from power, and other election related 
conflict (DOS, Venezuela a, 2001; DOS, Venezuela a, 2004). Others refer to severe storm 
damage and poor infrastructure (DOS, Venezuela a, 2005; DOS, Venezuela a, 2006).  
 Looking at the most common Background codes for Category 5 countries, they are 
similar to the previous two categories, but now the code for State Department personnel being 
under travel restriction is at the very top. Consular services being limited is the second most 
coded. Instead of dependents of personnel just being evacuated, specific dependent prohibition is 
also coded among the most common Background codes. Violence against U.S. interests is in the 
top spot for the Reason codes for the first time across the five country levels.  Perhaps it is not 
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surprising that in countries that would be socially constructed as Deviant are found to have 
violence against U.S. citizens, facilities, franchises, and other interests as the most common 
reason for Americans to avoid travel to those destinations. That Reason code is followed by 
murder and then terrorism, threat, and kidnapping. Then a variety of violence codes proceed.  
The only phenomenon that is noteworthy about the Verb codes for Level 5 countries is 
the appearance of more “do not” directives, even if at low incidence.  They include, do not: 
display wealth, take photos or video, attempt to pass through roadblocks, volunteer unofficially, 
carry large sums of cash, share private financial information, sail or dock near host country, stop 
at car accidents or gatherings, travel alone, violate curfew, attempt to visit the U.S. Embassy, 
challenge authorities, and resist or antagonize criminals. A curious change in language use has 
taken place. As the social construction of countries shifts from Advantaged to Contender to 
Dependent to Deviant, stronger advice language is used. Softer advice language like ‘avoid’ and 
‘be alert’ or ‘be aware’ remain the most common, but more forceful directives like ‘do not’ begin 
to appear with the Dependent and Deviant social constructions where they had not for 
Advantaged and Contender countries.  
The Travel Alert patterns for Category 5 countries are very similar to the Travel 
Warnings, with no notable exceptions. These Level 5 countries represent 36 percent of the 
countries of the world. Recall that Categories 1 through 4 represented, respectively, .1 percent, 
three percent, also three percent, and 23 percent of 1,303 Travel Warnings studied. Category 5 
countries represent 71 percent of all the Travel Warnings. They also have the highest Travel 
Alerts at 53 percent. As shown, as countries are socially constructed as less powerful and poorly 
regarded, their incidence of Travel Warning and Alert issuance increases.  
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The above discussion included examples of Travel Warning and Alert content from 
country Categories 1 to 5. There was no economic data provided in the U.N. 2014 W.E.S.P. 
report for Afghanistan, Lichtenstein, Monaco, and San Marino, so they were not included in the 
Categories 1 through 5 country classification (un.org, 2016). Of course, the United States is not 
counted among the sample for the countries of the world because the State Department does not 
issue Travel Warnings or Alerts for its own country. That is left to the foreign ministries of other 
countries. Below, Table 20a and Table 20b show Alerts and Warnings, respectively, issued for 
countries by their social construction classification.  
Table 20A       
       
Travel Alerts by classification of countries using social construction  
       
Travel 
Alerts Category 1 Category 2 
 
Category 3 
 
Category 4 
 
Category 5 
 
Total 
No 60 % 33 % 18 % 44 % 18 % 36 % 
Yes 40 % 67 % 82 % 56 % 82 % 64 % 
Total 
100 %  
n = 35 
100 %  
n = 6 
101 % * 
n = 11 
100 %  
n = 68 
101 % 
n = 68 
100 %  
n = 188 
*Does not add to 100 % because of rounding. 
X2 = 22.26    df = 4    p < .000 
 
Table 20B       
       
Travel Warnings by classification of countries using social construction  
       
Travel 
Warnings Category 1 Category 2 
 
Category 3 
 
Category 4 
 
Category 5 
 
Total 
No 97 % 17 % 46 % 66 % 27 % 55 % 
Yes 3 % 83 % 55 % 34 % 74 % 45 % 
Total 
100 %  
n = 35 
100 %  
n = 6 
101 % * 
n = 11 
100 %  
n = 68 
101 % 
n = 68 
100 %  
n = 188 
*Does not add to 100 % because of rounding. 
X2 = 54.83    df = 4    p < .000 
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A chi-square test was performed and a relationship found between Category 1 through 5 
countries and issuance of Travel Alerts, X2 (4, N = 188) = 22.3, p = .00. A chi-square test was 
then performed and a relationship also found between Category 1 through 5 countries and 
issuance of Travel Warnings, X2 (4, N = 188) = 54.8, p = .00. Both chi-square tests show 
significant results that as a country’s social construction moves from Advantaged to Deviant, its 
issuance of Travel Alerts and Warnings increases, even more significantly in the case of Travel 
Warnings. To summarize, it is evident that Category 1 countries, the Advantaged countries in 
Social Construction Theory, are the least represented with regard to Travel Warnings and Alerts. 
They represent 19 percent of the countries sampled, 0.1 percent of the Travel Warnings, and six 
percent of the Travel Alerts. The Category 2 countries, set in between the Advantaged and 
Dependent within Social Construction, represent three percent of the countries sampled, three 
percent of the total Travel Warnings, and two percent of the Travel Alerts. Category 3 countries, 
the Contender countries, represent six percent of the countries sampled, three percent of the 
Travel Warnings, and 10 percent of the Travel Alerts. The Category 4 countries have the lowest 
power and are socially constructed as Dependent; they represent 36 percent of the countries 
sampled, 23 percent of the Travel Warnings, and 29 percent of the Travel Alerts. Finally, the 
Category 5 countries, or Deviant countries in Social Construction Theory parlance, also represent 
36 percent of the sample, while representing the most Travel Warnings and Alerts at 71 percent 
and 53 percent, respectively.  
 While the descriptive statistics showing which countries based on their social construction were 
subjects of Travel Warnings and Alerts over the years sampled and how frequently such documents were 
written about them are revealing, it is also necessary to account for the share of those documents relative 
to social construction category size. In other words, if one social construction category made up a certain 
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percentage of the countries worldwide, then, with all things being equal, one might expect that its share of 
Travel Warnings and Alerts would be equal to that same percentage. Before engaging that analysis, 
though, the five social construction country categories required revisiting. Category 1 was a collection of 
countries with developed economies that were not autocratic—they represented the countries socially 
constructed as Advantaged. If variables were more ideal, one would expect the next group of countries 
socially constructed as Contender to be developed economies that were autocratic, but bringing together 
the data from the U.N. about country economies and the data on the autocratic status of countries from 
Geddes et al (2014) showed that that combination did not exist. There were no countries that were 
developed and autocratic. That left countries with economies in transition that were also autocratic as the 
next most powerful, and they were placed in the Contender category. However, the countries with 
economies in transition and not autocratic could not occupy the same space as the more powerful 
developed economies, but they were not as less powerful as the developing economies that were not 
autocratic. As such and as seen in Figure 1 earlier (see page 92), those countries were right on the X-axis 
in between the Advantaged and Dependent countries. There were only six of the economies in 
transition/not autocratic countries: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, and 
Ukraine. Some of these emerged as post-Soviet countries and the others emerged as post Yugoslav war 
countries. While they may be economies in transition now, there is a reason the statistics above show a 
spike in Travel Warnings and Alerts—most were mired in conflict in the 1990s. Their nature as transition 
countries make them difficult to classify within the social construction power typology for the period 
studied, and as such, they were removed from the next stage of the analysis 
 Below, Figure 2 shows an Index of Travel Warnings and Alerts to the relative size of social 
construction country categories.  As noted previously, there were 188 countries studied prior to the 
removal of the six economies in transition/not autocratic countries. For this analysis, there are now 182 
countries total. Over the 18-year sample studied, there were 792 total Travel Warnings found and 462 
total Travel Alerts. This analysis created an index to determine if the proportion of countries per social 
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construction category to total countries studied was equal to their share of the proportion of Travel 
Warnings and Alerts to the total documents sampled. A ratio of 1 for Travel Warnings/Alerts relative to 
social construction country category size indicates an equal proportion of documents to countries. A ratio 
of less than 1 means fewer documents to relative size, and a ratio of more than 1 means a greater share of 
Travel Warnings /Alerts relative to the countries in the social constructed category size. 
  
 Take the Advantaged countries, for example. There were 35 of them compared to 182 countries 
studied, and 35 / 182 = .192. They represent a proportion of about 19 percent of the total countries 
studied. Only one Travel Warning was issued for all of the Advantaged countries over the 18-year sample 
out of 792 Travel Warnings total, and 1 / 792 = .001. Their Travel Warnings represent .1 percent of the 
total Travel Warnings studied over the 18 years. To determine the ratio, .001 was divided by .192, which 
gave this group an index score of .005. For its Travel Alerts, the advantaged countries share was 30 over 
the 18 years compared to 462 total Alerts found, and 30 / 462 = .064, showing that its proportion of Alerts 
was 6.4 percent. For its ratio, .064 was divided by .192 for an index score .333. Both index scores of 
Travel Warnings and Alerts to the relative size of the group of 35 Advantaged countries are less than 1, 
showing that their share travel advice documents is less than proportional to its relative social 
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construction country category size.   Moreover, the low ratio (index) demonstrates that these countries 
had far fewer warnings and alerts than one might have expected. 
 As seen in Figure 2 above, the Contender countries have less Travel Warnings relative to size, but 
more Travel Alerts. It may not be theoretically inconsistent that these countries socially constructed as 
more powerful are subject of the lighter Alerts as opposed to the more serious Warnings. Perhaps the 
State Department will go so far as alerting U.S. travelers to unsafe conditions in those countries while 
finding the full Travel Warning diplomatically insensitive. Dependent countries approach an equal share, 
but still fall short, having fewer travel advice documents of both types relative to size. Again, this may not 
be inconsistent with Social Construction Theory of target groups if Dependent populations, while less 
powerful, are still well regarded. Finally, the Deviant countries have more than their share of both 
documents relative to size. These findings are mixed. At both ends of the spectrum, there are extremes. 
The share of travel advice documents for Advantaged countries is far less compared to the size of their 
country group and to the extreme for Travel Warnings. At the other end of the spectrum is the Deviant 
category of countries, and they have far greater proportion of Travel Warnings and Alerts compared to 
their proportion of countries studied. In the middle, the Contender and Dependent countries tell a mixed 
story. Their share of documents compared to relative country group size is still more than the Advantaged 
countries, and that is revealing and rings true to what Social Construction Theory asks one to expect. The 
index scores for Contender and Deviant countries show mostly that they have less than their share of 
documents relative to size, with the exception of Travel Alerts for the Contender group. That score of 
1.576 is in fact larger than the Deviant Travel Alert index score. Nonetheless, the data shown at the two 
ends of the spectrum show a relationship that as countries are constructed from Advantaged to Deviant, 
they are subject of increasing Travel Warning and Alert issuance. 
 
 121 
 
 This data begs certain questions. Is it simply that countries classified as Category 1 (i.e., 
Advantaged) are safer, and that explains the lack of Travel Warnings? Are the most Dependent 
and most Deviant countries simply more dangerous? Those are reasonable questions, but the 
answers to those questions were not sought for this study’s exploration of Travel Warnings and 
Alerts. The purpose of this paper was to explore the components and content of historical Travel 
Warnings and Alerts and to learn if there is a relationship between the between social 
construction and issuance of Travel Warnings and Alerts, regardless of danger, real or supposed. 
This data shows that there is indeed a relationship.  
Guiding Hypotheses Revisited 
 With regard to the second purpose of this study, to determine if there was a relationship 
between the social construction of foreign countries and the issuance of U.S. State Department 
Travel Warnings and Alerts, the research proceeded with two guiding hypotheses.  
H1 Countries that are constructed as Advantaged are less likely to have a Travel Warning or 
Alert while countries that are constructed as Contender, Dependent, and Deviant are 
more likely to have one.  
Indeed, this relationship appears to be present. As described above, Advantaged and 
Contender countries represented a much smaller proportion of Travel Warnings and Alerts. 
Meanwhile, Dependent and Deviant countries compose the majority share of these documents.  
H2 While Social Construction plays a role the creation and issuance of Travel 
 Warnings and Alerts, most official State Department travel advice is for the 
 purpose of transmitting safety information to U.S. citizen travelers.  
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This guiding hypothesis needs elaboration. A side effect of potentially finding that 
countries that are socially constructed as Dependent or Deviant and by extension culturally 
different opens the door to possibly finding that the content of Travel Warnings and Alerts are 
not just for safety notification, but perhaps political in nature, too. Consequently, there was 
curiosity to know if overtly political content would emerge from the content analysis. It did not. 
Certainly, codes like Reason:Anti-American/Western were present, but it was not found to be 
political in nature, as it was consistently followed with codes like Reason:U.S.Targeted, 
indicating violence perpetrated against U.S. interests. Instead, the content that emerged through 
content analysis consistently identified types of danger. In sum, this guiding hypothesis is 
supported by the content analysis of Travel Warnings and Alerts studied; those documents reflect 
a purpose and output for transmitting travel safety information to U.S. citizens. Finding a 
relationship between the social construction of foreign countries and the issuance of Travel 
Warnings and Alerts is not meant to imply that those documents are invalid; indeed, the content 
shows that there is real and present danger in the countries that are subject of State Department 
Travel Warnings and Alerts. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
Purpose and Research Questions  
The purpose of this study was to explore the world of State Department Travel Warnings 
and Alerts and describe what emerged from the archived pages. There were three research 
questions that guided this pursuit. First, what is the nature of State Department Travel Warnings 
and Alerts? Second, what is their function? Those two questions were meant to be answered 
through a qualitative content analysis of available Travel Warnings and Alerts. Combing the 
Internet Archives, Travel Warnings and Alerts were available as far back as 1994 through the 
present. A census of 21 years’ worth of archived Warnings and Alerts were collected and then 
pared down to a more manageable 18 years for analysis. This study was also anchored by the 
Social Construction theoretical framework to drill deeper into the policy implications of this 
State Department output. This leads to the third and final research question: Is there a 
relationship between how a foreign country is socially constructed from the U.S. perspective and 
the issuance of Travel Warnings and Alerts about those countries by the U.S. Department of 
State? This study sought to answer these questions, and it did so. 
The Nature and Function of Travel Warnings 
 Through a content analysis of 1,303 individual Travel Warnings and Alerts, the nature of 
Travel Warnings emerged.  Each document identifies whether it is a Travel Alert, previously 
called a Public Announcement, or a Travel Warning. If it was an Alert, there was an indication as 
to whether or not that Alert replaced or superseded a previous Alert and when it would expire. If 
it was a Warning, it indicated if it replaced or superseded a previous Warning. Warnings did not 
provide an expiration date because they were created for enduring circumstances. Appendix F 
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shows a list of all Travel Warnings and Alerts with the date of issuance, the date of the document 
it superseded, and the expiration date, if applicable and provided. Of course, each document 
included the subject country, and usually concluded with the contact information for the nearest 
U.S. Embassy and Consulates. Aside from these descriptors, the nature of Travel Warnings and 
Alerts had three principal content components: 
1. Background or contextual information. 
2. Reason or justification for issuance. 
3. Advice in the form of verbs. 
The complete list of Background, Reason, and Verb codes can be reviewed in Appendices C, D, 
and E.  
The Background codes added informative context that allowed the reader to extrapolate 
more about how he or she may fare if following through with the choice to travel in that country. 
Would an American proceed with travel plans if the State Department provided the contextual 
information that it had evacuated its own diplomatic personnel? Would an American with dual 
citizenship with Iran still travel there after reading that dual citizenship holders were stymied by 
the Iranian government, including harassment and incarceration? Would a university 
administrator still allow students to travel to a certain country after reading that both the Peace 
Corps and Fulbright programs withdrew their participants and canceled their presence in that 
country? Such background information provided insight that may influence one’s decision. The 
context included in these documents ended up being rich and diverse. As the content analysis 
deepened, it was revealed that some contextual content was merely informational while some 
was actionable. 
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The Reason codes composed the bulk of Travel Warning and Alert content. They were as 
varied as one might expect and comprehensive to the extent that it would challenge a creative 
mind to think of one that had not already been mentioned. From hooliganism being coded once 
to murder being coded the most at 564 times, there were a myriad of reasons provided in 
justification of each Warning or Alert. They ranged from the mundane, like shops being closed, 
to the terrible, such as rape and suicide operations. Coding such despair line by line came to be 
an unanticipated challenge of endurance for the researcher, but certainly at a level infinitesimal 
compared to those who lived it. There is little light that emerges from the body of Travel 
Warnings and Alerts, as their subject is of the most serious nature. As the content analysis of 
Reason codes deepened, it was revealed that some described circumstances of concern, some of 
severe harm, and the actors who were the perpetrators of danger.  
The Verb codes reflected the advice imparted by the State Department and style in which 
it offered it. If the State Department provided a given Reason for document issuance, such as 
violence against Americans, then it would follow it with advice, such as encouraging the traveler 
to be alert to his or her surroundings, avoiding certain areas at certain times, or advising to stay 
in certain types of accommodations. If there were landmines and unexploded ordnance offered as 
a reason for the Alert or Warning, it would proffer the advice to travel only on hard packed roads 
and be alert to signs that indicated the presence of landmines. Curiously, there was a nature to 
advice giving itself, which was much more implicit than explicit. As mentioned earlier, the State 
Department seemed more comfortable with suggesting a course of action rather than issuing 
directives. It was more common by far to find pieces of advice that began with ‘avoid’ or ‘be 
aware/alert to” instead of directives like ‘do not’ do one thing or another. Perhaps this is the right 
way to present information and advice to a free people. The words and phrases used in these 
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documents also indicated a State Department security vernacular. Phrases like ‘overland travel’ 
and ‘exercise vigilance’ that spanned across the sample studied reflected a specific language 
style that may not be easily consumed by the traveling American layperson. Overall, the advice 
content was particularly useful, and it is important that it is included. Not all Americans travel 
for tourism and many travel by obligation. They may have sick family members abroad, they 
may be sent by their employer, or they may be called abroad by important research opportunities. 
The advice provided by the State Department gives travelers some idea of how they may 
approach mitigating potential danger. The deeper content analysis showed that most Verb codes 
were rather general (‘avoid’ this and ‘be alert’ to that), while some were rather explicit (task 
oriented). 
That describes Travel Warnings and Alerts, but what about their function? That was the 
second research question. Generating an answer to this question strictly from the content 
analyzed, the function of these documents is to inform, to warn, and to advise. Their function 
seems to describe clear and present danger, whether fleeting or protracted, in a country outside 
the United States to where an American might be considering travel. The content analyzed 
confirms and reinforces the State Department’s explanation for the purpose of Travel Warnings: 
We issue a Travel Warning when we want you to consider very carefully whether you 
should go to a country at all. Examples of reasons for issuing a Travel Warning might 
include unstable government, civil war, ongoing intense crime or violence, or frequent 
terrorist attacks. We want you to know the risks of traveling to these places and to 
strongly consider not going to them at all. Travel Warnings remain in place until the 
situation changes; some have been in effect for years (travel.state.gov, 2015).  
 
And Travel Alerts:  
We issue a Travel Alert for short-term events we think you should know about when 
planning travel to a country. Examples of reasons for issuing a Travel Alert might include 
an election season that is bound to have many strikes, demonstrations, or disturbances; a 
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health alert like an outbreak of H1N1; or evidence of an elevated risk of terrorist attacks. 
When these short-term events are over, we cancel the Travel Alert (travel.state.gov, 
2015). 
 
In terms of what can be found from the archival documents alone, the question of function was 
answered. Previous researchers have raised questions, though, about how and why governments 
issue official travel advice. Sharpley et al (1996) posited that travel advice from the United 
Kingdom’s Foreign Office was used as an unofficial trade embargo against The Gambia for not 
complying with the U.K. government’s wishes. Lowenheim (2007) suggested that travel 
warnings issued by any country could be used as an “international disciplinary mechanism” (p. 
207). There are ways to address these questions. One could implement a multiple case study 
research design with variables that include multiple countries, their State Department Travel 
Warnings, U.S. foreign policy toward those countries, U.S. political, military, and business 
interest in those countries, U.S. allies’ orientation toward those countries, and so forth. Another 
way could be a quantitative research approach, like Combs (2009) multivariate analysis of 
different variables related to Travel Warnings and Alerts. Yet another way is the approach this 
paper took, and that was to look deeper at Travel Warning and Alert function through the lens of 
Social Construction Theory. 
Social Construction Theory and Travel Warnings 
The third research question asked if there was a relationship between how a foreign 
country is socially constructed and Department of State issuance of Travel Warnings and Alerts 
for those countries. This research shows that there is indeed a relationship. Countries that are 
categorized as Advantaged (high power, high regard) and Contender (high power, low regard) 
and less likely to be issued Travel Warnings and Alerts than countries socially constructed as 
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Dependent (low power, high regard) and Deviant (low power, low regard). It was established 
early in this paper that the State Department has a long history as a policymaking agency of the 
U.S. government, particularly through its Policy Planning Staff (Pugliaresi & Berliner, 1989). 
Social Construction Theory is a theory of public policy: 
The social construction of target groups has become a central concept in the study 
of public policy. Policies typically carve out certain populations to receive 
benefits or burdens and often embed positive or negative social constructions of 
the targeted groups. These constructions serve to justify the allocation of rewards 
and penalties within the policy and are critical to an understanding of the way 
democracy functions. Social constructions are powerful images or stereotypes… 
(Schneider et al, 2014, p. 105).  
 
In the case of this study, the policymaker is the State Department, the policy output is the Travel 
Warning or Alert, and the target group subject of the Warning or Alert is the foreign country. 
The power of target groups provided as examples in the work of Schneider et al (2014) tends to 
focus on economic power, so the variable of the state of each country’s economy was used 
(developed, in transition, and developing). If social constructions are powerful images or 
stereotypes, then countries that do not share the U.S. values of democracy and civil liberty, that 
is, countries that are autocratic, were chosen as likely having lower regard from the American 
perspective. Based on these variables, not only did Dependent and Deviant classified countries 
have more Travel Warnings and Alerts than Advantaged and Contender countries, but they did 
so overwhelmingly. The answer to this research question is, yes, there is a relationship between 
the social construction of a foreign country and the issuance of State Department Travel 
Warnings and Alerts. However, did the application of Social Construction Theory reveal a 
phenomenon beyond the presence of a relationship? 
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A Critique of Social Construction Theory Application to Travel Warnings and Alerts 
 Social Construction Theory implies that the biases of policymakers toward target groups 
shape how they will treat those groups in the policy arena. There are two ends of the spectrum: 
Positive biases mixed with the presence of high power of the target group produce positive 
policy decisions for that target group. Negative biases mixed with the lower power of the target 
group will engender negative and even punitive policy decisions. Those biases are generated 
based on behavior, identity, and power. This dynamic has been shown to be present in numerous 
examples over the decades since this theory was first presented (Pierce et al, 2014). In the case of 
Travel Warnings and Alerts, the application of Social Construction Theory is mixed. One is 
presented with the proverbial chicken or egg question: which came first? Are Dependent and 
Deviant countries issued Warnings and Alerts because of their social construction or because 
they are genuinely dangerous? In examples provided by Schneider et al (2014), criminals and sex 
offenders are meted out punishing policy decisions because of their deviant behavior. Deviance 
in this study was defined by political freedom—whether or not a country was autocratic—
because autocracy is anathema to American values. Yet, an autocratic government does not have 
to imply danger. After all, Singapore is autocratic and developing, but did not have a single 
Travel Warning or Alert throughout the entire sample. When one reads all the reasons for which 
these documents were issued, it makes one think that these countries were issued Travel 
Warnings and Alerts not because of their difference compared to the United States and many 
Americans, but because of legitimate danger. In this way, Social Construction Theory does not 
explain the relationship neatly, simply because settings and circumstances in these countries 
really are quite dangerous. The application of Social Construction Theory was not to imply that 
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these Warnings and Alerts could not be trusted.  In this study, however, Social Construction 
Theory turned out to be helpful in an unexpected way.  
If the travel advice document is a policy tool, what is revealed to be more interesting in 
this study is not which country is subject of the most Warnings and Alerts, but which countries 
are not. When categories of Social Construction Theory are applied, it is shown that primarily 
Western, white, Christian, democratic, and economically powerful countries generally do not 
receive Travel Warnings, while Travel Alerts are also issued at a significantly lower incidence. 
Indeed, these countries are generally safer, but are they so safe to merit only one Travel Warning 
(for a tsunami and nuclear reactor breach in Japan—Japan itself being an exceptional country 
among the others) over an 18-year period? A Travel Warning is a policy tool that has 
implications beyond informing travelers about safety. Even if their issuance is sincerely meant 
only for safety, it still has policy side effects. If Americans heed a Travel Warning, they withhold 
not only their presence in a given country, but their money. Economies dependent on tourism can 
be very negatively impacted when official travel advice keeps tourists and their spending money 
away (Sharpley et al, 1996). Further, there is the matter of delicacy—foreign governments may 
find being a subject of a Travel Warning offensive and could hamper relationships among friends 
(allies). If the U.S. perspective includes a positive bias for Western countries, that preferential 
bias may keep the State Department from issuing Travel Warnings and Alerts for security 
incidences in those countries when it would it would issue them for similar circumstances in 
negatively socially constructed countries, even if it is just to protect them from the negative side 
effects of a Travel Warning. In the case of side effects for Dependent and Deviant countries, it 
may be that the danger is too much to overlook, or it may be the Dependent and Deviant bias 
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means that the State Department does not care overmuch about those negative side effects. In 
this way, the application of Social Construction Theory works well. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
 The qualitative orientation of this study was meant to be exploratory and descriptive. It 
was meant to lay groundwork about the nature of State Department Travel Warnings and Alerts. 
It intended to also explore public policy implications with the extension of Social Construction 
Theory to foreign countries. What resulted was a treasure trove of interesting contextual, reason, 
and advice content and the manner in which it was presented as well as a clear relationship 
between social construction of foreign countries and Travel Warning and Alert issuance. The 
application of Social Construction was successful in some ways but not others. Of course, it did 
not imply causation and was not meant to, but the correlation was informative. It inspires the 
possibility of further research.  
 First, some case study research could be employed to learn more about the relationship 
the U.S. has with a certain country or countries with Travel Warnings to determine if there are 
any other variables that motivate the issuance of that official travel advice additional to safety. 
The descriptive statistics provided in the appendices of all the Warnings and Alerts found could 
be used to create a quantitative research design similar to Combs (2009), in which she used 
multivariate analysis to determine if bias was present in the issuance of Travel Warnings in a 
single month of time. It may be that the data from this study could be used to create a predictive 
study of which countries will receive Travel Warnings and why. 
 The descriptive statistics in the appendices also provide when Travel Alerts are issued, 
which Alert it replaced, and when it will expire. Then it includes Travel Warnings and which 
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Warnings they superseded. It would be interesting to know which countries under which 
circumstances move from Travel Alert status to Travel Warning status. That information may 
also be used for predictive purposes. Furthermore, there is potential to know what Reason codes 
(with regard to severity, perhaps) predict what type of advice is provided (implicit or explicit). 
 Finally, it would be interesting to know more about security incidents and circumstances 
in foreign countries without Travel Warnings constructed as Advantaged or Contender and 
explore if the same or similar circumstances in a Dependent or Deviant classified foreign country 
had generated a Travel Warning in those negatively, socially constructed countries. Again, was 
Irish National Army (IRA) activity throughout the U.K. not dangerous enough to at least merit 
consistent Travel Alerts during the 1990s before the peace process was engaged at the end of that 
decade? It seemed rather ubiquitous at the time, and that is just one salient example. Even now in 
summer 2016, after three successive and brutal mass killings in France starting with the Charlie 
Hebdo Paris headquarters mass shooting attack in January 2015, the Bataclan concert hall 
massacre and related mass shootings in Paris in November 2016, and the mass homicide of 
revelers as a driver deliberately targeted them with his truck on Bastille Day 2016 in Nice, there 
is not and has not been even a single Travel Alert for France, let alone a Travel Warning 
(travel.state.gov, 2016). Why is that and would similar incidences in non-Western countries have 
generated a Travel Alert or Warning by now? For that first question as to why, this study shows 
that Social Construction Theory points to a credible answer.  
Concluding Remarks 
  The application of Social Construction Theory and its extension to foreign countries 
showed a relationship. It revealed more insight about countries that were not subjects of 
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Warnings and Alerts than it did subject countries. Based on the content of the documents studied, 
the countries that were subject of Warnings and Alerts were indeed dangerous, and those travel 
advice documents should be heeded. With the very high incidence of codes indicating that State 
Department personnel were reduced and evacuated, along with the prohibition of their 
dependents, one can conclude how unsafe some of these countries can be. If they are unsafe for 
employees with the might of U.S. government resources behind them, American travelers should 
certainly consume Travel Warning and Alert information seriously. Those examples about State 
Department employees are interesting in another way. The State Department regularly included 
information about its personnel’s travel restrictions. It seems less likely that such information 
was included just for State Department personnel’s sake. There is probably an internal method 
for State to communicate with its employees. Instead, it was likely included for the sake of 
American travelers. The State Department has to find a way to inform Americans, a free people, 
without directing them, and sharing State Department personnel travel restrictions may be a way 
to strike that balance. 
 The world of Travel Warnings provides thousands of snapshots in place and time. Much 
can be gleaned from a single travel advice document—a country’s security circumstances, the 
U.S. government’s orientation to that country, whether friend or foe, and how one might navigate 
visiting such a place, despite danger. Reviewing multiple Travel Warnings over time, one sees 
the changing stories of countries, as they struggle through natural disaster to rebellion to civil 
war to peace processes and elections. Travel Warnings and Alerts, as a collection, reveal much 
about how Americans may navigate the world more safely and much about the U.S. 
Government’s relationship with other countries. 
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Appendix A 
 
Frequency of Travel Warning and Alert Issuance by Country for 18 Year 
Sample Studied (1994 – 2014) 
 
Country Travel Warnings Travel Alerts 
Afghanistan 29 1 
Albania  3 1 
Algeria 30 0 
Angola 7 0 
Argentina 0 4 
Austria 0 2 
Azerbaijan 0 1 
Bahamas 1 1 
Bahrain 4 8 
Bangladesh 0 9 
Belgium 0 2 
Bhutan 0 1 
Bolivia 1 7 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 10 1 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia 0 1 
Brazil 0 1 
Burkina Faso 1 1 
Burundi 22 0 
Cambodia 3 1 
Cameroon 2 2 
Canada 0 1 
Cayman Islands 1 0 
Central African Republic 30 0 
Chad 16 6 
Chile 0 3 
China 2 5 
Colombia 24 2 
Comoros 0 2 
Congo 2 1 
Costa Rica 0 1 
Cote d'Ivoire 21 0 
Cuba 2 1 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 26 4 
Djibouti 2 3 
Ecuador 0 4 
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Egypt 5 11 
El Salvador 4 2 
Eritrea 16 0 
Ethiopia 2 4 
Fiji 0 4 
France-Monaco 0 2 
France-Switzerland 0 1 
Gabon 0 5 
Gabon-Congo  0 2 
Gambia 0 1 
Georgia 2 2 
Germany 0 3 
Ghana 0 3 
Grenada 1 0 
Guatemala 0 8 
Guinea 6 4 
Guinea-Bissau 1 2 
Guyana 2 4 
Haiti 25 2 
Honduras 4 3 
India 0 14 
Indonesia 18 6 
Iran 11 1 
Iraq 28 4 
Israel 28 2 
Italy 0 2 
Italy, Holy See, and San Marino 0 1 
Jamaica 1 3 
Japan 1 4 
Japan-Korea  0 1 
Jordan 2 2 
Kenya 17 6 
Kuwait 3 4 
Kyrgyz Republic 5 11 
Laos 0 7 
Lebanon 32 1 
Lesotho 2 1 
Liberia 17 1 
Libya 18 4 
Luxembourg 0 1 
Macedonia 6 3 
Madagascar 1 4 
Malaysia 0 12 
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Mali 15 2 
Mauritania 10 1 
Mexico 14 21 
Mongolia 0 1 
Montserrat 1 0 
Mozambique 0 3 
Myanmar (Burma) 0 4 
Nepal 12 20 
New Zealand 0 1 
Nicaragua 0 4 
Niger 8 4 
Nigeria 24 3 
North Korea 7 0 
Oman 1 0 
Pakistan 31 4 
Panama 0 2 
Papua New Guinea 0 4 
Paraguay 0 2 
Peru 0 9 
Philippines 14 22 
Portugal 0 1 
Qatar 1 0 
Russia 0 12 
Rwanda 4 5 
Saudi Arabia 22 6 
Senegal 0 2 
Serbia and Montenegro 2 2 
Sierra Leone 6 0 
Solomon Islands 3 4 
Somalia 19 0 
South Africa 0 2 
South Korea 0 2 
South Sudan 9 0 
Spain 0 2 
Sri Lanka 7 2 
Sri Lanka-Maldives 0 1 
St Lucia 0 1 
Sudan 25 1 
Swaziland 0 1 
Syria 16 1 
Taiwan 1 0 
Tajikistan 8 3 
Tanzania 0 6 
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Thailand 1 11 
Timor-Leste 3 9 
Togo 1 1 
Tonga 0 1 
Tunisia 6 7 
Turkey 3 5 
Turkmenistan 1 4 
Turks and Caicos 2 0 
Uganda 0 10 
Ukraine 5 0 
United Arab Emirates 1 0 
United Kingdom 0 6 
Uzbekistan 8 9 
Venezuela 5 9 
Vietnam 2 1 
Yemen 26 0 
Zambia 0 2 
Zimbabwe 5 2 
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Appendix B 
Discourse Analysis – Travel Warnings/Alerts, 18 Year Sample Studied (1994 – 2014) 
ID Text Change Analysis 
TW-Dem. Rep. Congo-
1/22/2004 
“Nevertheless, unofficial armed 
groups and active duty troops 
operating in some parts of the 
country are responsible for pillaging, 
vehicle thefts, carjackings, extra-
judicial killings, rapes, kidnappings, 
ethnic tensions, and continued 
military/paramilitary operations.” 
 
Introduction of rape as a  
reason for a travel warning 
Striking that rape did not appear 
as a code until 10 years within 
the sample 
TW-Pakistan-3/25/2005 “These measures include maintaining 
good situational awareness, …” 
 Vague advice; layperson may not 
know how to operationalize such 
advice. How does one maintain 
good situational awareness? Is it 
to be alert to surroundings? Such 
vocabulary appears to be more 
like security jargon than 
layperson advice. 
 
TW-Bosnia-Herzegovina-
3/30/2006 
“…exercise additional vigilance in 
urban areas to avoid being victimized 
during confrontational crime...” 
 
 
 
 
 Exercising vigilance vague 
advice; layperson may not 
understand the meaning of 
vigilance, an uncommon word in 
Colloquial American English, let 
alone how to exercise vigilance; 
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‘avoid being victimized’ is 
unhelpful advice 
 
TW-Bosnia-Herzegovina-
4/13/2001 
“…Americans and other foreigners 
were brutally attacked, pelted with 
rocks, …” 
 Rock throwing appears 
consistently over the years; this 
is first; rock throwing seems to 
reveal a most desperate form of 
powerlessness 
 
TW-Israel, Gaza, West 
Bank-11/26/2004 
“…American citizens involved in 
pro-Palestinian partisan volunteer 
efforts were severely assaulted in the 
West Bank by Israel settlers and 
harassed by the Israel Defense 
Forces. Those taking part in such 
efforts, including through 
demonstrations, non-violent 
resistance, and “direct action”, are 
urged to cease such activity for their 
own personal safety.” 
 
First appearance of caution 
of this kind regarding 
advocacy for minority 
population within a 
country; repeats over next 
few years 
Risk of direct involvement in 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process 
potentially dangerous, especially 
if pro-Palestinian; in later TWs, 
this advice is removed and 
relegated to a link to another 
document on the State Dept. 
website. 
TW-Israel, Gaza, West 
Bank-2/27/2006 
“… American citizens should stay 
away from demonstrations and 
generally avoid crowded public 
places, such as restaurants and cafes, 
shopping and market areas and malls, 
pedestrian zones, public 
transportation of all kinds, including 
buses and trains and their respective 
stations/terminals, and the areas 
around them.”  
 That includes almost every place; 
advice is equivalent to ‘shelter in 
place’.  Not realistic advice for 
visitors/tourists. 
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PA-Mexico-9/15/2006 “…alerts U.S. citizens to the rising 
level of brutal violence…” 
Introduction of the 
adjective brutal to type of 
violence 
Violence categorized in many 
ways over 20 years, but usually 
linked to perpetrators, such as 
gang violence, sectarian 
violence, etc; however, 
adjectives denoting severity not 
as common. 
TW-Nepal-4/24/2006 “…should factor the potential for 
violence into their plans” 
 Striking acknowledgment of 
likelihood of violence if traveler 
insists on visiting Nepal despite 
warning. 
 
TW-Somalia-6/5/2006 “Merchant vessels, fishing boats and 
recreational craft all risk seizure by 
pirates and having their crews held 
for ransom, …” 
Introduction of word 
“pirates”. 
I have been coding “piracy” for 
what has been described as 
seizure of boats for plundering 
and hostage taking from TWs 
back to 1999, but 2006 is first 
year I’ve seen actual word 
“pirates” or any of its derivatives 
(e.g., piracy) used. Why wasn’t 
State using the words ‘pirates’ or 
‘piracy’ for all those years for 
what was clearly piracy? 
 
TW-Syria-9/14/2006 “Americans in Syria should exercise 
caution and take prudent measures to 
maintain their security.  These 
measures include being aware of 
their surroundings, avoiding crowds 
and demonstrations, keeping a low 
 Excellent example of starting 
with vague language (“take 
prudent measures”) and 
reinforcing with concrete 
examples on how to do so; seems 
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profile, varying times and routes for 
all required travel, and ensuring 
travel documents are current.” 
 
much more useful for the lay 
traveler 
TW-Algeria-2/6/2014 “The Department of State 
recommends that U.S. citizens avoid 
overland travel…” 
 Phrase “overland travel” is 
consistently used in the 
documents coded as early as 
1995 through the last year 
sampled; it appears in a variety 
of countries 47 times; “overland” 
is an example of speech 
Americans would not use 
colloquially and makes me think 
that there is State Department 
jargon; perhaps this is common 
language to the military or 
security profession. 
 
TW-Burundi-1/8/2009 “Common crimes include muggings, 
burglaries, robberies, and 
carjackings.” 
 Redundant language that occurs 
in multiple warnings/alerts over 
the years, showing that the State 
Department distinguishes 
between robberies and muggings 
or burglaries and robberies; is it 
that only a house is burgled, but 
a person is mugged?  Maybe all 
muggings are robberies but not 
all robberies are muggings? 
 
TW-Central African 
Republic-4/1/2009 
“Highway bandits (‘coupeurs de 
route’ in French, ‘saraguinas’ in 
Introduction of terms in 
local language. 
First encounter of translations 
offered in TW for elements to 
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Sango) poste a serious threat to 
travelers throughout the country.” 
avoid; perhaps provided for the 
unexperienced traveler 
 
TW-Central African 
Republic-4/1/2009 
“Central Africa security forces (and 
people posing as such) at those 
checkpoints frequently harass local 
and expatriate travelers for bribes or 
small amounts of money (described 
as ‘coffee’ in French).” 
 
Introduction of slang 
terms. 
Curious slang term—the use of 
the term coffee as slang for bribe.  
It is difficult to imagine what the 
etymology of this slang term is. 
TW-Liberia-3/26/2003 “While fighting tends to increase 
during dry season, acts of organized 
violence can occur at any time.” 
Introduction of seasonal 
schedule for fighting. 
Interesting insight that 
weather/seasons are directly 
proportional to fighting intensity. 
Likely an ancient 
problem/practice in world 
history, but interesting to see 
contemporary examples. 
 
TW-Chad-4/12/2006 “Americans traveling with Thurarya 
satellite phones should register the 
phones with Chadian authorities.” 
First reference to satellite 
phones. 
Only country to ever have this 
advice appear in its Travel 
Warnings and only for the 2006 
year (but in multiple Chad TWs); 
Thurarya is a 
telecommunications company 
out of United Arab Emirates. 
Odd restriction.  Why? 
 
TW-Colombia-3/25/2009 “Extortion-related bombings have 
occurred recently in Bogota, Cali, 
and several smaller cities.” 
Introduction of this type of 
bombing. 
Appears to be threat to detonate a 
bomb if potential victim or 
perhaps authorities do not supply 
requested funds. 
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TW-Haiti-1/28/2009 “…kidnappers make no distinctions 
of nationality, race, gender or age.” 
New phrasing re: 
kidnapping 
Curious phrasing; reminiscent of 
language usually reserved for 
non-discrimination statements 
from an HR office, but certainly 
means to indicate that no one, 
regardless of identity, is safe 
from kidnapping. 
  
TW-Nepal-5/22/2009 “Crime in the Kathmandu Valley, 
including violent crime and 
harassment of women, continues to 
rise.” 
First appearance of women 
as specific target 
Shocking that women listed as 
targets only appears now, 15 
years into the sample. Women 
are consistent targets of crime 
and war and tend to be among 
most vulnerable; why only now? 
 
TW-Syria-2/12/2009 “Those registering should give due 
consideration to Privacy Act 
provisions and waivers.” 
Cautionary phrasing 
introduced regarding 
registering trip with State 
Department 
In almost every TW/PA/TA, 
traveler is directed to register 
one’s presence with the State 
Department, which allows the 
nearest U.S. embassy or 
consulate to know that its citizen 
in in the host country.  It had not 
appeared before, and it rarely 
appeared again.  Sentence creates 
a “big brother” sentiment—
volunteering one’s information 
for the government to track one’s 
movements/behavior. 
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TW-Afghanistan-
5/25/2010 
“No part of Afghanistan should be 
considered immune from 
violence…” 
 Extremely intense and impactful 
statement reflecting the breadth 
of violence across the country. 
 
TW-Burundi-11/4/2010 “…stay indoors in a ground floor, 
interior room.” 
New phrasing. Why? This is so curiously 
specific. Does it refer to gunfire? 
Perhaps an interior room is more 
protective from gunfire than a 
room with windows to the 
outside? Perhaps the ground 
floor is indicated because it is 
easier to escape from if attacked? 
 
TW-Nigeria-11/19/1996 “Violent crime, practiced by persons 
in police and military uniform.” 
Introduction of new 
criminal? 
This is mysterious phrasing, and 
it appears many times across 
multiple countries throughout the 
long term sample; phrasing 
leaves reader not know if the 
criminal stole police/military 
uniforms or if the criminal is a 
member of the police/military; 
it’s possible State Dept. doesn’t 
know, and it’s possible State 
Dept. knows it’s corruption and 
out of diplomacy and deference 
to host government, phrases it 
this way; I chose to interpret it as 
corruption and coded it as such. 
 
TW-North Korea-
8/27/2010 
“Since the United States does not 
maintain diplomatic or consular 
Introduction of consular 
limits 
TWs as early as Iran-1995 
mention that the U.S. 
 145 
 
relations with North Korea, the U.S. 
Government cannot provide normal 
consular services to its citizens in 
North Korea.  The Swedish Embassy 
in Pyongyang is the U.S. Protecting 
Power in North Korea.  It provides 
limited consular services to U.S. 
citizens traveling in North Korea 
who are ill, injured, arrested, or who 
have died while there.  As with other 
host nations, consular officials 
cannot obtain the release of U.S. 
citizens from the host government’s 
judicial system, i.e., release citizens 
from foreign prisons, influence the 
outcome of trials or pay criminal 
fines.” 
government has no diplomatic 
relations with the host country 
and is instead represented by a 
third country’s government and 
continue to reference this 
throughout the long term sample; 
this TW paragraph is very first 
that outlines what services that 
third government can and cannot 
provide to the American traveler. 
TA-Bhutan-9/23/2011 “U.S. citizens with questions or 
concerns may contact the American 
Citizens Services Unit of the U.S. 
Embassy in Kathmandu, Nepal, 
the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, 
India, or the Consulates General in 
India for further information.  Please 
note that consular issues related to 
Bhutan, including assistance to U.S. 
citizens, are covered by the U.S. 
Embassy in New Delhi.” 
 
Omission. Clearly no U.S. 
embassy/consulate in Bhutan, but 
zero mention of that explicitly.  
Why no explanation?  It is 
explicitly explained in most 
TWs.  And why no diplomatic 
presence?  Does U.S. have at 
least diplomatic relations with 
Bhutan?   
TW-Egypt-1/30/2011 “The U.S. Department of State 
recommends that U.S. citizens avoid 
Unlabeled Advantage of reading this TW 
with hindsight is that I know this 
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travel to Egypt due to ongoing 
political and social unrest.” 
to be the start of Egypt’s 
infamous Arab Spring, but it was 
not labeled as such at that time. 
Label came later, but since the 
TW was written in present time 
back on that date of January 
2011, the author of the TW 
doesn’t know what’s coming.  
Reading TWs historically reveals 
a trickling in of 
information/events/circumstances 
that regularly amount to a 
conflict of great significance, like 
bread crumbs to disaster. 
 
TW-Libya-2/25/2011 “The Department is working closely 
with other governments and 
multinational corporations to ensure 
the safe departures of those U.S. 
citizens who still need assistance. 
Please direct inquiries regarding U.S. 
citizens in Libya 
to LibyaEmergencyUSC@state.gov.” 
 
Introduction of an ad hoc 
email. 
First ad hoc email address to 
appear in a TW/PA/TA for a 
specific, temporal emergency. 
Very 21st Century method to 
track correspondence for a crisis. 
TW-Mali-2/9/2011 “This replaces the August 6, 2010 
Travel Warning for Mali and 
provides additional examples of 
violent acts carried out by the Islamic 
extremist group Al-Qaeda in the 
Lands of the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM) in the region.” 
Controversial term The term “Islamic extremist” is 
verboten in the Obama 
Administration and in current 
Kerry State Department, but this 
TW was from Clinton State 
Department; when did Obama 
make it clear he wasn’t going to 
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pair “Islamic” and “extremism” 
or “radical” in order to indicate 
that such groups did not 
represent Islam?  Was it before 
this time?  Had it not trickled 
down to State employees? 
 
TW-Mexico-4/22/2011 “Millions of U.S. citizens safely visit 
Mexico each year, including more 
than 150,000 who cross the border 
every day for study, tourism or 
business and at least one million U.S. 
citizens who live in Mexico.” 
 This sentence is followed by 
pages of descriptions of great 
violence endemic in Mexico, so 
why include it? First of all, it’s 
true, but it’s also a mixed 
message. Is this to give 
Americans perspective? Is it to 
pacify the Mexican government? 
Is it simply enough that it’s true?  
All of the above? This phrase 
also appears in other TWs over 
time. How should the lay traveler 
process this information—that 
you may succumb to a violent 
death or you may not? 
 
TW-Honduras-11/21/12 “Honduras has the highest murder 
rate in the world. San Pedro Sula is 
considered to be the world’s most 
violent city, with 159 murders for 
every 100,000 residents in 2011.” 
 
First stat of its kind across 
long term sample 
Shocking statements for such a 
small country. 
TW-Honduras-11/21/12 “Kidnappings and disappearances are 
a concern throughout the country.” 
 What distinguishes a kidnapping 
from a disappearance? Is a 
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disappearance a kidnapping 
without a trace or without 
extortion/ransom? 
 
TW-Iraq-1/19/12 “Methods of attack available to 
groups targeting U.S. interests have 
included roadside improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs), including 
Explosively Formed Penetrators 
(EFPs); magnetic IEDs placed on 
vehicles; human and vehicle-borne 
IEDs, mines placed on or concealed 
near roads; mortars and rockets, and 
shootings using various direct fire 
weapons.” 
 
Introduction of very 
technical explosive device 
language 
At times, TW language becomes 
very technical and reveals 
something about the writer and 
the audience; it’s as if the 
diplomat as become militarized 
and the audience is not the 
American tourist. 
TW-Cambodia-10/31/1997 “Those American citizens who feel 
that they must travel to Phnom Pehn 
should defer non-essential travel to 
other parts of the country.” 
 Phrase “non-essential travel” 
appears and is coded consistently 
throughout the long term sample 
and is often preceded by ‘defer’, 
‘avoid’, and ‘warns against’, 
among others; it is somewhat 
safe language and is a curious 
alternative to what the State 
Department seems to want to 
say: “Don’t go to this country.” 
TW-Cote d’Ivoire-
10/18/2002 
“U.S. citizens who remain in Cote 
d’Ivoire despite this Travel Warning 
are urged to register with the U.S. 
Embassy…” 
 Admonishing language; 
transferring risk/decision to 
traveler; kind of like, ‘if you 
come here even though we told 
you not to…’ 
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TW-Libya-8/27/2012 “…and provide their current contact 
information and next-of-kin or 
emergency contact information.” 
New warning language Severe language; asking for next 
of kin gives an impression that if 
you travel to Libya, you need to 
provide the State Department 
with the name of who State 
should contact upon your death; 
serves a healthy dose of reality. 
 
TW-Somalia-6/15/12 “U.S. citizens contemplating travel to 
Somalia, including Somaliland and 
Puntland, are advised to obtain 
Kidnap and Recovery Insurance, as 
well as Medical Evacuation 
Insurance, prior to travel.” 
 
Introduction of insurance 
type 
I wonder if people know that 
kidnap insurance exists; useful 
knowledge to have 
TW-Djibouti-6/8/2014 “Do not antagonize armed 
criminals.” 
 Advice that one shouldn’t have 
to give. 
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Appendix C 
Travel Warnings and Alerts for 18 Years Sampled (1994-2014)  
  
Background Codes Frequency Coded 
Background:Accommodations:Limited 16 
Background:AirEvacuationDifficultInEmergency 1 
Background:AlcoholProhibited 1 
Background:BailUnavailable:ShortTermVisits 1 
Background:BlasphemyPunished 2 
Background:BorderAreas:Dangerous 273 
Background:CabinetDissolved 1 
Background:Cease-fire 38 
Background:Cease-fire:Failed/Ended 6 
Background:CoalitionMilitaryAction 24 
Background:CollapseOfPyramidScheme 1 
Background:ConsularServicesLimited 335 
Background:ConsularServicesResumed 9 
Background:DiplomaticRelationsEstablished 1 
Background:Drugs:IllegalUse/PastUse/PosessionSeverelyPunished 1 
Background:DrySeason:FightingIncreases 3 
Background:DualCitizenshipHolders:Impeded 47 
Background:ElectionMonitorsPresent 1 
Background:Extraditions 1 
Background:FulbrightProgramSuspended 3 
Background:HistoryOfAnti-U.S.Violence 5 
Background:HistoryOfKidnapping/HostageTaking 23 
Background:HistoryOfTerrorism 22 
Background:HistoryOfViolence 26 
Background:HistoryOfWar 4 
Background:HolidaysPotentiallyDangerous 12 
Background:HostCountry:Divided 2 
Background:HostGovt/Police:TakingSecurityPrecautions 74 
Background:HostGovt/U.S.RelationsDeterioriating 2 
Background:HostGovt:Anti-U.S./WesternRhetoric 9 
Background:HostGovt:ArmingItsCitizens/CreatingCitizenMilitia 2 
Background:HostGovt:Assurances/Assistance 16 
Background:HostGovt:Cannot/WillNot/Incapable:AssureSafety 128 
Background:HostGovt:ClosedU.S.RelatedEstablishments 1 
Background:HostGovt:DisrespectTowardLeaderPunishable 5 
Background:HostGovt:ImposedTravelRestrictions 95 
Background:HostGovt:InTransition 28 
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Background:HostGovt:IronDomeMissileDefense 1 
Background:HostGovt:NoEffectivePoliceForce 5 
Background:HostGovt:None/Limited/Fledgling 5 
Background:HostGovt:NotifyingFamiliesOfDeceased 1 
Background:HostGovt:NotInControlOfMilitary/Police 2 
Background:HostGovt:ParticipatingInPeacekeepingOperationsAbroad 4 
Background:HostGovt:Prohibts/Delays/ImpedesConsularAccess 19 
Background:HostGovt:Provocation/Defiance 12 
Background:HostGovt:RestrictingDiplomats 2 
Background:HostGovt:WithdrawingTroops 1 
Background:HostGovt:WithholdsInformation 1 
Background:HumanitarianAids:ForcedOutByHostGovt 1 
Background:HumanitarianAids:Present 8 
Background:HumanitarianOrganizations:Partial/FullEvacuation 19 
Background:HumanitarianOrganizations:TakingSecurityPrecautions 2 
Background:InternationalObservers 1 
Background:MartialLawEnded 1 
Background:NATO 22 
Background:Negotiations 2 
Background:NoConsularRelations 7 
Background:NoDiplomaticRelations 32 
Background:NoDistinctionInTargetingOfficialsOrCivilians 38 
Background:NoFlyZone 2 
Background:NoSafe/ConventionalTransportationOutOfCountry 1 
Background:NoU.S.Consulates 4 
Background:NoU.S.Embassy/Services 58 
Background:NoVaccine/TreatmentExists 4 
Background:ParliamentDissolved 4 
Background:ParliamentRestored 1 
Background:PeaceAccords 47 
Background:PeaceCorps:Evacuated 14 
Background:PeaceCorps:ReducedVolunteers 1 
Background:PeaceCorps:TakingSecurityPrecautions 1 
Background:Peacekeepers:Present 25 
Background:Peacekeepers:Withdrawn 4 
Background:Prohibited:Music 1 
Background:Prohibited:SocialActivitiesBtwnSexes 1 
Background:Prohibited:Television 1 
Background:Prohibited:VideoTapes 1 
Background:Questioning:ForHavingVisitedCertainCountries 5 
Background:RebelsSupportingU.S.InTopplingRegime 2 
Background:Sanctions 34 
Background:SanctionsLifted 8 
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Background:SchoolsClosed 1 
Background:StateOfEmergency:Lifted 1 
Background:TouristAreasSafe 2 
Background:U.N. 47 
Background:U.S.Embassy:OperationsSuspended/Closed 41 
Background:UN:Coalition 17 
Background:UN:Controlled 4 
Background:UN:Evacuation:Dependents 1 
Background:UN:Evacuation:U.S.Employees 1 
Background:UN:FacilitatedDisarmament 2 
Background:UN:Inspectors:RefusedEntry 2 
Background:UN:Observers 7 
Background:UN:Partial/FullEvacuationOfPersonnel 8 
Background:UN:Personnel:Attacked/Killed/Targeted 9 
Background:UN:Personnel:TravelRestricted 3 
Background:UN:SponsoredBallot 1 
Background:US:BusinessInterests:Withdrawn/Affected 8 
Background:US:Consulate:Closed 4 
Background:US:Embassy:Attacked/Targeted 13 
Background:US:Embassy:Cannot/WillNotEvacuateTravelers 21 
Background:US:Embassy:CharteredEvacuation 2 
Background:US:Embassy:DoesNotProvidePrivateSecurity 3 
Background:US:Embassy:Established 1 
Background:US:Embassy:EvacuatesCitizensAtCitizensCost 12 
Background:US:Embassy:Moved 2 
Background:US:Embassy:Re-opened 20 
Background:US:Embassy:TakingPrecautions 9 
Background:US:Embassy:TemporarilyRelocatingStaff 1 
Background:US:Embassy:TemporaryLocation 1 
Background:USGovt:Contractors/Grantees:Evacuated/AdviseEvacuation 5 
Background:USGovt:InterestsSection 4 
Background:USGovt:InterestsSectionClosed 5 
Background:USGovt:LiaisonOfficeClosed 2 
Background:USGovt:LiaisonOfficeOpened 4 
Background:USGovt:Military:Action 29 
Background:USGovt:Military:Withdrawal 4 
Background:USGovt:NoRansomConcessionsToTerrorists 23 
Background:USGovt:NotRepresentedByThirdNation 8 
Background:USGovt:Personnel/Dependents:Evacuation:Lifted 83 
Background:USGovt:Personnel/Dependents:ProvidedPotassiumIodide 1 
Background:USGovt:Personnel:Behavior:Modified/Restricted 165 
Background:USGovt:Personnel:CurfewImposedbyDOS 28 
Background:USGovt:Personnel:Dependents:Evacuated 106 
 153 
 
Background:USGovt:Personnel:Dependents:Prohibited 58 
Background:USGovt:Personnel:Full/PartialEvacuation 105 
Background:USGovt:Personnel:Reduced 46 
Background:USGovt:Personnel:TravelRestricted 390 
Background:USGovt:Personnel:TravelRestrictions:Lifted 1 
Background:USGovt:RepresentedByThirdNation 36 
Background:USGovt:RestrictsCitizensTravelToCountry 1 
Background:USGovt:SeeksEqualTreatmentforItsCitizens 1 
Background:USPassports:NotValid 13 
Background:USPassports:RestrictionLifted 2 
Background:VaccinationsRequired 3 
Background:VisaRequired 47 
Background:War:Ended 9 
Background:WarCrimesTribunal 3 
Background:WarCriminal/Terrorists:Arrested/Sentenced/Killed 32 
TOTAL BACKGROUND CODES 3082 
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Appendix D 
Travel Warnings and Alerts for 18 Years Sampled (1994-2014)  
  
Reason Codes 
Frequency 
Coded 
Reason:AirPollution:Unhealthy/Hazardous 2 
Reason:Airport/Planes:Attacked 20 
Reason:Airport:Blocked 9 
Reason:Airport:Closed 15 
Reason:Airport:MajorCommercialCarriersResumeService 1 
Reason:Airport:MajorCommercialCarriersSuspendedOperations 4 
Reason:Airport:Reopened 7 
Reason:Airport:U.S.CarriersProhibited 7 
Reason:AirTravel/Airport:Unsafe 49 
Reason:AirTravel:Disruption 25 
Reason:Al-Qaida 161 
Reason:Al-Shabaab 19 
Reason:AngryYouth 2 
Reason:Anti-American/Western 204 
Reason:Anti-Christian 1 
Reason:Anti-Foreign 28 
Reason:Anti-Globalization 1 
Reason:Anti-Government:Group/Activity 24 
Reason:Anti-Peace 1 
Reason:ApostasyPunished 15 
Reason:Arrests 80 
Reason:Assassination 60 
Reason:AutomaticWeapons 1 
Reason:Bandits 84 
Reason:Bank/CashShortages 4 
Reason:Boat:Accidents 4 
Reason:BokoHaram 17 
Reason:Bounties 1 
Reason:BribesRequired 17 
Reason:Burglaries 23 
Reason:CallForExpulsionOfAmericans 1 
Reason:Carjacking 101 
Reason:CattleRustling 4 
Reason:Censorship 1 
Reason:Chaos/Lawlessness/Disorder 35 
Reason:ChildrenAffected 3 
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Reason:CivilEmergency 1 
Reason:CivilLiberties:Limited/Suspended 11 
Reason:Commerce:Interrupted 2 
Reason:ConditionsImproved 4 
Reason:Conferences/Forum/Summit 18 
Reason:Conflict 24 
Reason:Corruption:Government 7 
Reason:Corruption:Leader 1 
Reason:Corruption:Military 33 
Reason:Corruption:Police 51 
Reason:CoupRelated 25 
Reason:Crime/Criminal 258 
Reason:Criminals:Murdered 8 
Reason:Crisis 4 
Reason:Curfew 81 
Reason:Danger 153 
Reason:Death 64 
Reason:DeathPenalty 1 
Reason:Demonstrations 381 
Reason:Deportation 31 
Reason:Detention 98 
Reason:Detention:ForUnsubstantiatedAllegations/Reasons 40 
Reason:Detention:HostCountryHeritage 9 
Reason:Difficulties 3 
Reason:DiplomaticPersonnel:Targeted 99 
Reason:Dissident 3 
Reason:Disturbances 26 
Reason:DoctorsThreatened 5 
Reason:Drought 3 
Reason:Earthquake 32 
Reason:EconomicHardship/Crisis 31 
Reason:Elections 185 
Reason:ElectronicMediaHacked 2 
Reason:ElNino 3 
Reason:EmergencyAssistanceLimited 3 
Reason:EmergencyDepartureLimited 7 
Reason:Entry/Exit:Restrictions/Harassment 57 
Reason:Ethnic 38 
Reason:Expatriates:Targeted 55 
Reason:Extortion 34 
Reason:ExtrajudicialProceedings/Killings 12 
Reason:Extremists 107 
Reason:Famine 1 
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Reason:Fatal/Lethal 5 
Reason:Festival 7 
Reason:Fines 6 
Reason:Flood 6 
Reason:FluidSituation 16 
Reason:Food/Water:Limited 25 
Reason:Foreign/Non-U.S.Victims:Targeted 184 
Reason:ForeignCurrencyExchangeRestrictions 2 
Reason:ForestFire 2 
Reason:Fraud/Scam 10 
Reason:FuelShortage 19 
Reason:Gangs 39 
Reason:Government:Targeted 59 
Reason:Hamas 14 
Reason:Harassment 50 
Reason:HarshPenalties 15 
Reason:HarshPrisonConditions 9 
Reason:Hazardous 31 
Reason:Heritage:Bias 10 
Reason:Hezbollah 28 
Reason:Hijacking 12 
Reason:HiredSecurityCannotBeTrusted/Betrayal 4 
Reason:HitList 3 
Reason:HomeInvasions 24 
Reason:Hooliganism 1 
Reason:Hostage-taking 88 
Reason:HumanitarianAids:Targeted 80 
Reason:HumanitarianCrisis 9 
Reason:HumanTrafficking 6 
Reason:Inauguration 1 
Reason:Incarceration 13 
Reason:Incursion 2 
Reason:Infrastructure:Attacked/Damaged 44 
Reason:Insecurity 17 
Reason:Instability 58 
Reason:Insurgence 69 
Reason:Interrogation 10 
Reason:Intimidation 15 
Reason:Invasion/Incursion 1 
Reason:ISIS 3 
Reason:IslamicShariaLaw 5 
Reason:Kidnapping 380 
Reason:LaborDispute 2 
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Reason:Landmines 103 
Reason:LandSeizures 1 
Reason:Landslides 12 
Reason:LeaderAttacked 3 
Reason:LeaderChange 23 
Reason:LeaderDeposed 8 
Reason:LeaderDetained 4 
Reason:LeaderDied 4 
Reason:LeaderKilled 2 
Reason:LeaderResigned 4 
Reason:LimitedResources/Services 28 
Reason:Looting 23 
Reason:MartialLaw 6 
Reason:Military 199 
Reason:Military/Police:/Targeted 94 
Reason:Military/Police:HeavilyArmed 3 
Reason:Military/Police:Undisciplined/Ill-trained 22 
Reason:Military:DecommissionedSoldiers 3 
Reason:Military:ForeignMilitaryPresence 4 
Reason:MilitaryOperations 70 
Reason:MissingPersons 3 
Reason:Missionaries:Targeted 8 
Reason:Muggings 18 
Reason:Murder 564 
Reason:Mutiny 8 
Reason:Narcotraffickers 56 
Reason:NationalDisaster 4 
Reason:NightTravelDangerous 66 
Reason:NuclearDanger 3 
Reason:Occupation:ByForeignGovt 1 
Reason:OppositionLeaders/Forces 19 
Reason:Oppression 1 
Reason:OsamaBinLadin 16 
Reason:Outbreak:Disease 66 
Reason:Overcrowded 1 
Reason:ParamilitaryActivity 243 
Reason:PeaceKeepers:Targeted 7 
Reason:PettyTheft 9 
Reason:Pickpockets 2 
Reason:Pilgrimage 6 
Reason:Pillaging 16 
Reason:Piracy 38 
Reason:Poachers 5 
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Reason:Police 49 
Reason:Police:HeadquartersTakenOver 1 
Reason:Police:NotSolvingCrimes 1 
Reason:PoliticalUncertainty 14 
Reason:Poor:CriminalJusticeSystem 15 
Reason:Poor:HealthServices 47 
Reason:Poor:Infrastructure 43 
Reason:Poor:PublicTransportation 38 
Reason:Poor:SanitaryConditions 8 
Reason:Poor:Telecommunications 19 
Reason:Poor:TransportationMaintenance 18 
Reason:PortAccess:Impeded 1 
Reason:Potential:Arrest/Detention 42 
Reason:Potential:Assassination 12 
Reason:Potential:Assault 3 
Reason:Potential:Attacks 86 
Reason:Potential:Banditry 1 
Reason:Potential:Biological/ChemicalWarfare 6 
Reason:Potential:Bomb/Bombing/Explosives 43 
Reason:Potential:Conflict 3 
Reason:Potential:Crime 21 
Reason:Potential:Curfew 7 
Reason:Potential:Danger 59 
Reason:Potential:Demonstrations 79 
Reason:Potential:Deportation 9 
Reason:Potential:DestructionOfProperty 2 
Reason:Potential:Earthquakes 3 
Reason:Potential:Famine 2 
Reason:Potential:Fighting 2 
Reason:Potential:Harassment 15 
Reason:Potential:Harzard 1 
Reason:Potential:Health/SafetyProblems 1 
Reason:Potential:Hijacking 7 
Reason:Potential:Hooliganism 2 
Reason:Potential:HostageTaking 5 
Reason:Potential:Hostility 9 
Reason:Potential:Inconvenience 1 
Reason:Potential:Injury 9 
Reason:Potential:Instability 17 
Reason:Potential:Insurgency 1 
Reason:Potential:InterruptionInServices 37 
Reason:Potential:Kidnapping 90 
Reason:Potential:Looting 1 
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Reason:Potential:MilitaryActivity 5 
Reason:Potential:Murder 8 
Reason:Potential:Prosecution 3 
Reason:Potential:Retaliation 8 
Reason:Potential:Riots 1 
Reason:Potential:Roadblocks 8 
Reason:Potential:Robbery 11 
Reason:Potential:Shooting 2 
Reason:Potential:Strike 5 
Reason:Potential:SuicideOperations 20 
Reason:Potential:TelecommunicationsInterrupted 1 
Reason:Potential:Tensions 7 
Reason:Potential:Terrorism 171 
Reason:Potential:TransportationInterrupted 16 
Reason:Potential:Tsunami 1 
Reason:Potential:U.S.Embassy:Closure/ServicesSuspended 33 
Reason:Potential:U.S.GovernmentRetaliation 1 
Reason:Potential:U.S.Govt:InterestsTargeted 141 
Reason:Potential:Unrest:Civil/Political/Social 46 
Reason:Potential:Violence 328 
Reason:Potential:VolcanicActivity 2 
Reason:PowerVacuum 1 
Reason:PreditoryScams 6 
Reason:PrisonBreak 11 
Reason:Property:Damaged/Destroyed 53 
Reason:PropertyDisputes 7 
Reason:ProphetMohammad 1 
Reason:Prosecution 8 
Reason:Protesters 12 
Reason:PublicSympathyForTerrorists 4 
Reason:PurseSnatching 1 
Reason:Quarantine 13 
Reason:RadicalElements 7 
Reason:Raids 3 
Reason:Rallies/Meetings:Political 2 
Reason:Ransom 69 
Reason:Rape 23 
Reason:Rebels/Rebellion 101 
Reason:RecallReferendum 2 
Reason:Referendum 24 
Reason:Refugees/RefugeeCamp 67 
Reason:Religious 17 
Reason:ReligiousObservances 2 
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Reason:ReligousSite/Observers:Targeted 21 
Reason:Repression 6 
Reason:Resentment 2 
Reason:Retaliation/Revenge 34 
Reason:Revolution 3 
Reason:Risk 243 
Reason:Roads:Impeded 177 
Reason:RoadTravel:Dangerous 71 
Reason:Robbery 150 
Reason:Scrutiny 11 
Reason:Secessionists 1 
Reason:Sectarian 11 
Reason:Security:Concerns/Incidents 209 
Reason:Security:Fluid/Uncertain 78 
Reason:SecuritySituation:Deteriorating 33 
Reason:Separatist 11 
Reason:ServicesInterrupted 27 
Reason:SexualAssault 9 
Reason:Shakedowns 4 
Reason:Shelling 3 
Reason:ShopsClosing 1 
Reason:Skinheads 2 
Reason:Smugglers 9 
Reason:SportEvent 12 
Reason:Squatters 3 
Reason:StateOfAlert 1 
Reason:StateOfCalamity 1 
Reason:StateOfEmergency 45 
Reason:StrandedTravelers 5 
Reason:StreetChildrenThieves 9 
Reason:Strikes 50 
Reason:SuicideBomb 93 
Reason:Taliban 29 
Reason:TaxisUnsafe/Corrupt 26 
Reason:TearGas 7 
Reason:Telecommunications:Interrupted 22 
Reason:Telecommunications:Interrupted/Blocked 1 
Reason:Tensions 127 
Reason:Terrorism 485 
Reason:Threat 406 
Reason:Thugs 4 
Reason:Tourists:Affected 92 
Reason:Train:Attacked 6 
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Reason:Transportation:Interrupted 25 
Reason:Travelers:Searched 1 
Reason:TravelWarning:Cancelled 1 
Reason:Tsunami 13 
Reason:U.S.Franchises:Attacked 12 
Reason:UnexplodedAmmunition/Ordnance 40 
Reason:Unpredictable 154 
Reason:Unrest:Civil/Social/Political 117 
Reason:Unsafe 49 
Reason:UnsettledConditions/Situation 32 
Reason:UnsolvedCrimes 1 
Reason:Upheaval 1 
Reason:Vandalism 7 
Reason:VehicleTheft 28 
Reason:Vigilante 1 
Reason:Violence 485 
Reason:Violence:Abuse 5 
Reason:Violence:Against Civilians 167 
Reason:Violence:Against:U.N. 15 
Reason:Violence:Against:Women 8 
Reason:Violence:Aggression 1 
Reason:Violence:Ambush 26 
Reason:Violence:ArmedConflict/Clashes 162 
Reason:Violence:Arson 24 
Reason:Violence:Assault 38 
Reason:Violence:Attacks 335 
Reason:Violence:Beatings 16 
Reason:Violence:Boat:Attacked 7 
Reason:Violence:Bomb/Bombing/Explosives 358 
Reason:Violence:BulldozerAttack 1 
Reason:Violence:Buses:Attacked 31 
Reason:Violence:Businesses:Attacked 5 
Reason:Violence:BusinessInvasion 1 
Reason:Violence:CivilWar 26 
Reason:Violence:Confrontations 12 
Reason:Violence:Criminal 124 
Reason:Violence:Demonstrations 9 
Reason:Violence:Elections 8 
Reason:Violence:Ethnic 17 
Reason:Violence:Fighting 89 
Reason:Violence:Gang 9 
Reason:Violence:Government 1 
Reason:Violence:Hospitals:Attacked 2 
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Reason:Violence:Hostility 58 
Reason:Violence:Housing:Attacked 6 
Reason:Violence:Injuries 286 
Reason:Violence:Insurgent 5 
Reason:Violence:Interclan/Tribal 24 
Reason:Violence:Inter-factional 6 
Reason:Violence:IntraCommunal 16 
Reason:Violence:LegaciesOfWar 1 
Reason:Violence:Massacre 1 
Reason:Violence:Military 2 
Reason:Violence:Minorities:Attacked/Targeted 4 
Reason:Violence:Mob 7 
Reason:Violence:NarcoTrafficker 36 
Reason:Violence:NeedleStabbings 1 
Reason:Violence:Organized 1 
Reason:Violence:PledgeForFutureAttack 1 
Reason:Violence:Political 54 
Reason:Violence:Riots 37 
Reason:Violence:Rocket/MissleLaunches 69 
Reason:Violence:RockThrowing 27 
Reason:Violence:RubberBullets 1 
Reason:Violence:SchoolAttacked 9 
Reason:Violence:SchoolDestroyed 1 
Reason:Violence:SchoolInvasion 4 
Reason:Violence:Sectarian 27 
Reason:Violence:Separatist 4 
Reason:Violence:Shooting 180 
Reason:Violence:Skirmish 24 
Reason:Violence:SoftTargets 32 
Reason:Violence:Stabbing 1 
Reason:Violence:Standoff 1 
Reason:Violence:Terrorist 14 
Reason:Violence:Torture 1 
Reason:Violence:U.S.LocallyHiredEmployees:Targeted 7 
Reason:Violence:U.S.Targeted 511 
Reason:Violence:Vehicles:Attacked 54 
Reason:Violence:War 1 
Reason:Violence:WeaponsOfMassDestruction 2 
Reason:Visa/ImmigrationChanges 1 
Reason:Volatile 70 
Reason:VolcanicActivity 30 
Reason:WaterContaminated 3 
Reason:WeaponsTrafficker 8 
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Reason:Weather:SevereConditions 61 
TOTAL REASON CODES 14977 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 164 
 
Appendix E 
Travel Warnings and Alerts for 18 Years Sampled (1994-2014)  
  
Verb Codes 
Frequency 
Coded 
Verb:Abide 1 
Verb:Advise 197 
Verb:Alerts 145 
Verb:Apprise 1 
Verb:Ask:ForConsularAccess/RightToContactEmbassy 3 
Verb:Assemble:VitalDocuments 1 
Verb:Assure:PassportValidity 3 
Verb:Avoid 48 
Verb:Avoid/BeAlertIn:AreasPopularWithWesterners/Foreigners 71 
Verb:Avoid/BeAlertTo:Crowds/Demonstrations 392 
Verb:Avoid:Abandoned/DestroyedBuildings 7 
Verb:Avoid:Attention 6 
Verb:Avoid:BeingVictimized 2 
Verb:Avoid:Boats 2 
Verb:Avoid:BusStops/Buses 11 
Verb:Avoid:CommercialFarms 1 
Verb:Avoid:Confrontation 2 
Verb:Avoid:CongestedVehicleTraffic 2 
Verb:Avoid:Contact 2 
Verb:Avoid:CriminalActivity 12 
Verb:Avoid:Docking/SailingThroughHostCountryWaters 6 
Verb:Avoid:Downtown 2 
Verb:Avoid:DrugDealers 2 
Verb:Avoid:FuneralRites 3 
Verb:Avoid:Hospitals/Clinics(Outbreak) 1 
Verb:Avoid:Ice 1 
Verb:Avoid:IsolatedAreas 9 
Verb:Avoid:Landmines/UnexplodedOrdnanceAreas 6 
Verb:Avoid:Malls/ShoppingAreas 20 
Verb:Avoid:Military/MilitaryFacilities 12 
Verb:Avoid:OverlandTravel 28 
Verb:Avoid:PedestrianZones 6 
Verb:Avoid:PoliticalPartyHQs 1 
Verb:Avoid:Predictability 21 
Verb:Avoid:PreviousSitesOfTerrorism 1 
Verb:Avoid:Public/GovernmentBuildings 10 
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Verb:Avoid:PublicAreas 42 
Verb:Avoid:PublicTransportation 34 
Verb:Avoid:Red-light/ProstitutionDistricts 3 
Verb:Avoid:ReligiousPlacesOfWorship 17 
Verb:Avoid:Restaurants/Bars 26 
Verb:Avoid:Riots 1 
Verb:Avoid:RoadBlocks 8 
Verb:Avoid:TravelToSpecificAreas 318 
Verb:Avoid:UnpopulatedAreas 1 
Verb:Avoid:Walking/TrekkingAlone 19 
Verb:BeAlert 23 
Verb:BeAlert:LandmineWarnings 3 
Verb:BeAlert:WhenEntering/Exiting:Vehicles/Premises 15 
Verb:BeAlertTo/AwareOf:Surroundings/Situation 176 
Verb:BeAlertTo:ChangingSecurityDevelopments 16 
Verb:BeAlertTo:Surveillance 4 
Verb:BeAlertTo:SuspiciousVehicles 1 
Verb:BeAlertTo:TheUnusual/Suspicious 8 
Verb:BeAlertTo:Unexpected:Visitors/Packages/Incidents 29 
Verb:BeAlertTo:UnusualPhoneCalls 1 
Verb:BeAware 46 
Verb:BeAware:OfSecuritySituation 1 
Verb:BeCautious 4 
Verb:BeSelfReliant(LimitedEmergencyServices) 1 
Verb:Cancel:Travel 1 
Verb:Carry:Cash 3 
Verb:Carry:CellPhone/Two-WayRadio 6 
Verb:Carry:HealthDocuments 4 
Verb:Carry:MinimalBelongings 2 
Verb:Carry:TravelDocuments/PhotoID 29 
Verb:Carry:TravelItinerary 1 
Verb:Cautions 24 
Verb:Cease:ProPalestinianAdvocacy 5 
Verb:CheckInAtPoliceCheckpoints 1 
Verb:Confirm:Tourist/TravelServices 14 
Verb:Consider 131 
Verb:Consult:CDC 19 
Verb:Consult:PersonalPhysicians 1 
Verb:Contact:Doctor 1 
Verb:Contact:Family/Friends 14 
Verb:CooperateWithAuthorities 23 
Verb:CrossBordersOnlyAtBorderPosts 7 
Verb:Depart 132 
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Verb:Develop:ContingencyPlan 16 
Verb:Discourages 10 
Verb:DonateCash 2 
Verb:DoNot:AttemptToPassThroughRoadBlocks 15 
Verb:DoNot:AttemptToVisitU.S.Embassy 1 
Verb:DoNot:CarryLargeSumsOfCash 13 
Verb:DoNot:ChallengeAuthorities 2 
Verb:DoNot:ComeToVolunteerUnofficially 10 
Verb:DoNot:DisplayWealth 25 
Verb:DoNot:ParticipateInDemonstrations/Protests(Illegal) 3 
Verb:DoNot:Resist/AntagonizeCriminals 2 
Verb:DoNot:Sail/DockNearHostCountry 3 
Verb:DoNot:SharePrivateFinancialInformation 6 
Verb:DoNot:StopCarAtAccidents/Gatherings 2 
Verb:DoNot:TakePhotos/Video 16 
Verb:DoNot:TravelAlone 6 
Verb:DoNot:ViolateCurfew 2 
Verb:Dress:Appropriately 2 
Verb:Drink:BottledWater 3 
Verb:Drink:PlentyOfWater 1 
Verb:Drive:OnTollRoads 2 
Verb:Encourages 305 
Verb:EvacuateArea 7 
Verb:Evaluate 5 
Verb:Exercise:Caution/Prudence/Vigilance/GoodJudgement 590 
Verb:Exercise:OnlyInGyms/FitnessCenters 3 
Verb:Find/Locate:Shelter 13 
Verb:Follow:OfficialInstructions 46 
Verb:Have:EmergencyEvacuationPlan 45 
Verb:Have:MultipleMeansOfCommunication 4 
Verb:Have:SafeHavenPlan 6 
Verb:Heed 17 
Verb:InventoryHouseholdEffects 1 
Verb:Keep:MucousMebranesMoist 1 
Verb:Limit:Movements 10 
Verb:Lock:Homes/Vehicles 25 
Verb:Maintain/Keep:LowProfile 130 
Verb:Maintain:AdequateFoodAndWater 24 
Verb:Maintain:CarAndItsReadiness 9 
Verb:Maintain:CommunicationsAbility 9 
Verb:Maintain:MedicalSupplies 9 
Verb:Maintain:Passport/VisaValidity 66 
Verb:Maintain:Readiness 2 
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Verb:Maintain:StrongSecurityPosture 13 
Verb:Maintain:VehicleSecurity 4 
Verb:Make:AlternativeLodgingArrangements 1 
Verb:Monitor:Children 3 
Verb:Monitor:News 169 
Verb:Monitor:Situation 96 
Verb:Move:ToHigherGround/Inland 1 
Verb:Obtain/Purchase:Traveler's/HealthInsurance 14 
Verb:Park:InWellLit/GaurdedPaidLots 1 
Verb:Patronize:LegitimateBusinesses 5 
Verb:PersonalSecurity:Evaluate/BeAlertTo/BeAware 293 
Verb:Proceed:ToPoliceStationIfFollowed 9 
Verb:Protect:Belongings/Passport 7 
Verb:Provide:NextOfKinInformation 10 
Verb:Reaffirms 1 
Verb:Recognize 1 
Verb:Recommends 203 
Verb:Recommends:ArmedProtection 9 
Verb:ReduceVulnerability 10 
Verb:Refrain 1 
Verb:Register/Enroll:WithU.S.Embassy/Consulate/STEP 556 
Verb:Register:SatellitePhonesWithAuthorities 5 
Verb:Reiterates 1 
Verb:Relocate 3 
Verb:Remain:Calm 2 
Verb:Remain:OnHard-SurfaceAreas 5 
Verb:Reminds 143 
Verb:Report:ConcernsToAuthorities 28 
Verb:Report:ConcernsToU.S.Embassy 58 
Verb:Respect:Customs 1 
Verb:Restrict:Movements 1 
Verb:Return:ToHomeEarly 2 
Verb:Review:TravelPlans 4 
Verb:Share:TravelPlansWithReliableContact 10 
Verb:Shelter:InPlace 12 
Verb:Stay:Indoors 32 
Verb:Stay:Indoors:AfterDark 3 
Verb:Stay:InHotelsByAirport 1 
Verb:Stay:InPopular/SecureHotels 27 
Verb:Stay:InTouristAreas 9 
Verb:Stay:InWellPopulatedAreas 1 
Verb:Stay:WithinCityCenters 6 
Verb:TakeCover 1 
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Verb:TakePrecautions:Earthquake 5 
Verb:TakePrecautions:Health 8 
Verb:TakePrecautions:Security 156 
Verb:Travel:ByAir 4 
Verb:Travel:Defer/Curtail/Postpone/Reduce/Forgo/CarefullyConsider/Avoid 298 
Verb:Travel:DuringDay/AvoidNightTravel 82 
Verb:Travel:InConvoys 18 
Verb:Travel:InGroups 9 
Verb:Travel:OnTollRoads 6 
Verb:Travel:ThroughParticularCity 1 
Verb:Travel:ToLegitimateTouristAreas 2 
Verb:Travel:Warns/Cautions/RecommendsAgainst 202 
Verb:Travel:WarnsAgainstWithFirearms/Ammunition 2 
Verb:Travel:WithKnownLocalCompanion 13 
Verb:Travel:WithProvisions 5 
Verb:Travel:WithReputableTourGuides/TravelAgents/Drivers 19 
Verb:Travel:WithSecurity 12 
Verb:Urge 633 
Verb:Use:AlternateMeansOfTransportation 2 
Verb:Use:EyeWash 1 
Verb:Use:LegalTaxis/NegotiatePriceAhead 8 
Verb:Use:Non-CashPayment 1 
Verb:Use:PublicTransportation 1 
Verb:Use:SafeTransport 6 
Verb:Use:Well-TraffickedSurfacesRoadways 9 
Verb:Vary/Take:Alternate:Route 87 
Verb:Vehicle:Inspect:Security 4 
Verb:Vehicle:KeepSecure 1 
Verb:Verify:CellPhoneCoverage 2 
Verb:Verify:Legitimacy 6 
Verb:Walk:WithOthers 1 
Verb:Warns 274 
Verb:WarnsAgainst:CommercialTransports 2 
Verb:Wear:SurgicalMask 1 
TOTAL VERB CODES 7365 
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Appendix F 
Countries for 18 Year Sample Studied (1994 – 2014) 
 
Country Date Issued 
Travel 
Warning 
Travel 
Alert Expires Supersedes 
Afghanistan 9/5/2014 1 0  2/20/2014 
Afghanistan 2/20/2014 1 0  8/23/2013 
Afghanistan 8/23/2013 1 0  1/29/2013 
Afghanistan 1/29/2013 1 0  6/27/2012 
Afghanistan 6/27/2012 1 0  12/1/2011 
Afghanistan 12/1/2011 1 0  3/8/2011 
Afghanistan 6/27/2011 1 0   
Afghanistan 3/8/2011 1 0  8/13/2010 
Afghanistan 8/13/2010 1 0  5/25/2010 
Afghanistan 5/25/2010 1 0  7/23/2009 
Afghanistan 7/23/2009 1 0  9/10/2008 
Afghanistan 6/22/2006 1 0  1/9/2006 
Afghanistan 1/9/2006 1 0  1/9/2005 
Afghanistan 9/16/2005 0 1 10/14/2005 6/9/2005 
Afghanistan 6/9/2005 1 0  11/11/2004 
Afghanistan 11/15/2004 1 0  7/30/2004 
Afghanistan 7/30/2004 1 0  2/4/2004 
Afghanistan 2/4/2004 1 0  7/28/2003 
Afghanistan 7/28/2003 1 0  4/2/2003 
Afghanistan 4/2/2003 1 0  12/27/2002 
Afghanistan 12/27/2002 1 0  11/18/2002 
Afghanistan 11/18/2002 1 0  7/3/2002 
Afghanistan 7/3/2002 1 0  2/28/2002 
Afghanistan 2/28/2002 1 0  12/17/2001 
Afghanistan 12/17/2001 1 0  11/23/2001 
Afghanistan 11/23/2001 1 0  12/12/2000 
Afghanistan 7/8/1999 1 0  5/4/1999 
Afghanistan 8/21/1998 1 0  7/8/1998 
Afghanistan 6/10/1997 1 0  7/2/1996 
Afghanistan 7/2/1996 1 0  1/12/1994 
Albania 4/14/1999 1 0  12/24/1998 
Albania 12/24/1998 1 0  9/22/1998 
Albania 8/14/1997 1 0  6/10/1997 
Albania 2/20/1997 0 1 3/31/1997 1/24/1997 
Algeria 8/13/2014 1 0  2/6/2014 
Algeria 2/6/2014 1 0  8/23/2013 
Algeria 8/23/2013 1 0  2/19/2013 
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Algeria 2/19/2013 1 0  1/19/2013 
Algeria 1/19/2013 1 0  9/13/2012 
Algeria 9/13/2012 1 0  5/4/2012 
Algeria 5/4/2012 1 0  9/19/2011 
Algeria 9/19/2011 1 0  3/16/2001 
Algeria 3/16/2011 1 0  4/2/2010 
Algeria 4/2/2010 1 0  11/16/2009 
Algeria 11/16/2009 1 0  3/3/2009 
Algeria 3/4/2009 1 0  8/22/2008 
Algeria 12/20/2006 1 0   
Algeria 11/22/2006 1 0   
Algeria 8/31/2006 1 0  2/15/2006 
Algeria 2/15/2006 1 0  7/21/2005 
Algeria 7/21/2005 1 0  1/19/2005 
Algeria 1/19/2005 1 0  7/15/2004 
Algeria 7/15/2004 1 0  3/8/2004 
Algeria 3/8/2004 1 0  9/5/2003 
Algeria 9/5/2003 1 0  4/9/2003 
Algeria 4/9/2003 1 0  2/3/2003 
Algeria 2/3/2003 1 0  2/3/2003 
Algeria 12/11/2001 1 0  5/31/2001 
Algeria 5/31/2001 1 0  3/31/2000 
Algeria 10/29/1999 1 0  6/8/1999 
Algeria 5/1/1998 1 0  8/25/1997 
Algeria 8/25/1997 1 0  1/31/1997 
Algeria 1/31/1997 1 0  5/22/1995 
Algeria 5/22/1995 1 0  2/1/1995 
Angola 10/2/2003 1 0  3/24/2003 
Angola 3/24/2003 1 0  8/23/2002 
Angola 8/23/2002 1 0  9/8/2000 
Angola 7/27/1999 1 0  1/14/1999 
Angola 1/14/1999 1 0  7/15/1998 
Angola 4/18/1997 1 0  11/19/1996 
Angola 11/19/1996 1 0  9/20/1995 
Argentina 7/14/2009 0 1 9/14/2009  
Argentina 6/27/2002 0 1 10/31/2002 5/29/2002 
Argentina 2/28/2002 0 1 5/29/2002 1/3/2002 
Argentina 1/3/2002 0 1 4/3/2002 12/27/2001 
Austria 6/26/2001 0 1 8/1/2001  
Austria 12/18/1998 0 1 2/17/1999 11/20/1998 
Bahamas 10/15/2004 0 1 11/28/2004 10/12/2004 
Bahamas 9/17/2004 1 0 10/7/2004 9/7/2004 
Bahrain 6/26/2012 0 1 9/17/2012 4/25/2012 
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Bahrain 4/25/2012 0 1 6/30/2012 1/23/2012 
Bahrain 1/23/2012 0 1 4/19/2012 11/18/2011 
Bahrain 11/18/2011 0 1 1/19/2012 8/19/2011 
Bahrain 8/19/2011 0 1 11/19/2011 5/13/2011 
Bahrain 5/13/2011 0 1  4/12/2011 
Bahrain 4/12/2011 1 0  3/22/2011 
Bahrain 3/22/2011 1 0  3/17/2011 
Bahrain 2/18/2011 0 1 3/15/2011  
Bahrain 7/3/2004 1 0  7/1/2004 
Bahrain 12/23/2003 0 1 2/24/2004  
Bahrain 2/12/2003 1 0   
Bangladesh 3/2/2009 0 1 4/1/2009  
Bangladesh 3/21/2006 0 1 9/21/2006 9/21/2005 
Bangladesh 12/21/2005 0 1 3/21/2006  
Bangladesh 8/24/2004 0 1 11/22/2004  
Bangladesh 1/15/2004 0 1 4/15/2004  
Bangladesh 12/9/2003 0 1 3/9/2004  
Bangladesh 10/26/2001 0 1 1/9/2002 9/26/2001 
Bangladesh 6/29/2001 0 1 11/30/2001 4/11/2001 
Bangladesh 4/11/2001 0 1 7/11/2001  
Belgium 11/29/2001 0 1 12/28/2001  
Belgium 9/4/2001 0 1 9/30/2001  
Bhutan 9/23/2011 0 1 11/15/2011  
Bolivia 8/12/2010 0 1  11/12/2010 
Bolivia 12/13/2005 0 1 2/20/2006  
Bolivia 6/7/2005 1 0  6/1/2005 
Bolivia 7/2/2004 0 1 7/18/2004  
Bolivia 11/28/2003 0 1 2/21/2004 10/22/2003 
Bolivia 7/31/2002 0 1 8/7/2002  
Bolivia 11/1/2001 0 1 2/2/2002  
Bolivia 4/27/2001 0 1 7/26/2001  
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 3/30/2006 1 0  8/1/2005 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 8/1/2005 1 0  12/27/2004 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 6/2/2004 1 0  11/12/2003 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 11/12/2003 1 0  6/4/2002 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 6/4/2002 1 0  4/13/2001 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 4/13/2001 1 0  11/29/2000 
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Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 4/6/2001 0 1 7/7/2001  
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 7/30/1999 1 0  3/26/1999 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 1/12/1999 1 0  10/14/1998 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 10/14/1998 1 0  10/12/1998 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 6/5/1996 1 0  6/18/1996 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
and Croatia 1/22/1998 0 1 2/28/1998  
Brazil 5/18/2001 0 1 8/20/2001  
Burkina Faso 10/31/2014 0 1 1/29/2015  
Burkina Faso 4/19/2011 1 0   
Burundi 10/30/2014 1 0  4/3/2014 
Burundi 4/3/2014 1 0  10/11/2013 
Burundi 10/11/2013 1 0  4/22/2013 
Burundi 4/22/2013 1 0  11/8/2012 
Burundi 11/8/2012 1 0  4/18/2012 
Burundi 4/18/2012 1 0  11/25/2011 
Burundi 11/25/2011 1 0  6/1/2011 
Burundi 6/1/2011 1 0  11/4/2010 
Burundi 11/4/2010 1 0  5/16/2010 
Burundi 5/19/2010 1 0  7/22/2009 
Burundi 7/22/2009 1 0  1/8/2009 
Burundi 1/8/2009 1 0  4/22/2008 
Burundi 6/23/2006 1 0  10/19/2005 
Burundi 10/19/2005 1 0  12/7/2004 
Burundi 12/7/2004 1 0  5/11/2004 
Burundi 5/11/2004 1 0  8/12/2003 
Burundi 8/12/2003 1 0  7/13/2003 
Burundi 4/23/2003 1 0  8/9/2002 
Burundi 8/9/2002 1 0  12/21/2000 
Burundi 3/18/1999 1 0  5/21/1998 
Burundi 5/21/1998 1 0  8/23/1996 
Burundi 8/23/1996 1 0  8/9/1996 
Cambodia 9/18/1998 1 0  7/29/1998 
Cambodia 4/29/1998 1 0  10/31/1997 
Cambodia 1/15/1998 0 1 4/21/1998 10/31/1997 
Cambodia 10/31/1997 1 0  8/8/1997 
Cameroon 8/6/2014 1 0  5/6/2014 
Cameroon 4/25/2014 1 0   
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Cameroon 5/31/2013 0 1 8/26/2013  
Cameroon 9/28/1999 0 1 12/28/1999  
Canada 3/28/2003 0 1 6/26/2003  
Cayman 
Islands 9/14/2004 1 0  9/9/2004 
Central 
African 
Republic 11/5/2014 1 0  5/13/2014 
Central 
African 
Republic 5/13/2014 1 0  11/14/2013 
Central 
African 
Republic 11/14/2013 1 0  5/10/2013 
Central 
African 
Republic 5/10/2013 1 0  12/28/2012 
Central 
African 
Republic 12/28/2012 1 0  12/23/2012 
Central 
African 
Republic 7/11/2012 1 0  1/4/2012 
Central 
African 
Republic 1/4/2012 1 0  7/28/2011 
Central 
African 
Republic 7/28/2011 1 0  1/14/2011 
Central 
African 
Republic 1/14/2011 1 0  12/6/2010 
Central 
African 
Republic 12/6/2010 1 0  2/26/2010 
Central 
African 
Republic 2/26/2010 1 0  8/19/2009 
Central 
African 
Republic 8/19/2009 1 0  8/19/2009 
Central 
African 
Republic 4/1/2009 1 0  3/25/2008 
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Central 
African 
Republic 12/19/2006 1 0  10/20/2006 
Central 
African 
Republic 11/17/2006 1 0  4/20/2006 
Central 
African 
Republic 4/20/2006 1 0  4/19/2005 
Central 
African 
Republic 4/19/2005 1 0  10/29/2004 
Central 
African 
Republic 10/29/2004 1 0  4/15/2004 
Central 
African 
Republic 4/15/2004 1 0  4/7/2003 
Central 
African 
Republic 4/7/2003 1 0  2/13/2003 
Central 
African 
Republic 2/13/2003 1 0  10/31/2002 
Central 
African 
Republic 10/31/2002 1 0  10/31/2002 
Central 
African 
Republic 10/25/2002 1 0   
Central 
African 
Republic 11/8/2001 1 0  5/30/2001 
Central 
African 
Republic 5/30/2001 1 0   
Central 
African 
Republic 6/7/1999 1 0  12/11/1998 
Central 
African 
Republic 12/11/1998 1 0  3/28/1997 
Central 
African 
Republic 3/28/1997 1 0  3/28/1997 
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Central 
African 
Republic 12/6/1996 1 0  12/5/1996 
Central 
African 
Republic 5/21/1996 1 0  5/20/1996 
Chad 4/15/2014 1 0  4/15/2014 
Chad 10/10/2013 1 0  6/11/2013 
Chad 6/11/2013 1 0  11/21/2012 
Chad 11/21/2012 1 0  3/29/2012 
Chad 3/29/2012 1 0  8/16/2011 
Chad 8/16/2011 1 0  12/8/2010 
Chad 12/8/2010 1 0  7/9/2010 
Chad 7/9/2010 1 0  11/23/2009 
Chad 11/23/2009 1 0  6/2/2008 
Chad 6/2/2009 1 0  11/14/2008 
Chad 11/20/2006 1 0  10/27/2006 
Chad 10/27/2006 1 0  9/6/2006 
Chad 9/6/2006 1 0  7/6/2006 
Chad 7/6/2006 1 0  6/2/2006 
Chad 4/12/2006 1 0   
Chad 7/25/2005 0 1 1/20/2006 4/21/2005 
Chad 4/21/2005 0 1 10/31/2005  
Chad 7/29/2004 0 1 10/27/2004  
Chad 12/17/1998 0 1   
Chad 2/12/1998 0 1 5/11/1998 2/9/1998 
Chad 2/9/1998 0 1 5/9/1998  
Chad  6/30/2014 1 0  4/15/2014 
Chile 12/30/2011 0 1 1/31/2012  
Chile 3/12/2010 0 1 4/11/2010 3/1/2010 
Chile 12/17/1998 0 1 3/21/1999 10/21/1998 
China 9/25/2009 0 1 12/30/2009 7/9/2009 
China 9/9/2009 0 1 12/10/2009  
China 7/9/2009 0 1 9/30/2009 6/19/2009 
China 7/9/2009 0 1 8/10/2009  
China 5/6/2003 1 0  4/16/2003 
China 4/16/2003 1 0  4/10/2003 
China 4/19/2001 0 1 12/27/2001  
Colombia 11/14/2014 1 0  4/14/2014 
Colombia 4/14/2014 1 0  10/11/2013 
Colombia 10/11/2013 1 0  4/11/2013 
Colombia 4/11/2013 1 0  10/3/2012 
Colombia 10/3/2012 1 0  2/21/2012 
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Colombia 2/21/2012 1 0  7/22/2011 
Colombia 7/22/2011 1 0  11/10/2010 
Colombia 11/10/2010 1 0  3/5/2010 
Colombia 3/5/2010 1 0  11/10/2009 
Colombia 11/10/2009 1 0  3/25/2009 
Colombia 3/25/2009 1 0  8/7/2008 
Colombia 1/18/2006 1 0  5/4/2005 
Colombia 5/4/2005 1 0  3/3/2004 
Colombia 3/3/2004 1 0  12/19/2003 
Colombia 12/19/2003 1 0  6/16/2003 
Colombia 2/24/2003 1 0  7/3/2002 
Colombia 7/3/2002 1 0   
Colombia 2/22/2002 0 1 5/21/2002 4/17/2001 
Colombia 9/7/2001 0 1 12/3/2001  
Colombia 4/17/2001 1 0  1/28/2000 
Colombia 6/10/1999 1 0  4/23/1999 
Colombia 11/20/1998 1 0  3/26/1998 
Colombia 3/26/1998 1 0  11/12/1997 
Colombia 11/12/1997 1 0  2/11/1997 
Colombia 2/11/1997 1 0  5/23/1996 
Colombia 5/23/1996 1 0  3/14/1996 
Comoros 5/7/2009 0 1 6/30/2009 3/16/2009 
Comoros 3/16/2009 0 1 6/30/2009  
Congo 2/28/2003 0 1 8/20/2003  
Congo 12/3/1998 1 0  6/17/1997 
Congo 6/17/1997 1 0  6/8/1997 
Costa Rica 1/22/1998 0 1 4/21/1998 11/26/1997 
Cote d'Ivoire 5/16/2013 1 0  11/16/2012 
Cote d'Ivoire 11/16/2012 1 0  4/23/2012 
Cote d'Ivoire 4/23/2012 1 0  12/16/2011 
Cote d'Ivoire 12/16/2011 1 0  6/16/2011 
Cote d'Ivoire 6/16/2011 1 0  4/14/2011 
Cote d'Ivoire 4/14/2011 1 0  4/19/2011 
Cote d'Ivoire 3/2/2011 1 0  12/19/2010 
Cote d'Ivoire 12/19/2010 1 0  12/16/2010 
Cote d'Ivoire 10/20/2010 1 0  5/12/2010 
Cote d'Ivoire 5/12/2010 1 0  9/22/2009 
Cote d'Ivoire 9/22/2009 1 0  12/15/2008 
Cote d'Ivoire 12/18/2006 1 0  3/3/2006 
Cote d'Ivoire 3/3/2006 1 0  8/25/2005 
Cote d'Ivoire 8/25/2005 1 0   
Cote d'Ivoire 2/8/2005 1 0   
Cote d'Ivoire 12/3/2004 1 0  11/10/2004 
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Cote d'Ivoire 6/18/2004 1 0  2/4/2004 
Cote d'Ivoire 2/4/2004 1 0  8/13/2003 
Cote d'Ivoire 8/13/2003 1 0  12/9/2002 
Cote d'Ivoire 12/9/2002 1 0  10/18/2002 
Cote d'Ivoire 10/18/2002 1 0  9/26/2002 
Cuba 10/9/2009 0 1 1/7/2010  
Cuba 10/19/2005 1 0   
Cuba 9/9/2004 1 0   
DRC Congo 11/25/2014 1 0  4/23/2014 
DRC Congo 4/23/2014 1 0  10/24/2013 
DRC Congo 10/24/2013 1 0  10/24/2013 
DRC Congo 11/21/2012 1 0  8/2/2012 
DRC Congo 8/2/2012 1 0  7/25/2012 
DRC Congo 7/25/2012 1 0  1/12/2012 
DRC Congo 1/12/2012 1 0  7/19/2011 
DRC Congo 11/3/2011 0 1 1/3/2012  
DRC Congo 7/19/2011 1 0  11/25/2010 
DRC Congo 11/25/2010 1 0  4/21/2010 
DRC Congo 4/21/2010 1 0  9/1/2009 
DRC Congo 9/1/2009 1 0  2/5/2009 
DRC Congo 2/5/2009 1 0  10/30/2008 
DRC Congo 12/18/2006 1 0  10/20/2006 
DRC Congo 10/20/2006 1 0  8/24/2006 
DRC Congo 1/20/2006 1 0  6/24/2005 
DRC Congo 6/24/2005 1 0  3/30/2005 
DRC Congo 3/30/2005 1 0  8/19/2004 
DRC Congo 8/19/2004 1 0  1/22/2004 
DRC Congo 1/22/2004 1 0  4/7/2003 
DRC Congo 4/7/2003 1 0  7/1/2002 
DRC Congo 7/1/2002 1 0  4/11/2001 
DRC Congo 1/18/2002 0 1 7/17/2002  
DRC Congo 4/11/2001 1 0  1/21/2001 
DRC Congo 1/21/2001 1 0  1/18/2001 
DRC Congo 4/23/1999 1 0  3/12/1999 
DRC Congo 3/12/1999 1 0  12/2/1998 
DRC Congo 12/2/1997 1 0  10/10/1997 
DRC Congo 2/13/1997 0 1  1/17/1997 
DRC Congo 10/28/1996 0 1  10/26/1996 
Djibouti 11/25/2014 1 0  6/8/2014 
Djibouti 6/8/2014 1 0   
Djibouti 1/16/2004 0 1 7/14/2004 10/14/2003 
Djibouti 10/14/2003 0 1 1/17/2004 7/16/2003 
Djibouti 3/18/2003 0 1 7/17/2003  
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Ecuador 4/22/2005 0 1 5/31/2005  
Ecuador 9/28/1999 0 1 11/30/1999  
Ecuador 4/3/1998 0 1 6/30/1998 1/7/1997 
Ecuador 2/7/1997 0 1 3/5/1997  
Egypt 3/18/2014 0 1 6/18/2014 2/21/2014 
Egypt 11/6/2013 1 0  8/15/2013 
Egypt 8/15/2013 1 0  7/3/2013 
Egypt 5/15/2013 0 1 8/15/2013 3/29/2013 
Egypt 3/29/2013 0 1 6/27/2013 2/6/2013 
Egypt 2/6/2013 0 1 5/4/2013  
Egypt 3/29/2012 0 1 6/30/2012 11/7/2011 
Egypt 11/7/2011 0 1 4/1/2012 4/28/2011 
Egypt 4/28/2011 0 1  3/29/2011 
Egypt 3/29/2011 1 0  2/18/2011 
Egypt 2/18/2011 1 0  2/6/2011 
Egypt 1/30/2011 1 0   
Egypt 8/18/2005 0 1 11/15/2005 7/23/2005 
Egypt 7/23/2005 0 1 10/22/2005 5/3/2005 
Egypt 10/8/2004 0 1 1/8/2005  
Egypt 4/3/1998 0 1 7/1/1998  
El Salvador 11/21/2014 1 0  4/25/2014 
El Salvador 4/25/2014 1 0  8/9/2013 
El Salvador 8/9/2013 1 0  1/24/2013 
El Salvador 1/23/2013 1 0   
El Salvador 10/7/2005 0 1 10/31/2005  
El Salvador 2/14/2001 0 1 5/9/2001 1/16/2001 
Eritrea 9/12/2014 1 0  11/18/2013 
Eritrea 11/18/2013 1 0  5/10/2013 
Eritrea 5/10/2013 1 0  11/29/2012 
Eritrea 11/29/2012 1 0  4/18/2012 
Eritrea 4/18/2012 1 0  11/4/2011 
Eritrea 11/4/2011 1 0  2/27/2011 
Eritrea 2/27/2011 1 0  9/24/2010 
Eritrea 9/24/2010 1 0  3/2/2010 
Eritrea 3/2/2010 1 0  8/28/2009 
Eritrea 8/28/2009 1 0  2/18/2009 
Eritrea 2/18/2009 1 0  11/15/2008 
Eritrea 6/5/2006 1 0  12/9/2005 
Eritrea 12/9/2005 1 0 6/7/2006  
Eritrea 6/15/1999 1 0  2/11/1999 
Eritrea 1/20/1999 1 0  1/20/1999 
Eritrea 12/1/1998 1 0  6/4/1998 
Ethiopia 4/13/2010 0 1  7/1/2010 
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Ethiopia 11/4/2005 0 1 12/31/2005  
Ethiopia 12/23/2003 0 1 3/19/2004  
Ethiopia 4/21/1999 1 0  2/11/1999 
Ethiopia 1/20/1999 1 0  1/20/1999 
Ethiopia 7/18/1996 0 1   
Fiji 1/15/2009 0 1 1/30/2009  
Fiji 12/1/2006 0 1 12/22/2006 11/22/2006 
Fiji 7/24/2001 0 1 12/12/2001 4/9/2001 
Fiji 2/9/2001 0 1 5/9/2001 12/12/2000 
France-
Monaco 3/27/2006 0 1 4/30/2006  
France-
Monaco 11/7/2005 0 1 12/7/2005  
France-
Switzerland 5/28/2003 0 1 6/9/2003  
Gabon 7/21/2009 0 1 9/15/2009  
Gabon 6/15/2009 0 1 7/25/2009  
Gabon 12/12/2001 0 1 6/12/2002  
Gabon 12/4/2001 0 1 1/10/2002  
Gabon 1/9/1997 0 1 3/31/1997  
Gabon-Congo  1/10/2002 0 1 7/9/2002 12/12/2001 
Gabon-Congo 7/16/2002 0 1 10/15/2002 2/15/2002 
Gambia 11/12/1996 0 1 1/30/1997  
Georgia 5/3/2010 1 0  4/9/2009 
Georgia 4/9/2009 1 0  12/12/2008 
Georgia 9/26/2001 0 1 11/30/2001  
Georgia 4/15/1998 0 1 6/14/1998  
Germany 11/12/2009 0 1 2/10/2010 9/24/2009 
Germany 9/23/2009 0 1 11/11/2009  
Germany 1/31/2003 0 1 2/15/2003  
Ghana 12/3/2004 0 1 12/15/2004  
Ghana 7/9/2002 0 1 10/9/2002  
Ghana 5/25/2001 0 1 6/15/2001  
Grenada 9/9/2004 1 0   
Guatemala 10/7/2005 0 1 10/31/2005  
Guatemala 5/3/2005 0 1 11/3/2005  
Guatemala 10/29/2004 0 1 5/1/2005  
Guatemala 5/3/2004 0 1   
Guatemala 8/26/2003 0 1 1/15/2004 4/2/2003 
Guatemala 4/2/2003 0 1 12/1/2003 2/26/2003 
Guatemala 7/3/2002 0 1 10/1/2002  
Guatemala 6/21/2001 0 1 8/18/2001  
Guinea 9/10/2013 0 1 10/24/2013  
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Guinea 6/18/2013 0 1 7/15/2013  
Guinea 3/14/2013 1 0  9/7/2012 
Guinea 9/7/2012 1 0  11/4/2011 
Guinea 11/4/2011 1 0  12/3/2010 
Guinea 12/3/2010 1 0  6/16/2010 
Guinea 6/16/2010 1 0   
Guinea 10/17/2009 1 0   
Guinea 11/30/1998 0 1 1/18/1999  
Guinea 4/1/1998 0 1 5/31/1998  
Guinea-Bissau 4/13/2012 0 1 7/12/2012  
Guinea-Bissau 6/10/2009 0 1 8/1/2009  
Guinea-Bissau 6/14/1998 1 0  6/9/1998 
Guyana 3/2/2005 1 0  2/4/2005 
Guyana 2/4/2005 1 0  1/19/2005 
Guyana 1/19/2005 1 0   
Guyana 2/4/2004 1 0   
Guyana 4/12/2001 0 1 7/11/2001 1/11/2001 
Guyana 1/11/2001 0 1 3/19/2001  
Haiti 12/4/2014 1 0  3/12/2014 
Haiti 3/12/2014 1 0  8/13/2013 
Haiti 8/13/2013 1 0  12/28/2012 
Haiti 12/28/2012 1 0  6/18/2012 
Haiti 6/18/2012 1 0  8/8/2011 
Haiti 8/8/2011 1 0  1/20/2011 
Haiti 1/20/2011 1 0  12/9/2010 
Haiti 12/9/2010 1 0  6/24/2010 
Haiti 6/24/2010 1 0  3/15/2010 
Haiti 3/15/2010 1 0  2/22/2010 
Haiti 2/22/2010 1 0  1/14/2010 
Haiti 1/14/2010 1 0  2/13/2010 
Haiti 7/17/2009 1 0  1/28/2009 
Haiti 1/28/2009 1 0  4/30/2008 
Haiti 7/7/2006 1 0  11/22/2005 
Haiti 11/22/2005 1 0  5/26/2005 
Haiti 5/26/2005 1 0  3/11/2005 
Haiti 3/11/2005 1 0  10/14/2004 
Haiti 10/14/2004 1 0  10/9/2004 
Haiti 7/8/2004 1 0  5/25/2004 
Haiti 5/25/2004 1 0  3/11/2004 
Haiti 3/11/2004 1 0  2/27/2004 
Haiti 2/27/2004 1 0  2/21/2004 
Haiti 1/29/2004 1 0  1/9/2004 
Haiti 1/9/2004 0 1 5/5/2004 12/12/2003 
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Haiti 4/17/2001 0 1 10/17/2001 2/5/2001 
Haiti 2/5/2001 1 0  11/17/2000 
Honduras 6/24/2014 1 0  12/24/2013 
Honduras 12/24/2013 1 0   
Honduras 6/17/2013 1 0  11/21/2012 
Honduras 11/21/2012 1 0   
Honduras 11/6/2009 0 1 12/20/2009  
Honduras 10/20/2009 0 1 12/20/2009  
Honduras 7/24/2009 0 1 10/20/2009  
India 10/18/2011 0 1 1/20/2012  
India 9/23/2011 0 1 11/15/2011  
India 9/1/2010 0 1 11/15/2010  
India 4/16/2010 0 1 5/30/2010 1/29/2010 
India 1/29/2010 0 1 4/30/2010 12/29/2009 
India 12/29/2009 0 1 12/9/2009 10/29/2009 
India 12/23/2009 0 1 1/21/2010 12/9/2009 
India 10/29/2009 0 1 1/28/2010 9/12/2009 
India 9/12/2009 0 1 10/30/2009  
India 11/20/2002 0 1 3/20/2003 7/22/2002 
India 11/13/2002 0 1 11/25/2002 7/22/2002 
India 7/22/2002 0 1 11/20/2002 6/26/2002 
India 3/27/2002 0 1 6/26/2002 3/13/2002 
India 1/17/1997 0 1   
Indonesia 11/10/2010 0 1 12/31/2010  
Indonesia 11/18/2005 1 0  5/10/2005 
Indonesia 10/26/2005 1 0  5/10/2005 
Indonesia 5/10/2005 1 0  3/24/2005 
Indonesia 3/24/2005 1 0  1/13/2005 
Indonesia 1/13/2005 1 0  12/27/2004 
Indonesia 12/27/2004 0 1 1/28/2005  
Indonesia 12/17/2004 1 0  9/13/2004 
Indonesia 9/13/2004 1 0  9/7/2004 
Indonesia 6/16/2004 1 0  3/19/2004 
Indonesia 3/19/2004 1 0  8/28/2003 
Indonesia 8/28/2003 1 0  8/8/2003 
Indonesia 4/25/2003 1 0  4/10/2003 
Indonesia 3/22/2003 1 0  10/19/2002 
Indonesia 10/19/2002 1 0  10/14/2002 
Indonesia 11/23/2001 1 0  9/27/2001 
Indonesia 9/27/2001 1 0  9/26/2001 
Indonesia 8/10/2001 1 0  6/27/2001 
Indonesia 2/27/2001 1 0  2/22/2001 
Indonesia 10/4/1999 1 0  9/21/1999 
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Indonesia 1/22/1999 0 1 4/22/1999 12/11/1998 
Indonesia 11/14/1998 0 1 12/14/1998 9/14/1998 
Indonesia 5/6/1998 0 1 8/6/1998 3/20/1998 
Indonesia 2/4/1998 0 1 3/4/1998 1/9/1998 
Iran 5/22/2014 1 0  11/21/2013 
Iran 11/21/2013 1 0  5/24/2013 
Iran 5/29/2013 0 1 8/30/2013  
Iran 5/24/2013 1 0  12/7/2012 
Iran 12/7/2012 1 0  4/27/2012 
Iran 4/27/2012 1 0  10/21/2011 
Iran 10/21/2011 1 0  10/8/2010 
Iran 10/8/2010 1 0  3/23/2010 
Iran 3/23/2010 1 0  7/1/2009 
Iran 7/1/2009 1 0  9/15/2008 
Iran 10/10/2006 1 0  12/29/2005 
Iran 12/29/2005 1 0  11/22/2004 
Iran 6/30/2005 1 0  11/22/2004 
Iran 11/22/2004 1 0  5/14/2004 
Iran 5/14/2004 1 0  5/12/2003 
Iran 5/12/2003 1 0  1/30/2002 
Iran 1/30/2002 1 0  8/24/2001 
Iran 8/24/2001 1 0  9/14/1999 
Iran 9/14/1999 1 0  9/14/1999 
Iran 4/2/1998 1 0  7/8/1997 
Iran 7/8/1997 1 0  10/4/1995 
Iran 10/4/1995 1 0  8/31/1993 
Iraq 8/10/2014 1 0  8/8/2014 
Iraq 6/16/2014 1 0  6/11/2014 
Iraq 3/6/2014 1 0  9/5/2013 
Iraq 9/5/2013 1 0  2/25/2013 
Iraq 2/25/2013 1 0  8/9/2012 
Iraq 8/9/2012 1 0  8/9/2012 
Iraq 1/19/2012 1 0  12/31/2011 
Iraq 9/13/2011 1 0  4/12/2011 
Iraq 4/12/2011 1 0  11/5/2010 
Iraq 11/5/2010 1 0  2/25/2010 
Iraq 2/25/2010 1 0  6/15/2009 
Iraq 6/15/2009 1 0  6/13/2008 
Iraq 8/28/2006 1 0  3/24/2006 
Iraq 3/24/2006 0 1 6/28/2006 12/29/2005 
Iraq 12/29/2005 1 0   
Iraq 12/13/2005 0 1 1/13/2006 6/28/2005 
Iraq 10/13/2005 0 1 11/14/2005 6/28/2005 
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Iraq 6/28/2005 1 0  10/20/2004 
Iraq 10/20/2004 1 0  9/17/2004 
Iraq 9/17/2004 1 0  7/20/2004 
Iraq 7/20/2004 1 0  6/25/2004 
Iraq 10/31/2003 1 0  10/2/2003 
Iraq 4/25/2003 1 0  2/19/2003 
Iraq 2/19/2003 1 0  2/7/2003 
Iraq 10/31/2002 1 0  7/20/2001 
Iraq 7/20/2001 1 0  9/1/1999 
Iraq 9/10/1999 1 0  12/14/1998 
Iraq 12/17/1998 1 0  2/21/1998 
Iraq 2/21/1998 1 0  6/25/1997 
Iraq 6/25/1997 1 0  9/15/1994 
Iraq 9/3/1996 0 1   
Iraq 9/2/1996 1 0  9/15/1994 
Israel 9/10/2014 1 0  7/21/2014 
Israel 7/21/2014 1 0  2/3/2014 
Israel 2/3/2014 1 0  6/19/2013 
Israel 6/19/2013 1 0  12/20/2012 
Israel 12/20/2012 1 0  8/10/2012 
Israel 8/10/2012 1 0  3/19/2012 
Israel 3/19/2012 1 0  6/22/2011 
Israel 6/22/2011 1 0  8/10/2010 
Israel 8/10/2010 1 0  8/5/2010 
Israel 6/20/2010 1 0  8/14/2009 
Israel 8/14/2009 1 0  1/15/2009 
Israel 1/15/2009 1 0  9/26/2008 
Israel 1/6/2009 0 1 1/31/2009  
Israel 8/29/2006 1 0  7/19/2006 
Israel 7/19/2006 1 0  2/27/2006 
Israel 2/27/2006 1 0  6/20/2005 
Israel 6/20/2005 1 0  4/7/2005 
Israel 4/7/2005 1 0  11/26/2004 
Israel 11/26/2004 1 0  8/3/2004 
Israel 8/3/2004 1 0  4/28/2004 
Israel 4/28/2004 1 0  3/23/2004 
Israel 10/20/2003 1 0  4/17/2003 
Israel 4/17/2003 1 0  3/16/2003 
Israel 3/16/2003 1 0  2/7/2003 
Israel 1/10/2003 1 0  8/2/2002 
Israel 8/2/2002 1 0  7/12/2002 
Israel 12/7/2001 1 0  8/10/2001 
Israel 8/10/2001 1 0  1/12/2001 
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Israel 1/12/2001 1 0  10/24/2000 
Israel 11/1/1996 0 1 11/30/1996  
Italy 10/2/2001 0 1 1/6/2002  
Italy 9/7/2001 0 1 10/4/2001  
Italy, Holy 
See, and San 
Marino 3/21/2006 0 1 6/19/2006  
Jamaica 6/24/2010 0 1 7/23/2010 6/15/2010 
Jamaica 5/24/2010 0 1 6/23/2010 5/21/2010 
Jamaica 9/17/2004 1 0  9/14/2004 
Jamaica 7/9/2001 0 1 10/9/2001  
Japan 7/19/2011 0 1 9/18/2011 6/9/2011 
Japan 6/9/2011 0 1 8/15/2011 5/16/2011 
Japan 5/16/2011 0 1 7/15/2011 4/14/2011 
Japan 4/14/2011 0 1 6/15/2011 3/31/2011 
Japan 3/21/2011 1 0  3/18/2011 
Japan-Korea 5/23/2002 0 1 7/15/2002  
Jordan 11/10/2005 0 1 2/10/2006  
Jordan 4/13/2004 0 1 7/7/2004  
Jordan 2/7/2003 1 0   
Jordan 11/22/2002 1 0   
Kenya 6/19/2014 1 0  5/17/2014 
Kenya 5/17/2014 1 0  5/15/2014 
Kenya 9/27/2013 1 0  7/5/2013 
Kenya 1/14/2013 1 0  7/3/2012 
Kenya 7/5/2012 1 0  4/4/2012 
Kenya 4/4/2012 1 0  11/4/2011 
Kenya 11/4/2011 1 0  12/28/2010 
Kenya 12/28/2010 1 0  7/24/2009 
Kenya 7/22/2010 0 1 10/22/2010 3/16/2010 
Kenya 3/16/2010 1 0  6/24/2009 
Kenya 7/24/2009 1 0  11/14/2008 
Kenya 8/10/2006 1 0  12/30/2005 
Kenya 12/30/2005 1 0  7/1/2005 
Kenya 10/25/2005 0 1 12/20/2005 7/1/2005 
Kenya 7/1/2005 1 0  11/29/2004 
Kenya 11/29/2004 1 0  5/21/2004 
Kenya 5/21/2004 1 0  9/25/2003 
Kenya 9/25/2003 1 0  5/16/2003 
Kenya 5/16/2003 1 0  5/14/2003 
Kenya 3/14/2003 0 1 7/17/2003 12/24/2002 
Kenya 12/24/2002 0 1 4/24/2003  
Kenya 2/24/2002 0 1   
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Kenya 12/18/1998 0 1 3/17/1999  
Kuwait 7/27/2005 0 1 1/26/2006 1/28/2005 
Kuwait 1/28/2005 0 1 7/25/2005 12/23/2004 
Kuwait 3/16/2003 1 0  1/30/2003 
Kuwait 1/30/2003 1 0   
Kuwait 12/16/1998 1 0  11/11/1998 
Kuwait 2/6/1998 0 1 5/6/1998  
Kuwait 10/27/1996 0 1 11/30/1996  
Kyrgyz 
Republic 4/20/2010 1 0  4/9/2010 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 4/9/2010 0 1 5/9/2010  
Kyrgyz 
Republic 10/31/2005 0 1 4/27/2006 8/31/2005 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 3/24/2005 1 0  10/22/2004 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 10/22/2004 0 1 4/30/2005 4/27/204 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 4/27/2004 0 1  10/31/2003 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 10/31/2003 0 1 4/30/2004 5/6/2003 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 5/6/2003 0 1 10/31/2003 12/3/2002 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 12/3/2002 0 1 6/6/2002 6/2/2003 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 6/6/2002 0 1 12/2/2002 1/2/2002 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 1/2/2002 0 1 6/1/2002 11/19/2001 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 11/19/2001 1 0   
Kyrgyz 
Republic 9/21/2001 1 0  8/17/2001 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 8/17/2001 0 1 12/15/2001 3/14/2001 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 3/14/2001 0 1 9/15/2001 9/9/2000 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 8/27/1999 1 0 10/15/1999 8/23/1999 
Laos 12/6/2004 0 1 7/30/2005 10/21/2004 
Laos 10/21/2004 0 1 11/30/2004 7/9/2004 
Laos 7/9/2004 0 1 1/6/2005 1/5/2004 
Laos 1/5/2004 0 1 7/8/2004 8/28/2003 
Laos 2/26/2003 0 1 8/13/2003  
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Laos 1/30/2001 0 1 4/1/2001 12/1/2000 
Laos 4/6/1998 0 1 6/30/1998  
Lebanon 11/26/2014 1 0  8/15/2014 
Lebanon 8/15/2014 1 0  1/31/2014 
Lebanon 1/31/2014 1 0  10/9/2013 
Lebanon 10/9/2013 1 0  10/3/2013 
Lebanon 9/6/2013 1 0  4/1/2013 
Lebanon 4/1/2013 1 0  9/17/2012 
Lebanon 9/17/2012 1 0  5/8/2012 
Lebanon 5/8/2012 1 0  10/12/2011 
Lebanon 10/12/2011 1 0  4/4/2011 
Lebanon 4/4/2011 1 0  10/8/2010 
Lebanon 10/8/2010 1 0  3/29/2010 
Lebanon 3/29/2010 1 0  9/29/2009 
Lebanon 9/29/2009 1 0  5/13/2009 
Lebanon 6/2/2009 0 1 6/30/2009  
Lebanon 5/13/2009 1 0  9/10/2008 
Lebanon 12/22/2006 1 0   
Lebanon 9/28/2006 1 0  7/27/2006 
Lebanon 7/27/2006 1 0  7/19/2006 
Lebanon 5/2/2006 1 0  11/7/2005 
Lebanon 11/7/2005 1 0  4/21/2005 
Lebanon 4/21/2005 1 0  11/15/2004 
Lebanon 11/18/2004 1 0  5/20/2004 
Lebanon 5/20/2004 1 0  12/4/2003 
Lebanon 12/4/2003 1 0  5/6/2003 
Lebanon 5/6/2003 1 0  2/7/2003 
Lebanon 2/7/2003 1 0  12/9/2002 
Lebanon 12/9/2002 1 0  4/29/2002 
Lebanon 4/29/2002 1 0  8/28/2000 
Lebanon 7/9/1999 1 0  4/12/1999 
Lebanon 4/12/1999 1 0  6/29/1998 
Lebanon 5/11/1998 1 0  7/30/1997 
Lebanon 7/30/1997 1 0   
Lebanon 7/15/1996 1 0  9/6/1994 
Lesotho 9/30/2014 1 0  9/18/2014 
Lesotho 9/18/2014 1 0  9/3/2014 
Lesotho 2/11/1997 0 1 3/31/1997  
Liberia 8/7/2014 1 0   
Liberia 11/9/2011 0 1 11/21/2011  
Liberia 3/30/2006 1 0  11/4/2005 
Liberia 11/4/2005 1 0  9/23/2005 
Liberia 9/23/2005 1 0  3/3/2005 
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Liberia 7/23/2005 1 0   
Liberia 3/3/2005 1 0  7/30/2004 
Liberia 7/29/2004 1 0  1/7/2004 
Liberia 1/7/2004 1 0  9/30/2003 
Liberia 9/30/2003 1 0  6/6/2003 
Liberia 6/6/2003 1 0  6/6/2003 
Liberia 3/26/2003 1 0  1/17/2003 
Liberia 5/21/2002 1 0  2/26/2002 
Liberia 5/31/2001 1 0  5/3/2001 
Liberia 3/24/1999 1 0  11/2/1998 
Liberia 11/2/1998 1 0  9/19/1998 
Liberia 2/6/1998 1 0  9/13/1996 
Liberia 9/13/1996 1 0  4/16/1996 
Libya 7/26/2014 1 0  5/27/2014 
Libya 5/27/2014 1 0  12/12/2013 
Libya 12/12/2013 1 0  6/7/2013 
Libya 6/7/2013 1 0  5/9/2013 
Libya 1/2/2013 1 0  1/2/2013 
Libya 9/12/2012 1 0  8/27/2012 
Libya 8/27/2012 1 0  9/22/2011 
Libya 9/22/2011 1 0  8/23/2011 
Libya 2/25/2011 1 0  2/24/2011 
Libya 12/23/2005 0 1 6/28/2006 11/1/2005 
Libya 11/1/2005 0 1 1/5/2006 8/1/2005 
Libya 8/1/2005 0 1 11/1/2005 5/6/2005 
Libya 5/6/2005 0 1 8/5/2005 12/29/2004 
Libya 12/29/2004 1 0  6/28/2004 
Libya 6/28/2004 1 0  3/5/2004 
Libya 3/5/2004 1 0  11/20/2003 
Libya 11/20/2003 1 0  10/7/2002 
Libya 10/7/2002 1 0  6/6/2001 
Libya 6/6/2001 1 0  8/4/1999 
Libya 8/4/1999 1 0  6/3/1997 
Libya 6/3/1997 1 0  12/22/1994 
Libya 12/22/1994 1 0  8/31/1993 
Luxembourg 10/4/2001 0 1 11/3/2001  
Macedonia 5/21/2002 1 0  11/29/2001 
Macedonia 11/29/2001 1 0  10/22/2001 
Macedonia 10/22/2001 1 0  9/5/2001 
Macedonia 9/5/2001 1 0  8/30/2001 
Macedonia 8/10/2001 1 0  7/26/2001 
Macedonia 5/4/2001 0 1 8/6/2001 3/15/2001 
Macedonia 3/15/2001 0 1 6/14/2001 3/9/2001 
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Macedonia 3/6/2001 0 1 5/30/2001  
Macedonia 2/13/2001 1 0  11/24/2000 
Madagascar 10/16/2013 0 1   
Madagascar 3/17/2009 1 0   
Madagascar 1/28/2009 0 1 5/1/2009  
Madagascar 7/15/2002 0 1 11/15/2002 4/12/2002 
Madagascar 2/8/2002 0 1 5/7/2002 1/9/2002 
Malaysia 1/15/2010 0 1 4/15/2010  
Malaysia 6/24/2005 0 1 12/23/2005 5/17/2005 
Malaysia 11/8/2004 0 1 5/12/2005 5/12/2004 
Malaysia 5/12/2004 0 1 11/12/2004 11/7/2003 
Malaysia 11/7/2003 0 1 6/6/2004 5/14/2003 
Malaysia 5/14/2003 0 1 11/14/2003 11/20/2002 
Malaysia 11/20/2002 0 1 5/14/2003 9/20/2002 
Malaysia 9/20/2002 0 1 3/22/2003  
Malaysia 12/5/2001 0 1 6/22/2002 6/13/2001 
Malaysia 6/13/2001 0 1 12/6/2001 4/9/2001 
Malaysia 4/9/2001 0 1 8/6/2001 1/11/2001 
Malaysia 3/24/1999 0 1 6/24/1999  
Mali 12/18/2014 1 0  12/18/2014 
Mali 3/21/2014 1 0  7/18/2013 
Mali 7/18/2013 1 0  3/22/2013 
Mali 3/22/2013 1 0  1/18/2013 
Mali 1/16/2013 1 0  1/10/2013 
Mali 8/29/2012 1 0  4/9/2012 
Mali 4/9/2012 1 0  4/3/2012 
Mali 3/26/2012 1 0  3/23/2012 
Mali 10/4/2011 1 0  3/9/2011 
Mali 3/2/2011 1 0  2/9/2011 
Mali 2/9/2011 1 0  8/6/2010 
Mali 8/6/2010 1 0  7/29/2010 
Mali 11/19/2009 1 0  8/31/2009 
Mali 8/31/2009 1 0  6/2/2009 
Mali 6/2/2009 1 0   
Mali 6/29/2001 0 1 9/29/2001 3/30/2001 
Mali 3/30/2001 0 1 6/29/2001 1/5/2001 
Mauritania 10/7/2014 1 0  3/12/2014 
Mauritania 3/12/2014 1 0  5/21/2013 
Mauritania 5/21/2013 1 0  11/30/2012 
Mauritania 11/30/2012 1 0  5/24/2012 
Mauritania 5/24/2012 1 0  10/10/2011 
Mauritania 10/12/2011 1 0  3/11/2011 
Mauritania 3/11/2011 1 0  12/8/2010 
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Mauritania 12/8/2010 1 0  8/2/2010 
Mauritania 8/2/2010 1 0  12/2/2009 
Mauritania 12/2/2009 1 0  9/1/2009 
Mauritania 9/1/2009 0 1 11/30/2009  
Mexico 12/24/2014 1 0  10/10/2014 
Mexico 10/10/2014 1 0  8/15/2014 
Mexico 8/15/2014 1 0  1/9/2014 
Mexico 1/9/2014 1 0  7/12/2013 
Mexico 7/12/2013 1 0  11/20/2012 
Mexico 11/20/2012 1 0  2/8/2012 
Mexico 2/8/2012 1 0  4/22/2011 
Mexico 4/22/2011 1 0  9/10/2010 
Mexico 9/10/2010 1 0   
Mexico 8/28/2010 0 1 9/10/2010  
Mexico 8/27/2010 1 0  7/16/2010 
Mexico 7/16/2010 1 0  5/6/2010 
Mexico 5/6/2010 1 0  4/12/2010 
Mexico 4/12/2010 1 0  3/14/2010 
Mexico 3/14/2010 1 0  2/22/2010 
Mexico 2/22/2010 0 1 8/20/2010 8/20/2009 
Mexico 8/20/2009 0 1 2/20/2010 2/20/2009 
Mexico 4/27/2009 0 1 7/27/2009  
Mexico 4/20/2009 0 1 8/20/2009 10/15/2008 
Mexico 2/20/2009 0 1 8/20/2009 10/15/2008 
Mexico 11/15/2006 0 1 1/18/2007  
Mexico 9/15/2006 0 1 3/15/2007  
Mexico 8/24/2006 0 1 9/24/2006  
Mexico 10/28/2005 0 1 11/27/2005  
Mexico 10/20/2005 0 1 11/14/2005  
Mexico 4/26/2005 0 1 7/29/2005 1/26/2005 
Mexico 4/6/2005 0 1 5/31/2005 1/26/2005 
Mexico 1/26/2005 0 1  4/25/2005 
Mexico 1/31/2003 0 1 5/29/2003  
Mexico 2/19/1999 0 1 6/18/1999  
Mexico 12/4/1998 0 1 11/30/1999 8/3/1998 
Mexico 8/3/1998 0 1 7/28/1999  
Mexico 3/26/1998 0 1 6/27/1998  
Mexico 12/18/1997 0 1 3/18/1998  
Mexico 1/21/1997 0 1   
Mongolia 12/16/1997 0 1 2/14/1998  
Montserrat 8/27/1997 1 0   
Mozambique 9/18/2014 0 1 10/31/2014  
Mozambique 4/30/2010 0 1 5/31/2010  
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Mozambique 9/23/2009 0 1 11/10/2009  
Myanmar 
(Burma) 5/17/2005 0 1 8/31/2005  
Myanmar 
(Burma) 2/16/2001 0 1 4/15/2001  
Myanmar 
(Burma) 12/9/1996 0 1  5/23/1996 
Myanmar 
(Burma) 5/23/1996 0 1   
Nepal 11/1/2013 0 1 12/19/2013  
Nepal 9/23/2011 0 1 11/15/2011  
Nepal 1/12/2011 1 0  6/15/2010 
Nepal 6/15/2010 1 0  11/19/2009 
Nepal 11/19/2009 1 0  5/22/2009 
Nepal 5/22/2009 1 0  11/21/2008 
Nepal 12/8/2006 1 0  5/11/2006 
Nepal 5/11/2006 1 0  4/24/2006 
Nepal 4/24/2006 1 0  4/12/2006 
Nepal 12/15/2005 0 1  6/24/2005 
Nepal 6/24/2005 0 1  10/26/2004 
Nepal 2/2/2005 0 1 5/2/2005 10/26/2004 
Nepal 10/26/2004 1 0  9/14/2004 
Nepal 9/14/2004 1 0  7/21/2004 
Nepal 7/21/2004 1 0  6/8/2004 
Nepal 6/8/2004 1 0  4/7/2004 
Nepal 12/22/2003 1 0  10/22/2003 
Nepal 3/5/2003 0 1 6/5/2003 11/22/2002 
Nepal 11/22/2002 0 1 5/20/2003 9/3/2002 
Nepal 9/3/2002 0 1 5/16/2002 12/19/2002 
Nepal 5/16/2002 0 1 9/15/2002 4/19/2002 
Nepal 3/22/2002 0 1 6/20/2002 2/8/2002 
Nepal 2/8/2002 0 1 4/8/2002 1/24/2002 
Nepal 1/24/2002 0 1 4/22/2002 12/4/2001 
Nepal 12/4/2001 0 1 3/2/2002 11/27/2001 
Nepal 11/27/2001 0 1 11/27/2001  
Nepal 9/13/2001 0 1 10/21/2001  
Nepal 3/12/2001 0 1 6/15/2001  
Nepal 10/1/1999 0 1 11/6/1999  
Nepal 9/22/1999 0 1 11/21/1999 11/21/1999 
Nepal 1/27/1997 0 1  3/1/1996 
Nepal 3/1/1996 0 1   
New Zealand 2/25/2011 0 1 3/22/2011 2/22/2011 
Nicaragua 4/21/2005 0 1 7/19/2005  
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Nicaragua 10/30/2001 0 1 12/1/2001  
Nicaragua 11/4/1998 0 1 12/31/1998 10/26/1998 
Nicaragua 10/1/1996 0 1 12/15/1996  
Niger 3/27/2014 1 0  7/15/2013 
Niger 7/15/2013 1 0  6/13/2013 
Niger 6/14/2013 1 0  5/28/2013 
Niger 1/16/2013 1 0  11/16/2012 
Niger 4/6/2012 1 0  8/5/2011 
Niger 8/5/2011 1 0  1/12/2011 
Niger 1/12/2011 1 0   
Niger 5/11/2010 1 0   
Niger 11/19/2009 0 1 2/28/2010  
Niger 7/24/2009 0 1 8/31/2009  
Niger 11/19/1996 0 1 12/8/1996  
Niger  9/28/2001 0 1 9/28/2001  
Nigeria 8/8/2014 1 0  1/8/2014 
Nigeria 5/6/2014 1 0  1/8/2014 
Nigeria 1/8/2014 1 0  6/3/2013 
Nigeria 6/3/2013 1 0  12/21/2012 
Nigeria 12/21/2012 1 0  6/21/2012 
Nigeria 6/21/2012 1 0  2/29/2012 
Nigeria 2/29/2012 1 0  1/12/2012 
Nigeria 1/12/2012 1 0  10/13/2011 
Nigeria 10/13/2011 1 0  10/19/2010 
Nigeria 4/15/2011 1 0  10/19/2010 
Nigeria 10/19/2010 1 0  6/15/2010 
Nigeria 6/15/2010 1 0  5/24/2010 
Nigeria 7/17/2009 1 0  12/2/2008 
Nigeria 8/24/2006 1 0  2/17/2006 
Nigeria 2/17/2006 1 0  1/20/2006 
Nigeria 1/20/2006 1 0  12/1/2005 
Nigeria 12/1/2005 1 0  5/20/2005 
Nigeria 5/20/2005 1 0  7/19/2004 
Nigeria 7/19/2004 1 0  12/29/2003 
Nigeria 12/29/2003 1 0  6/26/2003 
Nigeria 8/8/2002 1 0  4/7/2000 
Nigeria 4/29/1999 1 0  5/27/1998 
Nigeria 2/17/1999 0 1 3/10/1999  
Nigeria 5/27/1998 1 0  11/19/1996 
Nigeria 4/24/1998 0 1 7/24/1998  
Nigeria 11/19/1996 1 0  6/5/1996 
Nigeria 1/25/1996 0 1   
North Korea 5/20/2014 1 0  11/19/2013 
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North Korea 11/19/2013 1 0  10/1/2013 
North Korea 10/1/2013 1 0  3/14/2013 
North Korea 3/14/2013 1 0  9/11/2012 
North Korea 9/11/2012 1 0  11/3/2011 
North Korea 11/3/2011 1 0   
North Korea 8/27/2010 1 0   
Oman 3/10/2003 1 0   
Pakistan 8/8/2014 1 0  2/5/2014 
Pakistan 2/5/2014 1 0  9/6/2013 
Pakistan 9/6/2013 1 0  8/9/2013 
Pakistan 4/9/2013 1 0  9/19/2012 
Pakistan 9/19/2012 1 0  8/27/2012 
Pakistan 8/27/2012 1 0  2/2/2012 
Pakistan 2/2/2012 1 0  8/8/2011 
Pakistan 8/8/2011 1 0  2/2/2011 
Pakistan 2/2/2011 1 0  7/22/2010 
Pakistan 7/22/2010 1 0  1/7/2010 
Pakistan 1/7/2010 1 0  6/12/2009 
Pakistan 6/12/2009 1 0  2/25/2009 
Pakistan 2/25/2009 1 0  2/25/2009 
Pakistan 12/5/2006 1 0  4/7/2006 
Pakistan 4/7/2006 1 0  1/27/2006 
Pakistan 1/27/2006 1 0  3/25/2005 
Pakistan 3/25/2005 1 0  9/24/2004 
Pakistan 9/24/2004 1 0  1/29/2004 
Pakistan 1/29/2004 1 0  4/17/2003 
Pakistan 4/17/2003 1 0  3/28/2003 
Pakistan 3/28/2003 1 0  3/19/2003 
Pakistan 8/12/2002 1 0  7/19/2002 
Pakistan 3/22/2002 1 0  3/18/2002 
Pakistan 1/30/2002 1 0  1/28/2002 
Pakistan 12/13/2001 1 0  9/25/2001 
Pakistan 9/25/2001 1 0  9/17/2001 
Pakistan 5/14/2001 1 0  8/19/1999 
Pakistan 8/10/1999 1 0  7/16/1999 
Pakistan 2/3/1999 1 0  8/16/1998 
Pakistan 8/16/1998 1 0  11/12/1997 
Pakistan 5/1/1998 0 1 5/30/1998 3/3/1998 
Pakistan 3/3/1998 0 1 6/2/1998 2/5/1998 
Pakistan 11/12/1997 1 0   
Pakistan 2/24/1997 0 1   
Pakistan 10/18/1996 0 1 1/31/1997 8/15/1996 
Panama 2/5/2012 0 1 2/20/2012  
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Panama 5/10/2001 0 1 6/30/2001  
Papua New 
Guinea 5/22/2002 0 1 8/15/2002  
Papua New 
Guinea 7/13/2001 0 1 10/31/2001 6/29/2001 
Papua New 
Guinea 6/29/2001 0 1 9/30/2001  
Papua New 
Guinea 11/6/1996 0 1   
Paraguay 8/6/1999 0 1 10/13/1999  
Paraguay 11/5/1996 0 1 2/1/1997  
Peru 10/17/2005 0 1 11/14/2005  
Peru 5/2/2003 0 1 7/24/2003  
Peru 4/19/2002 0 1 7/24/2002 3/21/2002 
Peru 12/1/2001 0 1 1/31/2002  
Peru 6/1/2001 0 1 5/18/2001 7/31/2001 
Peru 3/22/2001 0 1 5/31/2001 10/26/2000 
Peru 2/25/1998 0 1 6/30/1998 9/12/1997 
Peru 12/18/1996 0 1   
Peru 8/23/1996 0 1   
Philippines 11/20/2014 1 0  5/19/2014 
Philippines 5/19/2014 1 0  1/10/2014 
Philippines 1/10/2014 1 0  7/5/2013 
Philippines 7/5/2013 1 0  1/30/2013 
Philippines 1/30/2013 1 0  6/14/2012 
Philippines 6/14/2012 1 0  1/5/2012 
Philippines 1/5/2012 1 0  6/14/2011 
Philippines 12/22/2011 0 1 2/5/2012  
Philippines 6/14/2011 1 0  11/2/2010 
Philippines 11/2/2010 1 0  4/2/2010 
Philippines 4/2/2010 1 0  9/17/2009 
Philippines 1/20/2010 0 1 2/28/2010 9/17/2009 
Philippines 11/4/2009 0 1 1/6/2010 9/17/2009 
Philippines 9/17/2009 1 0  1/29/2009 
Philippines 1/27/2009 1 0  2/13/2008 
Philippines 6/16/2006 1 0  3/23/2005 
Philippines 3/23/2005 1 0   
Philippines 2/18/2005 0 1 7/18/2005 1/1/2004 
Philippines 11/1/2004 0 1 4/28/2004 4/30/2005 
Philippines 4/28/2004 0 1 10/29/2004 1/16/2004 
Philippines 1/16/2004 0 1 5/31/2004 7/16/2003 
Philippines 7/16/2003 0 1 1/17/2004 3/7/2003 
Philippines 3/7/2003 0 1 9/4/2003 1/10/2003 
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Philippines 1/10/2003 0 1 7/1/2003 11/2/2002 
Philippines 11/3/2002 0 1 1/10/2003 10/23/2002 
Philippines 10/23/2002 0 1 4/23/2003 8/20/2002 
Philippines 8/20/2002 0 1 2/19/2003 4/18/2002 
Philippines 10/5/2001 0 1 4/22/2002 10/4/2001 
Philippines 6/26/2001 0 1 11/1/2001 5/1/2001 
Philippines 6/14/2001 0 1 12/6/2001 6/6/2001 
Philippines 5/27/2001 0 1 9/5/2001 4/5/2001 
Philippines 5/1/2001 0 1 8/1/2001 2/1/2001 
Philippines 4/5/2001 0 1 8/5/2001 1/5/2001 
Philippines 2/1/2001 0 1 5/1/2001  
Philippines 1/5/2001 0 1 4/5/2001 12/30/2000 
Philippines 11/22/1996 0 1 12/10/1996  
Portugal 5/12/2004 0 1 7/14/2004  
Qatar 2/12/2003 1 0   
South Sudan 6/12/2014 1 0  4/23/2014 
South Sudan 4/23/2014 1 0  1/3/2014 
South Sudan 1/3/2014 1 0  12/17/2013 
South Sudan 12/17/2013 1 0  10/22/2013 
South Sudan 10/22/2013 1 0  3/29/2013 
South Sudan 3/29/2013 1 0  9/10/2012 
South Sudan 9/10/2012 1 0  7/12/2011 
South Sudan 12/22/2011 1 0   
South Sudan 7/12/2011 1 0   
Russia 10/23/2014 0 1 12/31/2014 7/22/2014 
Russia 7/22/2014 0 1 10/21/2014 6/12/2014 
Russia 6/12/2014 0 1 9/10/2014 3/14/2014 
Russia 3/14/2014 0 1 6/13/2014  
Russia 10/2/2006 0 1 3/31/2007 4/4/2006 
Russia 4/4/2006 0 1 9/30/2006 10/3/2005 
Russia 10/3/2005 0 1 3/30/2006 3/30/2005 
Russia 3/30/2005 0 1 9/30/2005 10/27/2004 
Russia 10/27/2004 0 1 3/31/2005 9/3/2004 
Russia 9/3/2004 0 1 3/3/2005  
Russia 4/22/1998 0 1 7/21/1998  
Russia 10/31/1996 0 1 11/30/1996  
Rwanda 1/19/2002 0 1 7/17/2002  
Rwanda 11/9/2001 0 1 3/18/2002 9/19/2001 
Rwanda 9/19/2001 0 1 3/18/2002 6/20/2001 
Rwanda 6/20/2001 0 1 9/18/2001 5/23/2001 
Rwanda 5/23/2001 0 1 6/22/2001  
Rwanda 3/19/1999 1 0  5/1/1998 
Rwanda 5/1/1998 1 0  2/14/1997 
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Rwanda 2/14/1997 1 0  9/12/1995 
Rwanda 9/12/1995 1 0  8/4/1994 
Saudi Arabia 8/8/2014 1 0  2/11/2014 
Saudi Arabia 2/11/2014 1 0  7/25/2013 
Saudi Arabia 7/25/2013 1 0  5/18/2012 
Saudi Arabia 11/19/2012 1 0  5/18/2012 
Saudi Arabia 5/18/2012 1 0  8/5/2011 
Saudi Arabia 8/5/2011 1 0  12/23/2010 
Saudi Arabia 12/23/2010 1 0  2/18/2010 
Saudi Arabia 2/18/2010 1 0  6/26/2009 
Saudi Arabia 11/5/2009 0 1 12/15/2009  
Saudi Arabia 6/26/2009 1 0  3/4/2009 
Saudi Arabia 3/4/2009 1 0  3/4/2009 
Saudi Arabia 12/19/2006 1 0  6/23/2006 
Saudi Arabia 6/23/2006 1 0  12/23/2005 
Saudi Arabia 5/17/2005 1 0  12/7/2004 
Saudi Arabia 12/7/2004 1 0  10/27/2004 
Saudi Arabia 10/27/2004 1 0  8/12/2004 
Saudi Arabia 8/12/2004 1 0  6/23/2004 
Saudi Arabia 6/23/2004 1 0  6/17/2004 
Saudi Arabia 2/20/2004 1 0  12/17/2003 
Saudi Arabia 12/17/2003 1 0   
Saudi Arabia 5/13/2003 1 0  5/1/2003 
Saudi Arabia 2/12/2003 1 0  1/30/2003 
Saudi Arabia 1/30/2003 1 0   
Saudi Arabia 10/6/1998 0 1 1/6/1999  
Saudi Arabia 2/25/1997 0 1   
Saudi Arabia 11/5/1996 0 1 11/30/1996  
Saudi Arabia 7/22/1996 0 1   
Saudi Arabia 7/10/1996 0 1  6/26/1996 
Senegal 12/12/2011 0 1 3/2/2012  
Senegal 11/22/1996 0 1 12/9/1996  
Serbia and 
Montenegro 9/29/1999 1 0  8/6/1999 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 11/25/1998 1 0  10/27/1998 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 3/3/1998 0 1 5/31/1998  
Serbia and 
Montenegro 1/31/1997 0 1 2/28/1997  
Sierra Leone 8/14/2014 1 0   
Sierra Leone 8/20/2001 1 0  8/4/2000 
Sierra Leone 9/16/1999 1 0  12/24/1998 
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Sierra Leone 12/24/1998 1 0  7/14/1998 
Sierra Leone 6/1/1997 1 0  2/1/1995 
Sierra Leone 2/1/1995 1 0   
Solomon 
Islands 10/27/2003 0 1 4/9/2004 9/8/2003 
Solomon 
Islands 3/17/2003 0 1 9/14/2003 12/20/2002 
Solomon 
Islands 12/20/2002 0 1 3/19/2003  
Solomon 
Islands 11/8/2001 1 0  5/1/2001 
Solomon 
Islands 5/1/2001 1 0  2/27/2001 
Solomon 
Islands 2/27/2001 1 0  11/3/2000 
Solomon 
Islands 9/22/1999 0 1 12/22/1999  
Somalia 10/24/2014 1 0  2/7/2014 
Somalia 2/7/2014 1 0  6/21/2013 
Somalia 6/21/2013 1 0  12/26/2012 
Somalia 12/26/2012 1 0  6/15/2012 
Somalia 6/15/2012 1 0  8/19/2011 
Somalia 8/19/2011 1 0  12/27/2010 
Somalia 12/27/2010 1 0  12/31/2009 
Somalia 12/31/2009 1 0  11/15/2008 
Somalia 6/5/2006 1 0  7/21/2005 
Somalia 7/21/2005 1 0  12/14/2004 
Somalia 12/7/2004 1 0  6/7/2004 
Somalia 6/7/2004 1 0  6/2/2004 
Somalia 10/31/2003 1 0  3/4/2003 
Somalia 3/4/2003 1 0  8/23/2002 
Somalia 8/23/2002 1 0  2/16/2001 
Somalia 2/16/2001 1 0  2/16/2001 
Somalia 12/21/1999 1 0  7/14/1998 
Somalia 7/14/1998 1 0  6/28/1996 
Somalia 6/28/1996 1 0  4/26/1995 
South Africa 5/25/2010 0 1 7/31/2010  
South Africa 8/27/2001 0 1  9/22/2001 
Spain 4/5/2004 0 1 7/2/2004 3/12/2004 
Spain 3/12/2004 0 1 6/11/2004  
Sri Lanka 5/26/2010 1 0  11/19/2009 
Sri Lanka 11/19/2009 1 0  6/26/2009 
Sri Lanka 6/26/2009 1 0  12/22/2008 
Sri Lanka 11/19/2006 1 0   
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Sri Lanka 10/23/2006 1 0 4/19/2007  
Sri Lanka 8/15/2006 1 0 11/15/2006  
Sri Lanka 10/26/2001 0 1 1/22/2002  
Sri Lanka 7/24/2001 1 0  7/13/2001 
Sri Lanka 3/18/1999 0 1 9/30/1999  
Sri Lanka-
Maldives 12/26/2004 0 1 1/25/2005  
St Lucia 11/3/2010 0 1 12/1/2010  
Sudan 10/30/2014 1 0  4/10/2014 
Sudan 4/10/2014 1 0  10/11/2013 
Sudan 10/11/2013 1 0  4/16/2013 
Sudan 4/16/2013 1 0  3/13/2013 
Sudan 9/15/2012 1 0  9/7/2012 
Sudan 1/11/2012 1 0  6/22/2011 
Sudan 6/22/2011 1 0  1/7/2011 
Sudan 1/7/2011 1 0  10/1/2010 
Sudan 10/1/2010 1 0  12/31/2009 
Sudan 12/31/2009 1 0  4/8/2009 
Sudan 4/8/2009 1 0  3/9/2009 
Sudan 3/9/2009 1 0  2/26/2009 
Sudan 10/5/2006 1 0  8/31/2006 
Sudan 8/31/2006 1 0  2/6/2006 
Sudan 2/6/2006 1 0  8/5/2005 
Sudan 8/5/2005 1 0  12/14/2004 
Sudan 6/30/2004 1 0  11/14/2003 
Sudan 11/14/2003 1 0  3/26/2003 
Sudan 3/26/2003 1 0  7/9/2002 
Sudan 7/9/2002 1 0  10/5/2001 
Sudan 10/5/2001 1 0  12/12/2000 
Sudan 8/22/2001 0 1 10/21/2001 12/12/2000 
Sudan 12/14/1999 1 0  7/29/1999 
Sudan 7/28/1999 1 0  7/28/1999 
Sudan 8/21/1998 1 0  1/31/1996 
Sudan 1/31/1996 1 0  1/30/1995 
Swaziland 1/31/1997 0 1 2/28/1997  
Syria 11/12/2014 1 0  5/5/2014 
Syria 5/5/2014 1 0  10/7/2013 
Syria 10/7/2013 1 0  3/1/2013 
Syria 3/1/2013 1 0  8/28/2012 
Syria 8/28/2012 1 0  8/1/2012 
Syria 7/27/2012 1 0  3/6/2012 
Syria 3/6/2012 1 0  3/6/2012 
Syria 1/11/2012 1 0  12/21/2011 
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Syria 12/21/2011 1 0  9/30/2011 
Syria 9/30/2011 1 0  9/30/2011 
Syria 9/15/2011 1 0  8/5/2011 
Syria 8/5/2011 1 0  4/25/2011 
Syria 4/25/2011 1 0  4/4/2011 
Syria 3/24/2011 0 1 6/24/2011  
Syria 2/12/2009 1 0  4/15/2008 
Syria 9/14/2006 1 0   
Syria 3/16/2003 1 0  2/7/2003 
Tajikistan 1/14/2005 0 1 8/12/2005 7/19/2004 
Tajikistan 7/19/2004 0 1 1/18/2005 1/20/2004 
Tajikistan 1/20/2004 0 1 7/19/2004 12/20/2002 
Tajikistan 12/20/2002 1 0  9/25/2001 
Tajikistan 12/2/2002 1 0   
Tajikistan 9/26/2001 1 0  6/29/2001 
Tajikistan 6/29/2001 1 0  5/29/2001 
Tajikistan 9/25/1998 1 0  3/13/1998 
Tajikistan 3/13/1998 1 0  2/25/1998 
Tajikistan 11/25/1997 1 0  10/21/1997 
Tajikistan 2/21/1997 1 0  2/13/1997 
Tanzania 10/15/2009 0 1 2/15/2010 8/28/2009 
Tanzania 8/28/2009 0 1 12/20/2009  
Tanzania 10/5/2005 0 1 11/30/2005  
Tanzania 1/10/2003 0 1  5/12/2003 
Tanzania 1/18/2001 0 1 4/18/2001  
Tanzania 2/18/1998 0 1 2/18/1998  
Thailand 6/20/2014 0 1 8/21/2014 5/28/2014 
Thailand 5/28/2014 0 1 8/21/2014 5/23/2014 
Thailand 2/14/2014 0 1 5/19/2014 1/19/2014 
Thailand 11/16/2011 0 1 2/14/2012 10/27/2011 
Thailand 10/27/2011 0 1 1/26/2012  
Thailand 5/27/2010 1 0  5/15/2010 
Thailand 4/22/2010 0 1 7/22/2010 4/12/2010 
Thailand 9/20/2006 0 1 12/19/2006  
Thailand 1/12/2005 0 1 2/6/2005  
Thailand 12/26/2004 0 1 1/25/2005  
Thailand 4/8/2004 0 1 7/6/2004  
Thailand 2/15/2001 0 1 4/15/2001  
Timor-Leste 11/1/2006 1 0  7/18/2006 
Timor-Leste 7/18/2006 1 0  5/30/2006 
Timor-Leste 5/30/2006 1 0  5/24/2006 
Timor-Leste 9/12/2003 0 1   
Timor-Leste 5/14/2003 0 1   
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Timor-Leste 12/9/2002 0 1 6/23/2003 10/23/2002 
Timor-Leste 10/23/2002 0 1 4/17/2003 6/28/2002 
Timor-Leste 6/28/2002 0 1 12/6/2002 3/29/2002 
Timor-Leste 3/29/2002 0 1 6/30/2002 3/31/2002 
Timor-Leste 10/22/2001 0 1 3/31/2002 8/8/2001 
Timor-Leste 8/8/2001 0 1 12/5/2001 8/11/2001 
Timor-Leste 3/7/2001 0 1 7/11/2001 11/3/2000 
Togo 4/26/2005 1 0  4/22/2005 
Togo 4/10/1998 0 1 7/10/1998  
Tonga 11/17/2006 0 1 3/17/2007  
Tunisia 10/4/2013 1 0  3/13/2013 
Tunisia 3/13/2013 1 0  10/19/2012 
Tunisia 10/19/2012 1 0  9/15/2012 
Tunisia 9/15/2012 1 0   
Tunisia 4/17/2012 1 0 6/30/2012 1/13/2012 
Tunisia 1/13/2012 1 0 4/12/2012 10/5/2011 
Tunisia 7/8/2011 0 1 10/8/2011 4/11/2011 
Tunisia 4/11/2011 0 1 7/9/2011 3/10/2011 
Tunisia 3/10/2011 0 1 4/9/2011 2/18/2011 
Tunisia 2/18/2011 0 1 3/10/2011 2/9/2011 
Tunisia 1/28/2011 0 1 2/28/2011 1/16/2011 
Tunisia 4/11/2010 0 1   
Tunisia 4/19/2005 0 1 7/19/2005  
Turkey 9/6/2013 1 0   
Turkey 6/4/2013 0 1 7/5/2013  
Turkey 3/19/2010 0 1 4/30/2010 3/19/2010 
Turkey 8/29/2006 0 1 11/1/2006  
Turkey 4/17/2006 0 1 5/16/2006 3/31/2006 
Turkey 5/27/2004 0 1 7/6/2004  
Turkey 11/20/2003 1 0   
Turkey 3/19/2003 1 0  3/17/2003 
Turkmenistan 12/23/2002 0 1 3/28/2003  
Turkmenistan 9/12/2002 0 1 12/13/2002 3/15/2002 
Turkmenistan 3/15/2002 0 1 9/14/2002 11/19/2001 
Turkmenistan 11/16/2001 0 1 3/14/2002 11/7/2001 
Turkmenistan 9/19/2001 1 0   
Turks and 
Caicos 8/23/2011 1 0   
Turks and 
Caicos 9/17/2004 1 0 10/7/2004 9/1/2004 
Uganda 1/24/2011 0 1 4/18/2011  
Uganda 7/16/2010 0 1 8/15/2010  
Uganda 9/11/2009 0 1 11/10/2009  
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Uganda 3/3/2006 0 1 5/16/2006 11/14/2005 
Uganda 11/14/2005 0 1 2/10/2006  
Uganda 9/7/2001 0 1 12/6/2001 6/1/2001 
Uganda 6/1/2001 0 1 9/4/2001 3/27/2001 
Uganda 3/27/2001 0 1 6/27/2001  
Uganda 3/9/2001 0 1 4/10/2001  
Uganda 4/10/1998 0 1 7/9/1998  
Ukraine 8/29/2014 1 0  8/1/2014 
Ukraine 6/5/2014 1 0  5/8/2014 
Ukraine 5/8/2014 1 0  4/16/2014 
Ukraine 4/16/2014 1 0  3/21/2014 
Ukraine 3/21/2014 1 0  3/7/2014 
United Arab 
Emirates 3/10/2003 1 0   
United 
Kingdom 6/28/2001 0 1 8/30/2001  
United 
Kingdom 4/27/2001 0 1 6/30/2001 3/15/2001 
United 
Kingdom 3/15/2001 0 1 5/30/2001 3/7/2001 
United 
Kingdom 3/7/2001 0 1 5/30/2001  
United 
Kingdom  1/31/2011 0 1 4/30/2011  
United 
Kingdom  8/3/2005 0 1 11/3/2005  
Uzbekistan 4/25/2011 1 0  7/22/2010 
Uzbekistan 7/22/2010 1 0  7/16/2009 
Uzbekistan 6/16/2009 1 0  7/3/2008 
Uzbekistan 10/4/2006 1 0  4/7/2006 
Uzbekistan 4/7/2006 1 0  7/1/2005 
Uzbekistan 11/4/2005 0 1 5/4/2005 8/24/2004 
Uzbekistan 7/1/2005 1 0  6/2/2005 
Uzbekistan 6/2/2005 1 0  5/27/2005 
Uzbekistan 11/4/2004 0 1 5/4/2005 8/24/2004 
Uzbekistan 8/24/2004 0 1 2/23/2005 8/3/2004 
Uzbekistan 3/30/2004 0 1 9/29/2004 12/17/2003 
Uzbekistan 12/17/2003 0 1 6/17/2004 9/29/2003 
Uzbekistan 4/5/2003 0 1 10/1/2003 7/23/2002 
Uzbekistan 10/31/2002 0 1 4/28/2003 7/23/2002 
Uzbekistan 7/23/2002 0 1 10/31/2002 1/8/2002 
Uzbekistan 1/8/2002 0 1 7/8/2002 9/22/2001 
Uzbekistan 9/22/2001 1 0 1/8/2002  
Venezuela 12/11/2014 1 0  6/4/2014 
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Venezuela 6/4/2014 1 0  11/22/2013 
Venezuela 11/22/2013 1 0   
Venezuela 5/25/2006 0 1 12/5/2006 1/11/2006 
Venezuela 1/11/2006 0 1 6/5/2006  
Venezuela 2/11/2005 0 1 3/10/2005  
Venezuela 8/11/2004 0 1 11/15/2004 6/4/2004 
Venezuela 6/4/2004 0 1 8/24/2004 3/10/2004 
Venezuela 2/27/2004 0 1 5/25/2004 2/11/2004 
Venezuela 8/15/2003 0 1 2/28/2004  
Venezuela 2/19/2003 1 0  12/10/2002 
Venezuela 12/20/2002 1 0  12/10/2002 
Venezuela 6/10/2002 0 1 10/10/2002 5/16/2002 
Venezuela 12/3/2001 0 1 1/10/2002  
Vietnam 4/24/2003 1 0  3/22/2003 
Vietnam 3/22/2003 1 0  3/21/2003 
Vietnam 2/12/2001 0 1 4/8/2001  
Yemen 9/25/2014 1 0  7/21/2014 
Yemen 1/29/2014 1 0  8/6/2013 
Yemen 8/6/2013 1 0  7/16/2013 
Yemen 11/19/2012 1 0  3/27/2012 
Yemen 3/27/2012 1 0  9/2/2011 
Yemen 9/2/2011 1 0  5/25/2011 
Yemen 5/25/2011 1 0  3/6/2011 
Yemen 3/6/2011 1 0  10/15/2010 
Yemen 10/15/2010 1 0  2/25/2010 
Yemen 2/25/2010 1 0  6/26/2009 
Yemen 6/26/2009 1 0  4/24/2009 
Yemen 4/24/2009 1 0  3/24/2009 
Yemen 10/13/2006 1 0  4/13/2006 
Yemen 4/13/2006 1 0  10/28/2005 
Yemen 10/28/2005 1 0  5/6/2005 
Yemen 5/6/2005 1 0  4/8/2005 
Yemen 11/16/2004 1 0  5/11/2004 
Yemen 5/11/2004 1 0  8/20/2003 
Yemen 8/20/2003 1 0  5/23/2003 
Yemen 5/23/2003 1 0  3/28/2003 
Yemen 3/28/2003 1 0  11/30/2002 
Yemen 3/18/2002 1 0  3/18/2002 
Yemen 12/3/2001 1 0  9/19/2001 
Yemen 9/19/2001 1 0  8/7/2001 
Yemen 8/7/2001 1 0  6/9/2001 
Yemen 1/28/1999 1 0  12/30/1998 
Zambia 8/11/2011 0 1 10/15/2011  
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Zambia 11/1/1996 0 1 11/30/1996  
Zimbabwe 11/14/2005 1 0  3/16/2005 
Zimbabwe 3/16/2005 1 0  7/2/2004 
Zimbabwe 7/2/2004 1 0  1/22/2004 
Zimbabwe 1/22/2004 1 0  1/27/2003 
Zimbabwe 1/27/2003 1 0   
Zimbabwe 1/23/2002 0 1 3/31/2002  
Zimbabwe 4/30/2001 0 1 7/31/2001  
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programming, passport fair, President’s Reception for International Community, 
UNLV recruitment events, etc.) 
• Peace Corps liaison 
• Act for director in her absence 
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Coordinator, Program for International Education and Training 
July 2003 – June 2008 
Office of International Programs, University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
• Create, market, and teach programs in cross-cultural communication, cultural 
awareness, culture/reverse culture shock, and cultural sensitivity/diversity for 
public and private organizations in Las Vegas/Southern Nevada 
• Study abroad advising 
• International visa acquisition advising  
• Design and lead pre-departure study abroad orientation curriculum 
• Event programming (including International Education Week, guest lectures, 
Passport Day, & returned student programs) 
• Advise/coach for nationally competitive scholarships (Boren, Gilman, Freeman, 
etc.) 
• Peace Corps liaison 
• National Student Exchange (NSE) advising 
 
Resident Program Coordinator  
May 2002 – May 2003 
University Studies Abroad Consortium, University of Alicante, Spain 
• Assistant to Resident Program Director at study abroad site for university-level 
students at the University of Alicante in Spain 
• Student support liaison 
• Coordinate cultural excursions 
• Interpret for student medical visits  
• Create and manage an organized office 
• Work with University of Alicante’s support staff to arrange student housing, 
process course registration, complete in-country visa process, and prepare for 
students’ arrival 
 
Assistant to Director and Office Manager 
May 2001 – May 2002 
University Studies Abroad Consortium, University of Nevada, Reno  
• Coordinate cooperative agreement and contract processes between the 
Consortium and international member universities, working closely with 
international consulates in the U.S. to facilitate work visa and student visa 
processing for international visitors and to certify legal procedures 
• Serve as liaison and host to visiting international dignitaries, university officials, 
and faculty 
• Coordinate administrative reorganization of Consortium policies, procedures, and 
records 
• Human Resources: process hiring contracts, personnel paperwork, serve as leave 
keeper for 30+ employees, etc. 
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• Draft correspondence for director 
 
Translator/Interpreter  
Fall 2000 – spring 2001 
Northern Nevada International Center, University of Nevada, Reno 
• Translated documents and interpreted between English and Spanish 
 
Research Interests 
• International education policy and practice, public policy, student immigration, 
public diplomacy and soft power, foreign policy, and qualitative methods. 
 
Awards 
• Fulbright Scholarship: International Education Administrator Program Award to 
Japan (short term), June 2015 
• Outstanding Service to International Education Award, NAFSA: Region XII, 
2014 
 
Conference Participation  
Conference Sessions Presented 
• Study Abroad and Its Importance to Your Institution, NAFSA Region XII 
Conference, 2015, Chair and Presenter 
• Federal Resources for Health and Safety in Study Abroad, NAFSA Biregional 
Region I and XII Conference, 2014, Chair and Presenter 
• Strategies for Difficult Student Meetings for Education Abroad and International 
Student Advisors, NAFSA National Annual Conference, 2014, Chair and 
Presenter 
• International Education as a Foreign Policy Tool, Southwest Social Science 
Association  Annual Conference, 2014, Presented Academic Paper 
• Process Management in Study Abroad, NAFSA Region XII Conference, 2013, 
Presenter 
• Difficult Student Meetings, NAFSA Region XII Conference, 2012, Chair and 
Presenter 
• Study Abroad Advising 101: “Do I need a visa if I have a MasterCard?”, NAFSA 
Regions I and XII Bi-regional Conference, 2011, Chair and Presenter 
• Toolbox for Creating a Pre-Departure Orientation, NAFSA Region XII 
Conference, 2010, Chair and Presenter 
• Opportunity Cost of Study Abroad, NAFSA National Annual Conference, 2009, 
Presenter 
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Service 
Professional Service 
 
NAFSA: Association of International Educators  
• Chair, Regional Affairs Committee (RAC), NAFSA, 2015 
• Chair Designate, Regional Affairs Committee (RAC), NAFSA, 2014 
• Past Chair, Region XII and Member of Regional Affairs Committee (RAC), 2013 
• Chair, Region XII, 2012 
• Chair-elect, Region XII, 2011 
• Treasurer, Region XII, 2008-2010 
• Nevada Representative, Region XII, 2006-2007 
• Conference Registrar, Region XII, 2006 Conference 
 
University Service 
UNLV 
• Member, Advisory Committee to Vice President for Diversity, 2012 to 2014 
• Member, Non-Traditional Student Scholarship Committee, 2006 to present 
• Faculty Advisor, Spectrum, 2008 to 2013 
• Trainer, Human Resources Staff Development Workshop: Cross Cultural 
Competency, 2004 to 2013 (taught each semester) 
• Trainer, Human Resources Staff Development Workshop: No Fear Less Gear—
How to Travel the World, 2008 to 2013 (taught annually) 
• Women’s Center Scholarship Committee, 2007-08, 2013 
• Chair and member of multiple candidate search committees 
 
Other Presentations 
• NAFSA webinar presenter: Interpreting and Responding to Travel Warnings in 
Education Abroad, February 2016 
• Gilman Scholarship: Tips for Advising and Outreach, webinar presenter, 
University Studies Abroad Consortium (USAC), summer 2015 
• Gilman Scholarship: Tips for Advising and Outreach, lead webinar presenter for 
the Gilman Scholarship Program, Institute of International Education, January 
2015 
 
Languages  
 
English: native language; Spanish: fluent 
